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Abstract 
The arm's-length principle (ALP), the transactions taken place between unrelated 
parties acting at an arm's length in competitive markets, is used by income tax 
authorities to determine transfer pricing, the pricing of goods, services and intangibles 
transferred between affiliates of a multinational enterprise (MNE), and is an important 
international tax issue for a number of reasons. First, globalization creates integrated 
businesses with enormous cross-border transfers whilst corporate income tax systems 
remain nationally based. Second, governments insist that globalization provides 
MNEs with more opportunities to manipulate transfer prices and reduce taxes than in 
the past, thus the need for tighter regulation. Third, there is an increased desire 
amongst tax authorities faced with tight fiscal situations, to protect and enhance their 
revenue base encouraging stricter regulation of MNEs. 
Profit is seen as only one of the many goals that motivate the behaviour of MNEs and 
the newly introduced profit based methods of transfer pricing has increased the 
reliance on comparables significantly. As the number of specified methods was 
increased and the hierarchy of acceptable methods was replaced by either the best 
method rule or the method of last resort, taxpayers are expected to document their 
transfer pricing policies. The documentation has to be contemporaneous and 
available upon request. The methods newly introduced by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD, 1995), Transaction Net Margin 
Method (TNMM), and US Internal Revenue Service's (IRS, 1994) Comparable Profit 
Method (CPM), vary in relation to their application and views in controlling for 
function and risk when developing comparables. This suggests a degree of discretion 
may be exercised under different regulations that may be detected through ownership 
and tax. This study attempts to identify the level of discretion provided under both 
OECD (TNMM) and US IRS (CPM) methods. It is also tests the scope of ownership 
effect on the reported profit of Japanese-owned companies and US-owned companies 
compared to their UK counterparts. Finally this study examines whether the reported 
tax expense has changed subsequent to tax policy changes, specifically the latest UK 
transfer pricing regulations introduced in 1998 corporation tax self-assessment. 
The empirical analysis confirms differences between OECD and US IRS profit ranges 
and variations between different profit level indicators (PLIs). Foreign-owned 
iv 
Japanese and US companies are also found to exhibit low profitability compared to 
UK companies. This research discovered low performance among a high number of 
the Japanese-owned companies with operating losses when compared to their UK 
counterparts and offers evidence of the low tax expenses reported by foreign-owned 
Japanese companies. 
V 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Research Question 
1.1 Significance of the Issues 
The arm's-length principle (ALP) that is, the transactions taken place between 
unrelated' parties acting at an arm's length in competitive markets, is used by income 
tax authorities to determine the international transfer pricing (ITP), the pricing of 
goods, services and intangibles transferred between affiliates of a multinational 
enterprise (MNE). This is the single "most difficult area of international taxation" and 
"the biggest international tax issue MNEs will face over the next two years", 
according to a survey of more than 450 multinational parent and subsidiaries (Ernst & 
Young, 1997). There are three reasons why transfer pricing has become such an 
important international tax issue. 
First, globalization is creating integrated businesses with enormous cross-border 
transfers while corporate income tax systems remain nationally based. According to 
Minister Miyazawa, Japan's Minister of Finance, (1998), the size of world trade for 
one year as a whole is $11 trillion and in the early 1990s, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that more than 60 
percent of world trade took place within MNEs. That proportion is likely to increase 
with the large number of cross-border consolidations. As MNEs globalize and create 
elaborate commercial partnerships, governments and fiscal authorities must create a 
new global framework and tools for managing this vast world commerce. The subject 
of transfer pricing has therefore gained increasing importance. 
Second, governments argue that globalization provides MNEs with more 
opportunities to manipulate transfer prices and reduce taxes than in the past thus the 
need for tighter regulation. New legislation has been passed in many countries 
including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Korea, and the United 
Kingdom. The focus in most of these countries is on the need to document adherence 
to the arm's length principle and the threat of large penalties for failing to do so. This 
is particularly true in the UK where Inland Revenue (IR) introduced legislation in 
1998 to level the playing field through a new requirement to return profits calculated 
in accordance with the arm's length principle and with a penalty regime for those 
1 Under the 1998 UK new rules, any joint venture (related parties) in which the parties each have a 
minimum 40 percent of the relevant interests, rights, and powers in or over the joint venture will now 
have to ensure that all their dealings with the joint venture are at arm's length. 
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taxpayers that had been neglectful in doing so. The burden of proof of complying is 
finally on the taxpayer. 
Third, the increased desire of tax authorities, faced with tight fiscal situations, to 
protect and enhance their revenue base also encourages stricter regulation of MNEs. 
Thus, transfer pricing is a prime area for international conflict, which is only partially 
mitigated by double taxation agreements between jurisdictions. 
The rationale for transfer pricing regulation derives from the fact that multinational 
enterprises are integrated businesses. The primary objective of most MNEs (and 
possibly the reason for their existence as detailed in Chapter 2) remains profit 
maximization which can be achieved through their internal advantages, assets 
specificity, and cost advantages. Profit is seen as only one of the many goals that 
motivate the behaviour of companies and the aim to minimize global tax liability may 
not be a prime corporate objective. This study attempts to contribute to the debate on 
the objectives MNEs may follow. 
The typical MNE consists of several affiliated firms that are located in different 
countries, under common control of the parent firm and sharing common resources 
and goals. Each multinational must declare income and pay taxes in the various 
countries where its affiliates do business. The need to declare taxable income means 
that the MNE must allocate its expenditures and revenues among its various affiliates 
and set transfer prices for all intra-firm transactions in goods, services and intangibles. 
Since governments have the authority to tax entities on both the source principle (i. e., 
all income earned within a country's borders is taxable regardless of ownership) and 
the residence principle (i. e., all income earned by a country's residents is taxable 
regardless of where the income was earned), multinationals must follow the different 
and, most likely, conflicting corporate tax rules set down by both home and host 
governments. Thus, double taxation of MNE income is a real possibility. At the same 
time, MNEs can arbitrage the differences in national tax systems, through transfer 
price manipulation, to reduce their overall taxation burden. In order to prevent both 
double taxation and under-taxation of MNE income, tax authorities have developed 
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sophisticated transfer pricing and income allocation rules and procedures as part of 
their corporate income tax systems. 
The most common solution that national tax authorities have adopted to reduce 
transfer price manipulation is to develop specific legislation as part of the income tax 
regulations. Tax authorities require transfer prices to be set according to the arm's 
length principle. The OECD defines the arm's length principle; 
"Where conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in regard 
to their commercial relations, which cause those relations to differ from those 
which would, but for those conditions, have benefited/accrued to one of the 
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, the enterprise has not so 
benefited, then the outcome of those relations may be included in the profits of 
that enterprise and taxed accordingly" (OECD, 1995, para. 1.6). 
Essentially, the ALP asks an MNE the question as to what would the parties have 
done if they were unrelated. The answer can only be hypothetical since the affiliates 
of an MNE are by definition related to each other. The most feasible measure is a 
proxy done in either of two ways. The first approach is to make reference to a price 
for the same or similar product negotiated by two other unrelated parties under the 
same or similar circumstances (External Comparable). The second approach is to use 
the price for the same or similar product traded between one of the related parties and 
an unrelated third party under the same or comparable circumstances (Internal 
Comparable). Both approaches together are called the comparable uncontrolled price 
(CUP) method; mentioned in detail in Chapter 5, this is the method most highly 
recommended by tax officials. The problem is that often neither approach can be used 
in practice because there are often specific services and unique goods where no real 
comparable transactions are available. In these cases, tax authorities must rely on 
other methods to determine the arm's length price such as the latest profit based 
methods as explained in Chapter 5. 
As comparables can be either comparable transactions or comparable companies, the 
reliance on comparable companies has increased significantly due to the introduction 
of profit based methods. The introduction of profit based methods in the US was 
mainly due to the increase in the number of transactions amongst national affiliates of 
MNEs which typically involve pricing unique products or services, thus rendering 
arm's length transactions unidentifiable. By default, "fourth" methods were widely 
3 
applied in actual cases, but with no regulatory guidance as to which specific methods 
were or were not appropriate (Cole, 1999). 
In 1994, the US Treasury was the world's most active innovator and developer of 
transfer pricing policy (Eden, 2001), and introduced the Comparable Profits Method 
(CPM). In the final 1994 Section 482 regulations, the numbers of specified methods 
were increased and the earlier hierarchy of acceptable methods was replaced by the 
best method rule, requiring the taxpayer to select the best method based on the facts 
and circumstances of the case. Taxpayers are expected to document their transfer 
pricing policies; the documentation has to be contemporaneous and available to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) upon request. The final IRS regulations, when 
compared with the earlier proposed and temporary regulations, are seen as a 
substantial retreat by the United States from any potential departure from ALP (Eden, 
2001). Across the Atlantic, the OECD after twice criticizing the US changes, spent 
three years rewriting its own transfer pricing guidelines. The new guidelines (OECD, 
1995) clearly show the stamp of the US 482 regulations; for example, they include a 
version of CPM called the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM). This major 
change is referred to as "transactional profit methods". OECD Guidelines recognize 
that, "The transactional net margin method may afford a practical solution to 
otherwise insoluble transfer pricing problems if it is used sensibly and with 
appropriate adjustments to account for differences" (OECD, 1995, para. 3.39). 
OECD Guidelines recognize the following transfer pricing methods as potentially 
consistent with the arm's-length principle: the CUP method, the resale price method, 
the cost plus method, the profit split method, and the transactional net margin method. 
Under OECD guidelines, profit based methods are to be applied only if the traditional 
methods can not be used. Although this priority of methods was abandoned in US 
regulations, it is preserved in the Guidelines which describe the profit methods as 
methods "of last resort", to be applied only when the complexities of real life business 
situations place practical difficulties in the way of application of the traditional 
transaction methods (OECD, 1995, Chap. II, para. 2.49; Chap. III, 3.1). 
In spite of the cautions on the application of CPM set forth in the 1994 US IRS 
Regulations and the practical benefits in determining arm's length transfer prices in 
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actual cases, CPM has received a hostile response according to Horst (Cole, 1999) 
from many MNEs and foreign governments. Their objections to CPM reflect a 
perception that the US systematically uses Section 482 to overreach and subject to US 
tax income which belongs in other countries. On a theoretical level, they argue that 
CPM does not address transfer prices. Profitability is affected by many factors aside 
from transfer pricing and, therefore, CPM is out of place as a transfer pricing method. 
On a practical level, MNEs and foreign governments accuse CPM of permitting the 
use of comparables with only limited comparability to the tested party and being less 
than rigorous in requiring adjustments that could increase comparability. 
In October 1997, the UK's IR issued a consultative document, Modernization of the 
TP Legislation, which served as a basis for revamping the UK's cumbersome transfer 
pricing legislation. The document, which includes draft rules, applied from 1999, and 
was necessitated by the need to reform the system to fit into the new self-assessment 
regime operating for UK taxpayers and the increased level of cross-border intra-group 
trading by MNEs (Rolfe, 1997). In 1998 the Finance Act introduced a comprehensive 
modernization of the United Kingdom's transfer pricing legislation. These changes 
were part of a wider reform of the Corporation Tax regime, which included the 
introduction of self-assessment for companies. The document proposed to bring 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention directly into UK statutory rules. Thus, this research examines the profit 
based methods through OECD guidelines (adopted by the UK) and US IRS 
regulations. More analysis of the regulations is detailed in chapter 4. 
This research tests the degree of discretion provided under different regulations 
through the assessment of comparables relative to a sample of UK based enterprises. 
The introduction of profit based methods by the OECD and US IRS as well as the 
ownership effect on the reported profit level indicators (PLIs) and the latest UK 
regulatory requirements introduced as a part of corporation tax self-assessment (with 
contemporaneous documentation, burden on proof, and penalties) are examined to 
assist the search for comparables. 
The UK was chosen to investigate the application of transfer pricing regulations for a 
number of reasons. As most ITP studies are conducted in the US, there remains a 
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need for empirical studies to be conducted outside the US to expand current research 
since transfer pricing remains the most important international tax issue facing global 
companies (Ernst & Young, 1999). The UK is the focus of this research as it is an 
example of a country adopting OECD guidelines and therefore, provides a sound 
basis for evaluating OECD's TNMM. US IRS regulations are selected due to the lead 
of the US transfer pricing regulations model with its documentation requirements and 
penalties which have been adopted strictly by other tax authorities in the world 
economy (Ernst and Young, 2001). Studying the gap between the two major 
regulatory bodies (OECD's TNMM vs. US IRS' CPM) in relation to profit-based 
methods not only provides an evaluation and increased awareness of the actual 
differences but also prevents future conflicts as the EU Commission announces the 
establishment of EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum which is based on OECD 
guidelines (Tax Analysts, 2002). Providing an assessment of these differences might 
open new avenues towards a universal transfer pricing regulation structure or 
increased harmonisation. 
"This gesture toward the United States and international transfer pricing 
harmony was considerably weakened by designating TNMM last resort. " 
(Cole, 1999, pg. 9-32) 
1.2 The Comparables Focus 
This research focuses on both TNMM, adopted by OECD guidelines in 1995 and 
CPM, the US IRS transfer pricing methodology that approximates arm's length 
conditions when traditional transaction methods cannot be reliably applied. Since 
profit-based methods have been newly introduced as part of the acceptable transfer 
pricing methods, the relevance of testing the validity and reliability of these methods 
is essential if MNE discretion is to be curbed. 
"In early 1999 more foreign countries appear to be willing to use 
CPMlINMM than in 1995 when the OECD Guidelines were issued" (Cole, 
1999 pg. 9-37). 
The two methods of regulating transfer price are the OECD's TNMM and the US 
IRS's CPM. The OECD describes TNMM as computing the appropriate net profit on 
particular transactions or groups of transactions. TNMM is usually applied when 
comparing the net margin resulting from a group of related party transactions with the 
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net profit margins of independent companies that are engaged in broadly comparable 
transactions. Under CPM, the profitability of the user affiliate's closest competitor is 
used to compute a "normal" profit for the user affiliate. Essentially the principle 
underlying this arm's length return concept is that a user affiliate may earn the same 
return (or profitability) as a competitor. 
Due to the importance of 1995 OECD guidelines and 1994 US IRS regulations, this 
research highlights the major discrepancies in terms of acceptable ranges of ITP 
between the main regulatory bodies. By closely examining these two methods, this 
study attempts to answer several issues that arise as a result of the OECD's adoption 
of TNMM and the US IRS' adoption of CPM including, whether there are, in fact, 
substantial differences between TNMM and CPM; how TNMM and CPM is applied 
in practical situations; the relative strengths and weaknesses of TNMM and CPM; 
and, whether either or both "control" transfer pricing abuse and curb MNE discretion 
to a similar degree. This research stresses the importance of understanding and 
evaluating the applications of transfer pricing regulations, resulting in increased 
compliance on the part of MNEs and awareness by regulatory bodies. 
1.3 The Ownership Focus 
The growing internationalization of the world economy, spurred by the growth in 
numbers and size of domestic and foreign MNEs and in their intra-firm trade 
activities with their increased amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) worldwide 
and especially in the United States during the mid-1980s, was a cause of concern for 
the US Treasury in relation to transfer price manipulation. The new fear was that 
foreign MNEs, especially Japanese MNEs, were overinvoicing inbound transfers to 
their US affiliates and not paying US taxes (Eden, 1998). In response, US Congress 
passed several pieces of legislation setting out new procedures for ensuring 
compliance with the ALP. These included a variety of information and reporting 
requirements, an accuracy-related tax penalty for transfer pricing mis-valuations, and 
an Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) procedure (a mechanism whereby a taxpayer 
and the US IRS can voluntarily negotiate an agreed transfer pricing methodology that 
is binding on both parties for three years). The transfer pricing penalty (Section 6662) 
provoked the most negative response from business and other tax authorities; it was 
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widely perceived as a "big stick" designed to shift tax revenues from foreign tax 
authorities and MNEs to the IRS (Eden, 1998). 
The theories of MNEs (reviewed in Chapter 2) suggest that the main pre-condition for 
the spread of FDI is the ability of a company to internalize certain advantage(s), carry 
them across national borders and transfer them into profits that are over and above 
those indigenous companies in the host country can make. This higher return is 
necessary to compensate the foreign MNE for developing, internalizing and 
transporting the advantage(s). The theory therefore supports higher levels of 
performance by foreign-owned subsidiaries in their foreign operations. Previous 
research (detailed in Chapter 3) suggests that non-compliance with the regulations 
exists among MNEs, particularly on the part of foreign companies and in the US. For 
example, the return on assets ratio of domestic-owned companies is six times larger 
than those of foreign-owned companies (Wheeler, 1988) and profits of foreign-owned 
companies are significantly lower than domestic-owned companies (Crain and Stiffs, 
1994). Thus, the second part of this research attempts to examine whether behaviours 
of foreign-owned companies differ from domestic companies. Previous research 
undertaken by academics (Harris, 1993) and practitioners (Ernst & Young, 2001) 
confirm that the majority of MNEs fear ITP audits, possibly due to non-compliance of 
arm's length pricing. 
This research also examines the extent to which ownership affects reported profit of 
foreign-owned companies in the UK. The research uses a representative sample of 
Japanese-owned companies and US-owned companies operating in the UK in order to 
test whether superior performance exists among foreign companies in the UK relative 
to UK indigenous companies. This provides an alternative empirical study to the US 
studies in the areas of income shifting and performance evaluation of foreign 
companies. 
Japanese-owned companies were selected as representative of foreign-owned 
companies operating in the UK as they play a leading role in international trade, and 
previous findings have suggested that Japanese-owned companies operating in the UK 
have lower profit performance (Munday and Peel, 1997). In addition, press reports 
have alleged the misuse of transfer pricing mechanisms by Japanese MNEs (Sunday 
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Times, 1992). Transfer pricing regulations used in Japan (issued in 1986 with minor 
updates in 2000) have not expressly adopted the arm's-length principle and have not 
been updated relative to the OECD or US IRS, thus, making Japanese-owned 
companies a good set for comparison due to their practices. In addition, Japan's 
unique business culture suggests preference in reporting profits and taxes from 
overseas operations in Japan (Buckley and Hughes, 1996). 
On the other hand, US-owned companies were chosen as representative of foreign- 
owned companies to provide another matched sample for UK-owned companies and 
to increase the validity of the comparison by comparing two sets rather than one as 
Japanese-owned and US-owned companies are capable of similar performance 
relative to the UK indigenous companies. US-owned companies were selected as the 
US IRS leads in transfer pricing regulation in the global market thereby possibly 
influencing the behavior of US-owned companies. Additionally, US MNEs are 
considered to be the most experienced in terms of compliance with current regulations 
(Section 482,1994). 
"Foreign authorities observing the United States enlarge its transfer pricing 
requirements and enforcement efforts are increasingly concerned that 
multinationals will overcorrect in favor of the United States. More generally, 
they are concerned about protecting their tax bases whether the related party is 
located in a low-tax or a high-tax jurisdiction. Hence, these countries are also 
strengthening their transfer pricing rules and stepping up their transfer pricing 
enforcement. Indeed, for many multinational groups, foreign transfer pricing 
enforcement has become more of a problem than US transfer pricing 
enforcement" (Cole, 1999 pg. 1-6). 
This research also examines the effect of the form of investment as an organizational 
factor influencing MNEs transfer pricing policies. Several empirical studies (Kim and 
Miller, 1979; Tang and Chan, 1979: Tang, 1981) rank the interests of local partners of 
a foreign subsidiary as an important variable in the non-abuse of transfer pricing. A 
local partner in a joint venture plays a monitoring role which might restrict the 
latitude of transfer pricing strategy practiced by the foreign investor (Lecraw, 1985; 
Emmanuel and Mehafdi, 1994). The influence of a local partner as a factor on transfer 
pricing decisions remains inconclusive and is difficult to generalize as it depends 
upon the management role of a local partner in the joint venture. Since the presence of 
local partners may motivate foreign investors to use transfer pricing to reduce IT? 
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abuse (reported profits) of the joint venture (Lall, 1973; Lyn et al., 1993; Emmanuel 
and Mehafdi, 1994), this research used a sample of Japanese-owned companies with a 
UK partner and US-owned companies with a UK partner compared with the UK 
companies with foreign partners. 
This research attempts to compare the performance of loss-making foreign-owned 
companies (companies with average operating losses) with domestic loss-making UK- 
companies. The shortage of loss-making company studies in the transfer pricing 
literature, the high number of loss making companies in the UK (especially Japanese 
-owned companies), and the elimination of loss-making companies in developing 
comparables by the regulatory bodies provides the impetus for this comparison. 
It was noted from the ITP literature that there were no studies that address the effects 
of the final UK tax regulations on transfer pricing and income shifting. One of the 
most important environmental factors on a company's transfer pricing policies is the 
tax and accounting rules changes (Business International Corporations and Ernst 
&Young, 1991). UK international tax rules are complex and this study supplements 
the body of knowledge in the area of international taxation. It attempts to identify 
changes in the patterns of reported tax by foreign-owned companies and UK-owned 
companies and to further establish if these changes can be attributed to transfer 
pricing strategies aimed to shift income out of the UK. 
This research examines whether the reported tax expense has changed subsequent to 
tax policy changes, specifically the UK 1998 transfer pricing regulatory requirements 
introduced as part of the corporation tax self-assessment. This research utilized the 
most recent data available to assess the effects of the 1998 UK transfer pricing 
regulations on foreign-owned companies. As the financial year ended 2000 was the 
most up-to-date for the sample data during the data collection period, the sample of 
foreign-owned companies (Japanese- and US-owned) and domestic UK companies 
are obtained using the years ended 1999 and 2000 to represent the period subsequent 
to the 1998 UK regulations and the years ended 1996 and 1997 to represent an 
equivalent two-year period prior to the 1998 UK regulations. 
The final portion of this research uses a sample of foreign-owned (Japanese- and US- 
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owned) and UK-owned companies to test the relative reported tax in order to obtain 
evidence, of the misuse of transfer pricing. This research endeavors to determine the 
impact, if any, of the latest 1998 UK corporation tax self-assessment on the tax 
expenses of both foreign-owned (Japanese- and US-owned) and UK-owned 
companies. 
While the first research question tests comparables in relation to profit-based TNMM 
and CPM methods, the remaining questions of this research investigate the 
comparability (differences, if any) between foreign-owned Japanese and US 
companies compared to their UK counterparts. With the existence of joint ventures 
and the large number of loss making companies among foreign-owned companies, it 
was necessary for this study to fill the gap in the literature and test the performance 
and comparability of entities with these features. The investigation of the latest 1998 
UK regulations and the tax expenses of foreign-owned companies was central to this 
research in order to explain the effects of the regulations on the profitability and 
comparability, and supply evidence (if any) of the reported tax. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Due to strict tax regulations which may adversely affect world trade, as well as 
uncertain and unclear ITP regulations which may reduce FDI's growth, the following 
research questions are stated as follows: 
Do OECD (TNMM) and US IRS (CPM) international transfer pricing (ITP) 
regulations, where applied, determine comparable sets of companies that justify the 
arm's length principle? Do companies (both profit- and loss-making) of different 
countries of ownership display different patterns of performance as measured by a 
wide range of profit level indicators? Do companies of different countries of 
ownership report different amounts of tax and, if so, what are the effects of the 1998 
UK transfer pricing regulations (corporation tax self-assessment) on the patterns of 
reported tax by companies of different ownership? 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
The following chapter of this dissertation covers the theories of FDI and MNEs in 
order to highlight the link between FDI theories and the performance of foreign 
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subsidiaries. In addition, Chapter 2 also provides a theoretical understanding of 
comparables. Chapter 3 presents the literature review as well as income shifting 
studies in order to note scarcity of similar studies, limitations of previous empirical 
studies, and the various focuses of previous work. Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
discusses the importance of ITP and ITP regulations and summarizes the methods 
adopted by different countries. Chapter 5 focuses on whether different comparable 
methods (TNMM and CPM) reflect functions and risks differences, stressing the 
importance of research design. Chapters 6 and 7 dealing with methodology and 
analysis highlight the research design used by this research, the method adopted, and 
the various stages of the analysis that satisfy the research questions. Finally, Chapter 8 
summarizes the findings, results, and possible areas of future research, as well as 
discuses the limitations and the implications of this study. 
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Chapter 2 
FDI and Multinationals Theories 
2.1 Introduction 
It is commonly observed that as companies grow in size and complexity, they tend 
towards a decentralized organization comprising several divisions. As the volume of 
divisionalized global trade expands and these companies increasingly dominate the 
world economy, the importance of transfer pricing increases. An examination of 
some of the existing theories of the growth of the MNE may help to clarify the 
important areas of choice of asset utilization, location of operations, and cost 
allocation policies. These theories suggest that FDI is motivated by internal 
economies and resources plus highly imperfect external markets. Hence, foreign 
comparable companies, according to the FDI theories, expect to report greater 
performance (profits) compared to their indigenous counterparts. 
Although the primary objective of most companies remains profit maximization, a 
criticism of this objective is that the centrality of emphasis on profit maximization 
makes it deficient and unrealistic. Profit is seen as only one of the many goals that 
motivate the behavior of companies. 
The importance of these theories was furthered when regulators realized the typical 
difficulties of obtaining an arm's length transaction and introduced the latest profit 
based methods as an acceptable method of determining transfer pricing. The latest 
profit based methods allows the use of comparables profit to limit corporate 
discretion. 
Decentralization of operations and associated transfer prices and cost allocations has 
complicated the search for a theory of why companies expand to become MNEs. The 
trend toward decentralization within business organizations has increased the 
importance of appropriate accounting for internal transfers of goods and services, in 
part, to measure how well individual responsibility centers contribute to the goals of 
the company. On the other hand, literature suggested the contrary (Chapter Three 
provides a review of the evidence of low performance among MNEs). 
This chapter explains how MNEs are coordinated businesses engaged in formulating 
and implementing strategies at the global level and provides the theoretical 
justification for their existence. It is necessary to conclude from the following MNE 
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theories the expected performance of these entities to assess their comparability. 
2.2 Definitions 
The key concept in terms of understanding what MNEs are and why they exist is that 
the MNE is a multidivisional business. By definition, an MNE consists of two or more 
firms under common control, with a common pool of resources and common goals, 
where the units of the enterprise are located in more than one country (Eden, 1994). 
Other definitions have described MNEs as "a company that has at least one division in 
a foreign country" (Tang, 1981, pg. 7), and "any firm which performs its main 
operations, either manufacture or the production of service, in at least two countries" 
(Brooke and Remmer, 1970, pg. 5) to "firms with manufacturing subsidiaries in six or 
more nations" (Vernon, 1971). Disagreements abound over the exact number of 
foreign locations of operation that will qualify a firm to be referred to as an MNE. 
Buckley and Casson (1976) avoided this debate by defining an MNE as "an enterprise 
which owns and controls activities in different countries" (pg. 1). The definition of an 
MNE cannot, however, be reduced to the location of its production facilities alone. 
According to Holland (1993), the MNE: 
1. operates within and between a spectra of differing political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural systems; 
2. trades within and across a number of product and factor markets, each 
displaying differing levels of efficiency and competition; 
3. resorts frequently to foreign exchange markets for a wide range of 
different currencies; and, 
4. accesses a broad range of regulated and unregulated domestic and 
international capital markets which display different levels of efficiency 
and integration (pg. 3). 
A definition of an MNE that involves three variables is as follows, 
1. location of production facilities - which should "be restricted to firms 
which operate in six or more foreign nations"; 
2. the foreign to total operations (FIT) ratio - which attempts to categorize 
firms by comparing the percentage of their sales or profits generated in, or 
assets or employees located on, foreign sites to the totals; and, 
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3. attitude of management - Perlmutter (1969) classified management views 
into: ethnocentric (portraying a home-country orientation by 
management); polycentric (reflecting an international outlook which 
however lacks systematic global integration); and geocentric (which not 
only thinks and operates on a worldwide basis, but also operationalizes a 
globally-integrated planning strategy) (Rugman et al, 1985). 
The definition of an MNE will, in most circumstances, depend on which of these three 
variables warrants greatest importance. By considering all variables, a more well 
rounded definition is attained. 
It is important to be able to distinguish the MNE from a number of similar looking 
forms of investment which include pure portfolio investments; multi-plant domestic 
operations; exporting and importing; licensing and technical agreements; and, 
uncontrolled foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Hood and Young (1979) provided descriptions on each of these close relations of the 
MNE. They appropriately concluded that: 
"The MNC represents the outworking of the FDI process ... (and) as with the 
multi-plant domestic operation... owns and controls production units in more 
than one location. On the other hand, the MNC's production units are 
operated in different nation states. Secondly, as with an exporting firm, the 
MNC sells goods across national boundaries. Conversely, unlike the 
exporting firm, the MNC also produces these goods outside its domestic 
location and moreover a large part of MNC exports may represent intra-group 
trade. Thirdly, like the national firm licensing foreign manufacturers, the 
MNC is involved in foreign production. But the multinational company owns 
and controls its manufacturing units located abroad, and this characteristic also 
clearly distinguishes the MNC from a basically national company with foreign 
portfolio holdings" (pg. 29). 
FDI involves the ownership (in part or whole) and management of a foreign operation 
established through the wholesale transfer of a package of production resources 
abroad. These transferred resources translate into foreign subsidiaries and may be 
formed either through the acquisition of existing local companies or in the form of 
new ventures. Whether a company is determined an MNE is dependent on its ability 
to originate and continuously perpetuate FDI. Various pieces of literature that discuss 
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FDI theories are equated to, and viewed as MNE theories (Rugman, 1980). A wide 
range of existing FDI and ITP theories are examined in the next section. 
2.3 FDI Theories 
2.3.1 Internalization Theory 
Internalization has been suggested in one form or another as an underlying reason for 
FDI but was only first developed as a theory in ints own right by Buckley and Casson 
(1976). Their original objective was to use the concept to develop a model of the 
growth of the firm. Their theory depends on the assumption of profit maximization, 
emphasizes very general forms of imperfect competition stemming from the costs of 
organizing markets, and concentrates on imperfections in intermediate product 
markets rather than in the final products markets (Buckley, 1989; pg. 78). 
Buckley and Casson criticized previous FDI theories as lacking in comprehensive 
theoretical base and failing to take into account the various other activities that MNEs 
engage in such as research and development (R&D), marketing and distribution, 
training and development, etc. These activities are linked to the physical production 
process and generate a flow of a series of intermediate products, which could be in the 
form of knowledge, information, human capital and other intangibles. With market 
imperfection even more pertinent in the market for these intermediate products than in 
final markets, a company will seek to maximize its returns on these intermediate 
products by internalizing. Internal transfer pricing, for example, was suggested as an 
internalization weapon for sidestepping government-imposed market barriers such as 
tax, tariff, etc. Since flows of knowledge are so difficult to value, they provide an 
excellent basis for the manipulation of transfer pricing. Substantial benefit is derived 
from the ability to minimize the impact of government intervention through the use of 
transfer prices (Buckley & Casson, 1976). Markets will be internalized when the 
transaction costs of overcoming market imperfections exceed the cost of internal 
corporate trading. 
The internalization theory rests on two axioms: 
1. companies will choose the least cost location for each activity they 
perform; and, 
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2. companies grow by internalizing to the point where the costs of before 
making a decision, firms consider explicitly the relative costs of 
servicing foreign markets in one (or any combination) of three ways: 
exporting, FDI or licensing. The method of servicing a market is 
predicted to fluctuate with the associated costs of implementing each 
strategy (Rugman, 1980). 
This internalization theory proposes that before FDI can proceed at all, the firm must 
possess some unique advantages obtained as "the rewards for past investments in (1) 
R&D facilities; (2) the creation of an integrated team of skills; and, (3) the creation of 
an information transmission network which not only allows the benefits of the first 
two advantages to be transmitted at low cost within the organization, but also protects 
such information from outsiders. " (Buckley and Casson, 1976, pg. 69). In essence, a 
company must not only possess unique advantages but also must be convinced in its 
economic calculations that it will be able to profitably exploit those advantages with 
minimal risk of dissipation. 
Rugman's (1980) and Rugman et al's (1985) approach are very similar to Buckley 
and Casson's. Progressing from a free trade assumption, they introduced market 
imperfection into the transfer pricing discussion and observed that MNEs are 
replacements for free trade when trade is impeded by market imperfections. Two sets 
of factors that account for FDI strategy were identified as a location-specific factors 
(environmental variables) and company-specific factors (internal variables). 
Location-specific factors are the economic and non-economic variables in a country's 
aggregate production function which include its political, cultural and social systems. 
They are exogenous parameters which the MNE cannot influence. Company-specific 
advantages on the other hand, are those internal advantages (such as knowledge, 
management, marketing, R&D and strategic planning skills, etc. ) possessed by MNEs 
which gives them a relative advantage over other firms. The MNE then needs to 
exercise proprietary rights over its company-specific advantages to maximize its 
worldwide income with minimal dissipation of this invaluable asset. Through 
internalization, the creation of an internal market allows a company to appropriate the 
returns from the advantage it generates. Internalization therefore is a rational 
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response to market imperfections in the pricing of MNEs' unique advantages. It is an 
economically efficient internal response to exogenous impediments to free trade and 
is far superior to other potential solutions such as licensing or patent rights as it gives 
the MNE the additional benefit of self-regulation and monitoring of its advantages. 
The development of internalization as a complete concept is a major breakthrough in 
the search for an FDI theory. Buckley and Casson were able to synthesize most 
previous theories of FDI and explain them relative to their own position. The overall 
effect is pervasive and most of the concepts that were developed afterwards have not 
been able to successfully eclipse Buckley and Casson's theory with the exception of 
Dunning's Eclectic OLI paradigm. 
2.3.2 Dunning's Eclectic OLI Paradigm 
According to Dunning's OLI paradigm, MNEs are the most successful form of 
business organization because of their ownership, locational, and internalization 
(OLI) advantages. The OLI paradigm, developed by John Dunning, provides a general 
explanation as to why firms engage in, and are successful at, international production. 
The model is formed from three basic approaches to the question of why MNEs exist 
and why they are relatively more successful than domestic firms: the location, 
ownership, and internalization approaches. 
Dunning based his model on several theories: 
1. industrial organization theory -- why international production takes place 
based on important ownership advantages (including technology, innovative 
capacity, and product differentiation). In the 1960s and 1970s, industrial 
organization theorists shifted the focus from a macro perspective on FDI to a 
micro perspective on the firm and its activities (the ownership approach). 
Industrial organization theorists argued that MNEs were generally found in 
oligopolistic markets, so that monopolistic advantages provided an 
explanation for MNEs (e. g., Hymer 1976). Another theory was that MNEs 
owned intangible assets on which they could earn additional profits if the 
assets were deployed in other countries (e. g., Caves 1971, Johnson 1970, 
Magee 1977); 
2. location theory -- why a company produces in a particular country. The 
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location theory also explains FDI in terms of differences in country 
endowments and characteristics. Explaining the FDI approach assumes that 
external markets are characterized by high transactions costs; and, 
3. firm theory and market failure theory -- which argue in favor of internalizing 
markets. Internalizing the market through a wholly owned foreign affiliate 
allows the firm to reduce transaction costs by creating an internal market to 
replace the imperfect external one. The internalization approach (e. g., 
Buckley and Casson 1976; Casson 1982; Rugman 1980,1981,1982,1986) 
dominated much of the FDI literature throughout the 1980s. 
Firm-Specific Advantages: 
An MNE operating a plant in a foreign country is faced with additional costs 
compared with a local competitor. The additional costs could be due to cultural, legal, 
institutional, and language differences; a lack of knowledge about local market 
conditions; and/or, the increased expense of communicating and operating at a 
distance. So if the MNE is to be profitable abroad it must have some advantages not 
shared by its competitors. These advantages must be, at least in part, specific to the 
firm and readily transferable within the firm and between countries. These advantages 
are called ownership or firm-specific advantages. The firm owns this advantage, it has 
a monopoly over its firm-specific advantages and can exploit them abroad resulting in 
a higher marginal return or lower marginal cost than its competitors, thus more profit. 
These advantages are internal to a specific firm and may include location-bound 
advantages (i. e., related to the home country, such as monopoly control over a local 
resource) or non-location-bound (e. g., technology, economies of scale and scope from 
simply being of large size). 
There are three basic types of ownership advantages for an MNE as follows: 
1. Knowledge/technology -- broadly defined to include all forms of innovative 
activity; 
2. Economies of large size (advantages of common governance) -- economies of 
scale and scope, economies of learning, broader access to financial capital 
throughout the MNE organization, and advantages from international 
diversification of assets and risks; and, 
3. Monopolistic advantages -- accrue to the MNE in the form of privileged 
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access to input and output markets through patent rights, ownership of scarce 
natural resources, and the like. 
As Dunning (1993) notes, some of these ownership advantages can be found with 
first-time overseas investments while others come from being an established affiliate 
in an MNE. Firm-specific advantages can change over time and will vary with the age 
and experience of the multinational. 
Country-Specific Advantages: 
A company must use some foreign factors in connection with its domestic firm- 
specific advantages in order to gain full value on these firm-specific advantages. 
Therefore, the location advantages of various countries are key in determining which 
will become host countries for the MNE. Clearly the relative attractiveness of 
different locations can change over time so that a host country can to some extent 
engineer its competitive advantage as a location for FDI. 
The country-specific advantages that influence where an MNE will invest can be 
broken into three categories: economic, social, and political. Economic advantages 
include the quantities and qualities of the factors of production, size, and scope of the 
market and transport and telecommunications costs. Social/cultural advantages 
include relative proximity between the home and host country, general attitude 
towards foreigners, language and cultural differences, and the overall stance towards 
free enterprise. Political country-specific advantages include the general and specific 
government policies that affect inward FDI flows, international production, and 
intrafirm trade. Attractive country-specific advantages for an MNE would include a 
large, growing, high-income market, low production costs, a large endowment of 
factors scarce in the home country, and an economy that is politically stable, 
welcomes FDI, and is culturally and geographically close to the home country. 
Internalization Advantages: 
The existence of a specialized knowledge or skill is an asset that can generate 
economic rents for a company. These rents can be earned by licensing the firm- 
specific advantages to another company, exporting products using this firm-specific 
advantage as an input, or setting up subsidiaries abroad. The ownership advantages of 
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MNEs thus explain why they go abroad, while the location advantages of countries 
explain where MNEs set up foreign subsidiaries. 
The OLI model argues that external, arm's length markets are either imperfect or in 
some cases nonexistent. As a result, the MNE can substitute its own internal market 
and reap some efficiency savings. A company could go abroad by simply exporting its 
products to foreign markets; however, uncertainty, search costs, and tariff barriers are 
additional costs that will deter such trade and possibly result in the loss of company 
specific advantages. 
The OLI model predicts that the hierarchy (the vertically or horizontally integrated 
company based on internal markets) is a superior method of organizing transactions 
than the market (trade between unrelated companies) whenever external markets are 
nonexistent or imperfect. The theory predicts that internalization advantages will lead 
the MNE to prefer wholly owned subsidiaries over minority ownership or arm's length 
transactions. It is therefore the internalization advantages, part of the OLI paradigm, 
that explain why MNEs are integrated businesses, are producing in several countries, 
and are using intrafirm trade to ship goods, services, and intangibles among their 
affiliates. 
In summary, the internalization part of the OLI paradigm therefore answers how an 
MNE goes abroad. The model predicts that the MNE will internalize markets in order 
to reduce natural market imperfections. 
2.3.2.1 Criticisms of Dunning's OLI Paradigm 
Critics of the OLI theory suggest that Dunning has underestimated the power of 
internalization theory for explaining MNEs. Teece (1982) addressed the issue of 
when internalization is most likely to be the most efficient way for an organization to 
conduct its economic activity. One of the benefits of dimensionalizing international 
trade is that "a contingency theory of the MNE (can be) developed" (pg. 52). Teece 
further explained FDI by distinguishing between production costs (associated with 
foreign production) and transactions/governance costs (associated with 
internalization). Analyzing the combination of the production cost function and the 
transactions cost function, Teece showed that there is a cost advantage favoring FDI 
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compared to licensing for horizontally integrated MNEs as technological complexity 
increases. Similarly for vertically integrated MNEs there is a cost advantage 
associated with internalization once the characteristics of an asset has reached a 
certain level of specificity. 
2.3.2.2 Implications of the Internalization Theory and Dunning's OLI Paradigm on 
ITP 
Within an MNE, FDI theory suggests that there will be internal transactions which 
cross international borders and have ITP consequences. An MNE can be assumed to 
have certain ownership advantages. In addition, it can be assumed from the statistics 
on FDI that MNEs prefer to internalize these ownership advantages. (The markets 
and hierarchies framework also lends some support to this assumption. ) Finally, 
either to gain proximity to a market and/or take advantage of market imperfections 
(Qian, 1996) a suitable location will be selected. It is these market imperfections 
which the FDI, coupled with appropriate ITP policies, seeks to exploit. 
Therefore, from a FDI viewpoint, MNEs seek to maximize location-specific 
advantages by taking advantage of government incentives and market imperfections. 
Consistent with this, ITP can be used as a mechanism for ensuring that the MNE is 
able to utilize these market imperfections (Leitch and Barrett, 1992). Dunning (1981) 
supported the link between ITP and internalization: 
"Government intervention ... encourages 
(MNEs) to internalize existing 
activities and to engage in new activities which offer the possibility of 
internalizing gain. Other things being equal, the more internal transactions the 
company engages in the greater its opportunity for doing this (manipulating 
transfer prices) - hence, in the case of and to practice product or process 
specialization within its organization" (pg. 31). 
There does appear to be strong support for the view that ITP is a means for ensuring 
that FDI market imperfections can be exploited. ITP cannot be based on the market 
as it is imperfect. Although the majority of empirical studies survey the relative 
importance of a set of factors on the transfer pricing decision, very few studies either 
justify how these factors were selected or anchor them in terms of market 
imperfections and FDI theory. 
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2.3.3 Porter's Competitive Strategy 
Porter (1985) stated that: "Competition is at the core of the success or failure of firms. 
Competition determines the appropriateness of a firm's activities that can contribute 
to its performance, such as innovations, a cohesive culture, or good implementation. 
Competitive strategy is the search for a favorable market position in an industry, the 
fundamental arena in which competition occurs. Competitive strategy aims to 
establish a profitable and sustainable position against the forces that determine 
industry competition. " (pg. 1) 
Porter proposed that competitive strategy is based on five competitive forces: the 
threat of new entrants; the threat of substitute products or services; the bargaining 
power of suppliers; the bargaining power of buyers; and, the rivalry among the 
existing competitors. 
Porter's competitive advantage determines the way in which firms position 
themselves in an industry. The two basic types of competitive advantage are lower 
cost and differentiation (provision of superior value to the buyer). Porter (1990) 
argued that the central task concerning competitive advantage in industries "is to 
explain why firms based in a nation are able to compete successfully against foreign 
rivals in particular segments and industries. Competing internationally may involve 
exports and/or locating some company activities abroad" (pg. 10). Porter further 
argued that "multinational status is a reflection of a company's ability to exploit 
strengths gained in one nation in order to establish a position in other nations" (pg. 
18). 
Porter further noted that the reason for industries globalizing is that "shifts in 
technology, buyer needs, government policy, or country infrastructure create major 
differences in competitive position among firms from different nations or make the 
advantages of a global strategy more significant" (pg. 63). The company can either 
generate competitive advantage by concentrating activities in one country and 
exporting, or it can disperse activities through a number of countries through the use 
of FDI. In turn, the decision to disperse activities will mean that transfer pricing is 
more influential within that company. Whenever a company has activities located in 
a number of different countries it must be able to coordinate these activities. 
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2.3.3.1 Criticism of Porter's Competitive Advantage Theory 
It is argued that the focus of strategy should not be on how to beat the competition but 
on how to create value for customers. A middle strategic course, between cost- 
leadership and up-market product differentiation, is consistent with the focus on the 
customer. Also, some believe that companies can successfully pursue cost leadership 
and product differentiation simultaneously (Ohmae, 1988). 
In addition, Porter's nation-state focus has been challenged. It has been argued that on 
a competitive map political boundaries have largely disappeared and the notion of 
national boundaries are becoming obsolete. It is further contended that the crucial 
question relevant to national competitiveness is where a company conducts its R&D 
and other technologically complex activities, and not where the company is 
headquartered or where a majority of its shareholders are domiciled (Reich, 1990). 
2.3.3.2 Implications of Competitive Advantage Theory for ITP 
Within the competitive advantage framework, Porter (1985) identified transfer pricing 
policies as one of the procedures used to govern cross-business unit activities. The 
framework identifies a particular role for transfer pricing systems: 
"Interrelationships imply that transfer pricing and other decisions should be 
designed to improve the firms' overall position and not the financial results of 
individual business units... Business unit goals also may need to be adjusted in 
order to make them consistent with transfer pricing rules" (pg. 404). 
2.3.4 Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
Transaction cost theory concentrates on the relative efficiency of different exchange 
processes. If internalization of one or more stages of production might generate 
savings on the costs for that company, it could lead also to transactional economies 
(savings on the cost of inputs) when reduced amounts of resources are required to get 
the intermediate inputs. 
A central hypothesis of transaction-cost theory is that interunit relationships in which 
supplier assets are specialized have lower transaction costs inside an organization than 
when the relationship occurs between organizations (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian. 
1978; Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Demsett, 1988). 
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Williamson (1985) identifies a number of types of asset specificity which involve 
investments in the transactions by one or both parties to the transaction. These 
include: (1) physical asset specificity resulting from investments in tangible assets, 
e. g. plant, equipment, tooling, dies, etc. that are more or less unique to this economic 
relationship; (2) human asset specificity resulting from investments in specialized 
training or specialized know-how gained through education or experience which is 
not easily transferred to other transactions; (3) site specificity which results from 
parties locating their operations in close physical proximity to one another for flow 
economies; and, (4) dedicated asset specificity which arises from investments in 
generalized (as contrasted to special purpose) productive capacity for the explicit 
purpose of selling a significant amount of a product to a specific customer and that 
capacity cannot be redeployed or otherwise utilized with a cost. 
Proponents of transaction cost economics theory (Williamson, 1985) have found that 
organizations and markets differ in their governance capabilities. Other authors 
(Stinchcombe, 1983; Granovetter, 1985; Eccles and White, 1988), however, suggest 
that the transaction-cost argument is stated too strongly. They argue that organizations 
and markets are not discrete institutions to which the theory can be applied in a 
straight forward fashion. 
2.3.4.1 Criticisms to Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
The major criticisms of transaction cost theory is that it overstates the effect of asset 
specialization on vertical integration and understates the costs of managing interunit 
relationships within an organization, particularly for nonstandard organizations and 
markets. Transaction costs are only relevant when relationships are: 
1. Frequent - if a transaction is not frequent there is less chance of 
internalization; 
2. Uncertain - if complete contracts cannot be foreseen, the company making the 
specific investment is advantaged when future contingencies impose to 
renegotiate the contract terms based on environmental uncertainty 
(unpredictability of future contingencies) and behavioral uncertainty 
(possibility of monitoring the behavior of the contract party); and, 
3. Asset specific 
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2.3.4.2 Implications of Transaction Cost Economics Theory for ITP 
Spicer (1988) draws on transaction cost economics to develop a positive theory of the 
transfer pricing process in which the strategic and transactional characteristics of 
specific transfers are related to transfer pricing issues and the organizational processes 
used to manage transfers within firms. Based on the premise that internal transfers are 
transactions, he argues that transaction cost economics can be used to consider 
contracting issues involved with the management of internal transfers and the setting 
of transfer prices. 
As Spicer (1988) points out, the extent to which a company makes internal transfers 
arises out of a strategic choice between buying components from external sources and 
making them itself. This is the issue of the appropriate extent of vertical integration. 
Porter (1980) cites the potential benefits of vertical integration as including 
economies of operations, tapping into technology, assuring supply, offsetting 
bargaining power and input cost distortions in non-competitive markets, and 
enhancing ability to differentiate end products. The transaction cost economics frame- 
work offers a particular explanation for vertical integration. The make-or-buy 
decisions can be made so as to minimize the sum of production and transaction costs. 
The scope of the transactions involved (asset specificity, uncertainty and extent) is 
thought to positively relate to the decision to integrate vertically into component 
production. 
2.4 Summary 
Through the years a number of theories explaining the origin and continued influence 
of MNEs have been reviewed. Those reviewed here are primarily economic in nature 
although most of them drew upon varied aspects such as political, socio- 
psychological, etc. backgrounds in an attempt to develop concepts well rounded 
enough to cover the multitudinous nature of MNEs' involvement, and predict them 
over time. The asset specificity dimension gives further reason to state that market 
prices are unavailable, hence providing justification to the regulators in adopting 
profit based ITP methods and increasing the reliance on comparables in setting 
transfer prices. As MNE theories claim that foreign-owned companies, due to their 
internal and external advantages over time should perform as well or better than 
domestic companies, this statement needs to be certified in order to ensure that 
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comparables (including MNEs) under different regulations are reliable to determine 
whether MNE discretion is limited or safeguarded. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review & Income Shifting Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
The importance of international transfer pricing has increased due to the ever-growing 
effect of international taxation on the global economy. For many years, there has been 
an awareness that MNEs can evade a large portion of their statutory tax burden 
through the manipulation of transfer prices on cross-border charges. In summary, a 
number of research approaches have been used to examine the transfer price 
manipulation: macro-level and regional studies, comparison at the company level, and 
micro level (plant level) studies using primary data drawn from questionnaires and/or 
case studies. Each approach has its relative advantages and disadvantages. 
This chapter lists some of the important empirical studies in order to determine 
whether the theoretical foundation of comparables can be matched with previous 
empirical studies. The demonstration of the income shifting studies is essential in 
order to uncover limitations, various focuses, limited theoretical bases, methods 
adopted by previous empirical studies, and provide a justification of the under 
researched area of comparables and income shifting in the UK. 
3.2 Income Shifling Evidence 
This chapter provides summaries of previous research studies to help demonstrate the 
significance of income shifting on both in the UK and on a global scale. Brief 
synopses of the objectives, data and methods used, findings, and evidence of income 
shifting by previous researchers is given to highlight the different approaches 
including sources that previous research has adopted. 
3.2.1 Arpan (1972a 1972b) 
Arpan investigated the ITP practices of US-based subsidiaries of non-US MNEs and 
compared them to those of US MNEs to determine the environmental factors 
influencing ITP as well as cultural differences that MNEs perceive when determining 
ITP systems. 
Arpan sent a letter to the largest or most representative wholly owned US based 
subsidiary of 145 foreign-owned companies. The parent companies were based in 
fifteen different countries and the size of the parent company (in terms of sales) 
ranged from under $1 million to over $500 million. From the 145 companies, 60 
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responses were received from the 15 selected countries. Of the 60 responses, 16 
granted follow-up interviews. In addition, partners of international accounting firms 
were interviewed. 
For very large MNEs, no significant differences were found for external variables on 
a parent nationality basis. Taxes proved to be one of the most important 
considerations for US, Canada, France and Italy, but not as important for Germany, 
Scandanavia or England. The main finding for internal variables was that non-US 
MNEs considered only roughly half as many internal parameters as their US 
counterparts. With regards to ITP methods, Arpan found that approximately 50% of 
firms used market pricing, 30% used cost-oriented pricing, while 20% used a 
combination of the two. He also found that: larger firms tended to use cost-oriented 
systems; the higher the level of market competition for a firm's product, the greater 
the likelihood that it would use market pricing; nationality and cultural diversity 
affected TP orientation; and, US systems are more cost oriented while non-US 
systems are more market oriented. 
3.2.2 Kim and Miller (1979) 
Kim and Miller's research investigated the factors influencing the ITP policies of US 
MNEs operating in eight developing countries. With a useable questionnaire response 
rate of 8.8% (30 out of 342 MNEs, with at least one subsidiary in two of the eight 
countries specified, listed in the 1978 edition of US Subsidiaries and Affiliates 
Abroad World Trade Academy Inc. ), they proceeded to rank eight factors in the order 
of importance placed on them by respondents. 
The two researchers found profit repatriation restrictions and exchange controls in the 
host country to be the two most important factors affecting ITP decisions. Other 
factors included joint venture constraints, tariffs/custom duties and income tax 
liability (in that order) in the host country. 
As a follow-up to their 1978 research, Kim and Miller sought to establish a theoretical 
framework for worldwide transfer pricing for US MNEs with specific reference to 
subsidiaries in less developed countries (LDCs). Using survey and interview 
evidence, 30 US MNEs (out of 342 US parents listed in the World Trade Academy 
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Press, 1978) with subsidiaries in at least 2 out of 8 LDCs, rated the importance of 9 
variables relating to the transfer pricing decision on a scale of 1 to 4. The average 
scores of these variables were ranked with profit repatriations considered as the most 
important and tax influences at numbering fifth and sixth. 
Kim and Miller surmised that in the late 1960's and early 1970's income tax liability 
was probably the most significant factor, but by the late 1970's it was only one of 
several factors MNEs took into consideration when making transfer pricing decisions. 
3.2.3 Tang and Chan (1979) 
Tang and Chan endeavored to compare the ITP practices of US and Japanese MNEs 
at both domestic and international levels, determine important environmental 
variables considered by large US and Japanese MNEs when formulating their transfer 
pricing polices, and to find those environmental variables which discriminated 
between large US and Japanese MNEs. 
They sent questionnaires to the controller, treasurer, financial vice-president, or 
secretary of 300 manufacturing and mining companies selected from the largest 1000 
US industrial corporations, and to the president of 369 of the largest manufacturing 
and mining companies in Japan. In terms of responses, 145 out of 300 sampled US 
and 102 out of 369 Japanese companies were received. 76 US and 50 Japanese 
companies' responses were useable allowing an aggregate useable response rate of 
nineteen percent. 
They found overall profitability to be the most important of twenty environmental 
factors affecting ITP decisions of both sets of MNEs. With regards to ITP practices, 
cost-based methods (particularly full production cost plus some allowance for profits) 
were revealed to be the most popular among both US and Japanese MNEs. Forty-six 
and forty-five percents of US and Japanese firms respectively use cost-based methods. 
Thirty-two and sixteen percents of US firms use market-based and negotiation-based 
pricing methods as compared to thirty-eight and eighteen percents of Japanese MNEs. 
3.2.4 Wu and Sharp (1979 
Wu and Sharp investigated both domestic and international transfer pricing practices 
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of US firms to establish the dominant TP methods used in the presence or absence of 
market prices and to find out whether differences exist between domestic and 
international transfer prices. From their questionnaire they received 61 useable 
responses, spread over 11 industries, from all 500 firms listed in the Fortune 500. 
From their statistical analysis, they found that where market prices were available, 
they were the predominant basis for pricing transfers. In their absence, full product 
cost plus a profit margin were most frequently used. While many firms encouraged 
negotiation as part of their TP method (especially as a means of settling disputes), 
little evidence was found for the use of mathematical programming and marginal 
costing approaches. Significant differences were found between domestic and 
international transfer pricing practices, which Wu and Sharp attributed to the fact that 
the economic environment for international transfers of goods was much more 
complex and perplexing than that for domestic transfers. For international transfers, 
due considerations were given to additional economic factors such as host country 
inflation, currency fluctuation and exchange control, foreign governmental regulations 
of income taxes, tariffs, dividend remittance and ownership by foreign parties, and 
host country's economic, social and political stability. 
3.2.5 Bums (1980) 
Bums aimed to improve the understanding of intracompany policies on transfer 
pricing decisions of US based MNEs. She sent a questionnaire to the senior financial 
officer of 210 US MNEs to assess the influence of 14 variables on the export pricing 
decision and select the five most important. Sixty-two useable responses were 
received. 
Bums identified five factors (internal foreign environment, influences on cash flows, 
artificial barriers, taxes, and economic structure), each explaining more than five 
percnt of the variance and eighty percent in total. Using factor analysis, she isolated 
ten variables with the greatest influence on the intra-firm pricing decisions of the 
respondents. Market conditions in the foreign country, competition in the foreign 
country, and reasonable profit for foreign affiliates, in that order, were found to be the 
three most influential factors in the TP decisions of firms. 
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3.2.6 Tang 0 981) 
Tang extended his previous work on US and Japanese firms (Tang, 1979; Tang and 
Chan, 1979) to British and Canadian MNEs in an attempt to investigate domestic and 
international practices with regards to methods and environmental factors. 
With 80 (28%) and 192 (48%) useable UK and Canadian responses respectively, 
Tang found that UK MNEs showed similar preferences for both cost-oriented (34%) 
and market-oriented (34%) methods in pricing their international transfers. Twenty- 
seven percent of UK MNEs preferred negotiated pricing. Canadian MNEs, on the 
other hand, showed slightly greater preference for market-oriented pricing. With 
respect to ITP objectives, 44% of UK MNEs cited the maximization of consolidated 
after-tax profit as their most dominant ITP objective while 39% cited equitable 
performance evaluation of domestic and/or foreign divisions. These compared with 
38% and 46% of Canadian respondents respectively. With regards to environmental 
factors affecting ITP, both sets of companies ranked overall profitability highest while 
the competitive position of subsidiaries in foreign countries was ranked second and 
third respectively by UK and Canadian companies. Opinions differ significantly 
between the two groups with regards to the ranking of the influence of custom duty 
rates and legislation. While UK companies ranked it eleventh out of twenty, Canadian 
companies ranked it second. 
3.2.7 Czechowicz et al (1982) 
The aim of this research was to document the ITP practices of US-based firms as part 
of a broad investigation of the performance evaluation practices of US and non-US 
MNEs operating in the US. Czechowicz et at sent out 300 questionnaires and 
received 88 useable responses from MNEs. 
They found that cost-based methods were most often used by US firms while non-US 
firms preferred market-based methods. Negotiated pricing was more popular with 
non-US firms than with US MNEs who appeared to have equal preferences for central 
administration and negotiation of prices. 
3.2.8 Tan (1982 
For this study Tang identified the environmental factors that UK MNEs consider in 
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formulating their transfer pricing policies. Tang sent questionnaires to the managing 
directors of 290 manufacturing and mining companies selected from the largest 500 
UK companies in The Times 1000 Directory. Eighty companies returned useable 
responses of which forty-seven rated the importance of twenty environmental factors 
(on a five-point scale) in formulating their transfer pricing policies. He found that the 
overall profit to the company was ranked highest followed by the competitive position 
of subsidiaries in foreign countries. 
3.2.9 Benvignati (1985) 
The aim of Benvignati's research was to analyze the scope, uniqueness, method of 
pricing, and firm and industry characteristics for transfer pricing. 
Using confidential corporate data from the US Federal Trade Commission's Line of 
Business program, 466 companies with 3186 lines of business were analyzed. 
Benvignati ran multiple regression analysis on the percentage of foreign transfers at 
market against twelve independent variables to test which variables were significant 
in the market versus non-market decision. 
The higher the level of intra-firm exports the higher the proportion of non-market 
pricing. If firms were exporting to branches (rather than subsidiaries) this 
corresponded to higher levels of market-based pricing. Of the organizational 
variables, market-based pricing was significantly related to the size of the film and 
also to the number of foreign subsidiaries. 
The results were significantly different with 75% of foreign transfers compared to 
50% of domestic transfers accounting for non-market pricing. The research suggested 
that differences in the market versus non-market pricing decision were due to inter- 
company differences rather than inter-industry differences. 
3.2.10 Lecraw (1985) 
Lecraw investigated MNEs from US, European, Japanese and other less developed 
countries with subsidiary operations in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia or 
the Philippines to establish the extent of usage of market and non market-based TP 
methods by his respondents relative to their home country. 
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Through the use of responses from questionnaires he administered during interviews 
with top managers of 153 subsidiaries of 111 MNEs, he found the use of non market- 
based methods to be significantly greater among Japanese firms with seventy-five per 
cent of their transfers (inwards and outwards) priced on a non-market basis. US 
MNEs used market-based pricing for sixty-eight percent of their transfers compared 
to sixty-five percent and forty-five percent usage by MNEs from Europe and other 
countries respectively. Subsequent multiple discriminant analysis confirmed that 
Japanese MNEs tended to use non market-based transfer prices to a greater extent 
than the other MNEs. 
Lecraw also found the use of non market-based TP to be strongly associated with 
attempts by MNEs to reduce duties and profit taxes, allocate capital between 
countries, reduce risk and circumvent government price and capital/profit remittance 
controls. Joint ventureship with local partners was found to significantly reduce the 
extent to which non market-based prices were used. 
3.2.11 Al-Eryani (1987) 
Al-Eryani identified, tested and explained similarities and differences in transfer 
pricing motives and tested the influence on company size and industry on a transfer 
pricing model for both affiliates in less developed (LDCs) and more developed 
countries (MDCs). 
Questionnaires were sent to 791 MNEs identified by Dunn and Bradstreet's Billion 
Dollar Directory. Of those sent surveys, 164 US MNEs replied of which 88 had 
affiliates in LDCs and 76 had affiliates in MDEs. The questionnaire asked 
respondents to rate thirty-four environmental factors and fifteen transfer pricing 
methods using a five-point scale. 
Al-Eryani found that the top four ranked environmental determinants for US MNEs 
operating in MDCs (and LDCs) were compliance with US tax and customs 
regulations, compliance with the tax and custom regulation of the host country, 
maximization of overall corporate profit, and minimization of overall corporate 
income taxes. 
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3.2.12 Wheeler (1988) 
Wheeler sought to compare the rate of return on assets of US-based foreign-owned 
companies and their US-owned counterparts using Statement of Income data from the 
IRS. He found that the return on assets of all US-owned corporations was six times 
larger than those of foreign-owned US subsidiaries. He concluded that improper 
transfer pricing is the only potential explanation for these differences. 
3.2.13 Al-Eryani. Alam and Akhter (1990) 
These three researchers sought to examine the impact that both organizational and 
environmental factors have on the ITP strategies of US MNEs. Based on information 
obtained through a questionnaire-based survey of 164 US MNEs, Al-Eryani et al 
identified the key determinants of transfer pricing decisions. 
Legal constraints and firm size were the most significant factors influencing the ITP 
strategies of US MNEs. In addition, larger firms tended to use market-based TP 
methods enabling them to comply with the laws and regulations of both home and 
host countries. 
3.2.14 Kim and Lyn (1990) 
Kim and Lyn compared the profitability of foreign-owned companies to those of US 
owned ones as part of a broad-ranging study of the power, performance, growth 
opportunities, risk, efficiency, etc. of foreign MNEs in the US. 
A group of fifty-four foreign companies was compared with an unmatched group of 
fifty-four US companies using the average of five different ratios (earnings per share, 
return on equity before tax, return on equity after tax, gross profit margin and 
operating profit margin) for the years 1980 to 1984. 
The unpaired univariate t-test statistics revealed significant differences between the 
two groups, thus Kim and Lyn concluded that foreign companies operating in the US 
earn lower profits than American companies. By using accounts receivable turnover, 
inventory turnover, and total asset turnover as measures of efficiency, they found that 
American-owned companies were more efficient than foreign-owned ones. 
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3.2.15 Business International Corporation and Ernst & Young (1991) 
The aim of this study was to investigate how internal and external factors affect 
MNEs' ITP methodology and policy formulation processes. Ninety-six useable 
responses were received and interviews with a wide-range of professionals (lawyers, 
accountants, etc) were conducted. 
Both environmental and organizational factors were found to affect impact respondent 
firms' TP policies. The two most important environmental factors were competitive 
pressures and tax/accounting rules changes, while the two most important internal 
factors were organizational structure and corporate strategy. With regards to ITP 
methods, market price or CUP ranked first for the transfer of tangible products by 
respondents, followed by modified market price, standard price and rate of return 
methods in that order. The descending order of method preference for intangibles was 
profit split method, exact comparable method and inexact comparable method 
respectively. Ensuring arm's length relationship, avoiding ITP audits, global tax 
minimization and profit maximization were found to be the most important TP 
objectives of respondents. 
3.2.16 Grubert and Mutti (1991) 
Grubert and Mutti investigated income shifting and tax planning opportunities used 
by MNEs as well as addressed a number of international taxation issues. 
1982 data on a cross-section of 33 countries was used to determine whether income 
shifting would be supported by a negative correlation between the reported after-tax 
profit rate and the tax rate. Several regression models were run using different 
measures of tax (average effective tax rate; statutory tax rate), profitability (book 
income/sales net of purchases from the parent; book income/equity), algebraic 
relationship (linear or not), and with and without an adjustment for GDP growth rate. 
They found that tax rates were a highly significant determinant of reported profits. It 
was also suggested that the influence of the tax rate on reported profits was much 
more pronounced at the low end of the tax spectrum and that GDP was often a 
significant determinant. 
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3.2.17 Johnson and Kirsch (1991) 
Johnson and Kirsch examined the ITP objectives of US-based MNEs through a 
survey-based study. Questionnaires were sent to 576 US-based companies identified 
from the Business Week Global 1000 and Fortune 500 lists. Out of the 576,230 
companies responded of which 79 used transfer pricing in an international setting. 
Minimization of corporate taxes was the most important ITP goal of US companies. 
Other important goals were increasing overall corporate profit and simplicity/ease of 
application. Performance evaluation of subsidiaries' managers was the least ranked 
corporate objective. In addition, companies who claimed to use decentralized ITP 
policies ranked performance evaluation low. 
3.2.18 Borkowski (1992a) 
Borkowski strove to investigate the motivational criteria that US-based MNEs use to 
select an ITP method to determine whether the choice of an ITP method was affected 
by either organizational (internal) or international (external) variables. 
Based on a selection of 7 overall internal variables, 7 overall external variables, and 
using the TPM as the dependent variables, Borkowski sent questionnaires to 301 
manufacturing companies with international affiliates listed on either the Fortune 500 
or Business Week 1000. Replies were received from seventy-nine companies, which 
transferred products internationally. Of the 79,51.9% used a version off full-cost, 
32.9% used market-based and 15.2% used negotiated price. 
She found that the choice of TP method was affected by organizational variables such 
as size, conflict between parent and subsidiary, ease/cost criterion, degree of 
decentralization and performance evaluation. TP choice was also affected by 
international factors such as international tax and tariffs, economic stability of parent 
MNEs, favorability of the economy to parent, and SS 482 regulations. 
3.2.19 Borkowski (1992b) 
As a follow-up to her 1992a research, Borkowski sought to investigate the 
organizational and environmental factors affecting the ITP practices of US-based 
MNEs and the objectives of their ITP methods. 
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Using the data obtained from Borkowski 1992a, nonparametric tests (Chi-square test 
of goodness of fits and Wilcoxon paired sign-rank tests) were applied to 247 (39 
matched) respondents. Differences were found in a number of organizational and 
environmental factors affecting their transfer decision-making process. These 
differences were, however, not reflected in transfer pricing choices. Most MNEs 
employed the same transfer pricing method for both domestic and international 
transfers in an attempt to achieve similar domestic and international objectives. In 
addition, the choice of TP method was contingent upon specific organizational and 
environmental characteristics rather than the nature of transfer. 
3.2.20 Borkowski (1992c) 
For this research Borkowski attempted to expand on her two previous studies (1992a, 
1992b). Her findings were adapted to document the TP methods preferred by MNEs 
operating in the US. 
Borkowski found that in relation to legally accepted TP methods, under SS 482 of the 
US Internal Revenue Service regulations, of the 128 useable responses received, 47% 
used cost plus, 33% used comparable uncontrolled prices (CUP), while 20% used the 
"fourth method". She also reported that most MNEs used their current method mainly 
to fulfill US legal requirements. Given the choice, the majority of the companies 
would shift to other methods they considered optimal. 
3.2.21 Cravens (1992) 
Cravens attempted to increase the understanding of the motivating factors involved 
for MNEs in setting transfer pricing policies using both qualitative and quantitative 
measures. In addition, she explored the causal relationship beginning with the extent 
to which situational determinants influence transfer pricing objectives which, in turn, 
influences transfer pricing policy thus influencing financial statements. 
Cravens received 82 questionnaires out of a sample of 542 US-based MNEs to 
determine the objectives of their transfer pricing policies, the characteristics of these 
companies, and assess how well these companies achieved their stated objectives. 
She tested five main hypotheses - two on tax management, two on competitive 
position, and one on internal dimensions (performance evaluation, motivation and 
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goal congruence). These hypotheses were tested on the basis of objectives rather than 
pricing method on the grounds that firms following different objectives might still use 
similar pricing. 
Cravens findings stressed that transfer pricing was viewed as an effective tool rather 
than merely a necessity. Cravens concluded that transfer pricing should play an active 
role in business strategy and could be used to achieve a variety of objectives such as 
managing the tax burden, maintaining competitive position, and promoting equitable 
performance evaluation. 
3.2.22 Tang 
`(1992) 
In an update of Tang's 1977 study, Tang used the 143 replies from the largest 500 US 
industrial companies listed in the 1990 directory of Fortune 500 (80% of these 
respondents had at least one foreign subsidiary) to determine if the transfer pricing 
methods utilized by respondents in his 1977 were still found to be applicable. 
Since the 1977 study, the respondents stated that market-priced methods were now 
used more than cost-based methods. In a direct comparison of the 1977 and 1990 
rankings of environmental factors considered in formulating transfer pricing policies, 
overall profit to the company remained the most important environmental variable but 
"differentiation in income tax: rate and income tax: legislation among countries" rose 
from number four to number two. 
3.2.23 Klassen et al (1993) 
Klassen et al attempted to examine geographic income shifting by US MNEs in 
relation to worldwide changes in corporate tax rates between 1984 and 1990. 
Financial statement data from 191 US MNEs was used to determine changes in 
reported profitability for the period subsequent to a particular tax change. 
They found that US MNEs shifted income to the United States from Canada and from 
the United States to Europe in 1985 and 1986, consistent with increasing Canadian 
rates and decreasing rates in Europe. 
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3.2.24 Harris (1993) 
Harris compared US MNEs' US and worldwide income and investment activities both 
before and after the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, which reduced the corporate tax 
rate from 45% to 34% and reduced subsidies for capital investment. 
Two hundred US manufacturing firms were randomly selected from the SIC3000 
industry file on Compustat from 1984 to 1988. Compustat data (which includes the 
dependent variable -current taxes payable to the federal government net of investment 
tax credits) was supplemented by company annual reports. Regression analysis 
including dummy variables for location of subsidiaries as well as additional variables 
available on Compustat -- R&D expenses, investment tax credits, interest expense, 
number of employees were used. 
Harris found evidence to suggest that US manufacturing companies engaged in 
income shifting. In the US-based tests, MNEs shifted more income into the US (and 
responded more quickly) after the TRA of 1986. In the foreign-based tests, the results 
supported MNEs shifting income from foreign jurisdictions into the United States in 
1987 and 1988. 
3.2.25 Tang (1993) 
For this study, Tang investigated both domestic and international transfer pricing 
methods used by firms. Tang administered questionnaires to all the 500 firms listed 
in the 1990 edition of the Fortune 500 directory of the largest industrial corporations 
in the US. responses from 143 companies covering 24 industrial groupings were 
received. 
He found that 41%, 46% and 13% of firms used cost-based, market-based and 
negotiation-based TP methods respectively for their international transfers, while 
46%, 37% and 17% used the three methods respectively for their domestic transfers. 
His comparison of these findings with those of his earlier study (Tang, 1979) revealed 
a shift towards greater use of market-based prices by US companies for both domestic 
(from 32% in 1979 to 37% in 1993) and international (39% in 1979 to 46% in 1993) 
transactions. With regards to the influence of environmental variables on the TP 
decisions of companies, Tang found that overall profitability, inter-country 
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differentials in income tax rates and regulations and restrictions on the repatriation of 
profits and dividends by foreign countries (in that order) were the three most 
important variables considered by his respondents. 
3.2.26 Crain and Stitts (1994) 
Crain and Stifts compared the gross profit margin (GPM) of foreign-controlled firms 
operating in the US to their US-controlled counterparts. 
Fifty-one foreign companies and fifty-one US companies were matched on the basis 
of SIC code and sales and the mean GPM was compared using matched-pair t-tests. 
They found that the mean GPM of the two groups were significantly different at the 
ten percent level. Foreign-controlled firms reported significantly lower GPMs than the 
US controlled firms. 
3.2.27 Borkowski (1996) 
Borkowski aimed to consolidate the findings of twenty-five transfer pricing studies of 
US MNEs using meta-analysis. Her main objective was to analyze whether there were 
any significant factors across the studies which affected the choice of ITP method. 
One of the overriding findings was that there was very limited consistency between 
these studies in terms of sample size, response rates, variables studied and level of 
statistical analysis, making it difficult to use meta-analysis. Her findings suggested 
that many of the empirical studies over the last forty years had either been ad-hoc in 
nature, not attempting to ensure any consistency with previous research, or designed 
specifically to address shortcomings of previous research. 
3.2.28 Cravens and Shearon-0 996) 
For this study Cravens and Shearon extended Cravens (1992) research on TP by 
applying an outcome-based approach to companies' ITP choices, concentrating on the 
financial consequences or outcomes of TP rather than TP methods. 
Questionnaires were sent to 519 US-based MNEs yielding 82 useable responses. 
Cravens and Shearon developed and estimated multivariate regression models using 
financial outcomes (total tax burden and return on assets) as dependent variables. 
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It was found that 42% of firms used cost-based methods, 33% used market-based 
methods, 18% used negotiated pricing, while the remaining 7% used multiple 
methods. 
3.2.29 Jacob (1996) 
Following and extending the approach of Harris (1993), Jacob (1996) supplemented 
the data on taxes paid and geographic profits with information on volumes of inter- 
geographic trade. 
The study examined two time periods, 206 US MNEs in 1982-84 and 289 US MNEs 
in 1988-90, and combined data gathered from both Compustat and annual reports. 
The results for both periods, considering the differentials in corporate tax rates 
between the US and overseas, were consistent with global tax-minimization through 
transfer prices during both periods. 
3.2.30 Borkowski (1997a) 
For this study, Borkowski investigated whether organizational, environmental and 
financial factors influenced the transfer pricing choices made by Japanese and US 
MNEs. 
Survey responses were received from 39 out of 241 Japanese MNCs and 28 out of 
126 US MNEs. The survey data was mainly categorical (5 point Likert scale) and 
was analyzed using nonparametric statistics (Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis). 
Borkowski found that Japanese MNEs shifted from the use of cost-based methods 
market-based and negotiated pricing methods. Performance evaluation was a 
significantly more important organizational factor to Japanese MNEs than to US ones 
when TP choices are being made. In addition, there was a statistically significant 
difference in the TP methods used by both groups of MNEs. 
3.2.31 Cravens (1997) 
In a further expansion of her earlier research, she used the data collected in Cravens 
(1992) to examine the strategic role of TP among US-based MNEs listed in the World 
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Directory of Multinationals and on the US stock exchange. 
She received 82 questionnaires out of a sample of 542 US-based MNEs to determine 
the objectives of their transfer pricing policies, the characteristics of these firms, and 
assess how well these firms achieved their stated objectives. 
Twenty-eight percent of her respondents listed the management of the tax burden and 
other related issues as the primary objective of their ITP system. Other variables of 
importance include maintenance of the competitive position of subsidiaries and the 
promotion of equitable performance evaluation. 
3.2.32 Mundau & Peel (1997) 
Munday and Peel undertook a wide-ranging comparison of the performances of 
Japanese owned manufacturing companies operating in the UK with those of their UK 
owned counterparts. 
With a matched sample of 97 companies, they compared both groups' performance 
and efficiency, among other characteristics, using annual financial and non-financial 
details for 1994 as provided by the FAME database. 
They found that Japanese-owned companies significantly underperformed UK-owned 
ones with respect to profitability, asset efficiency, stock efficiency and credit risks. 
The findings suggested that Japanese companies may have engaged in ITP strategies 
which had the effect of minimizing liability to UK corporate tax. 
3.2.33 Collins and Shackelford (1998) 
Collins and Shackelford examined the effects of taxes on cross-border payments of 
dividends, interest, royalties and management fees, between US MNEs' foreign 
affiliates. 
Their study used 1990 tax return information based on US Form 5471 since US 
MNEs are required to file a separate Form 5471 to the IRS for each foreign 
subsidiary. The form disclosed information on cross-border payments of dividends, 
interest, royalties and management fees (with the precise recipient/payer of the flows 
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not identified) for the largest 7,500 foreign subsidiaries (by total assets). 
Their findings supported the assertion that for cross-border payments of dividends, 
interest, and royalties, but not management fees, US MNEs coordinated their non-US 
activities to mitigate foreign taxes. 
3.2.34 Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998) 
The aim of this study was to determine whether the profitability (performance) and 
dividend (post-performance) distribution of foreign-owned domestic companies 
(FoDCs) operating in the UK revealed evidence of the use of ITP for income shifting. 
The study investigated the link between reported profitability and dividend 
distributions of UK-based FoDCs and UK-controlled enterprises (UKCEs) to 
determine whether ITP was used for income-shifting purposes. 
Sample FoDCs were matched with sample UKCEs on the basis of capability (total 
assets), and consequently, a comparison of the reported profitability (performance) 
and dividend (post-performance) distributions of the two samples was undertaken. A 
sample of 36 FoDCs operating in the UK were matched with 36 UKCEs on the basis 
of total assets value. 
Their findings revealed significant divergence in the performance and post- 
performance distributions of the two samples. They found an unusual relationship 
between the profitability and distribution of FoDCs, suggesting that ITP was used to 
shift income from the UK. 
3.3 Limitations 
In addition to the limited theoretical bases and the various focuses of previous 
research, one of the limitations of the findings of previous studies is that the 
explanation for the results is limited to the influences of tax (i. e., income shifting, 
transfer pricing). The studies usually do not consider alternative explanations for 
observed effects or even the total tax regime such as corporate strategy and regulatory 
requirements with the exception of Emmanuel (1999). As the aim of this research is 
to test whether comparables under different regulations allows greater or lesser 
discretion, this research provides an evaluation of the new profit methods (TNMM 
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and CPM) within the transfer pricing regulatory framework, building upon previous 
research (Lecraw, 1985; Wheeler, 1988,1990; Kim and Lyn, 1990; Crain and Stiffs, 
1994; Chan and Chow, 1997; Munday and Peel, 1997; Oyelere and Emmanuel, 1998; 
Tworkowski, 1999) while, at the same time, computing comparables that can be used 
for profit based methods and support transaction based methods. 
The limitations of previous research vary according to the aim of the research, 
research method, statistical tests, etc. In addition, the limitation of the previous 
empirical studies lie in the data used. The majority of income shifting studies analyze 
US MNEs reflecting the predominance of US studies and further illustrating that there 
is more access to informative data (both accounting and tax data) in the US where ITP 
research is more welcome compared to other countries. 
Although in the UK access to quality, publicly available data remains available, 
research on transfer pricing is limited with the majority of empirical evidence being 
US based and a limited amount UK based. Small empirical studies (Munday & Peel, 
1997) were conducted based on 1993-1994 data before the introduction of profit 
based methods and (Oyelere and Emmanuel, 1998) did not focus on comparables. 
Empirical US evidence was monitored under different tax systems than the UK and 
was subject to substantial changes i. e. 1986 IRS Tax Changes. Through the use of 
UK data, this research increases the understanding of the degree of discretion that can 
be provided under different regulations and the extent to which the ownership effect 
on profit and taxes can be detected. This study opens a new avenue for ITP research 
which stresses issues on whether comparables give wide discretion calculation, and to 
what extent control is exercised over abuse. 
3 .4 
Summary and Justification for Current Study 
After reviewing the relevant literature, it is apparent that there is a lack of non-US 
studies in this area. The income shifting literature relates to either tax regime change 
(mainly in the US) or was conducted prior to the introduction of comparables. The 
absence of empirical tests on companies discretion on comparables and the limited 
theoretical bases justifies this research and attempts to go beyond previous work in 
testing whether current regulations allow MNEs discretion in terms of compliance by 
providing an evaluation of the most recent OECD TNMM and US IRS CPM. Under 
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the new regulations, it can be observed that all the transfer pricing methods and 
documentation relates to comparables. This study compares the profitability of 
foreign-owned UK companies to UK companies and tests the reported taxes by 
foreign-owned and domestic companies. Although indirect observation of income 
shifting has its limitations, due to data access it is perhaps the only feasible approach. 
This work is not primarily concerned with income shifting but whether or not the new 
ITP profit-based methods and comparables, TNMM and CPM, curb discretion. 
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Chapter 4 
ITP Regulations 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the relevance of the ITP legislation, provides a brief 
background on each of the main players in the ITP studies, and explains the main 
features of the 1995 OECD Guidelines, 1998 UK transfer pricing regulations self 
assessment, 1994US IRS section 482 Regulations, and 1986 Japan Special Taxation 
Measures Law 66-4 (STML). The focus on mainly of ITP methods, the hierarchy of 
methods adopted by these regulations, and the differences between these regulatory 
bodies. This chapter represents an introduction to the complex world of transfer 
pricing and highlights the fact that different countries are subject to different rules, 
regulations, and recommendations from their tax authorities and governments. This 
chapter demonstrates that the exercise of discretion may be country oriented and/or 
facilitated by methods chosen. 
4.2 The Relevance of ITP Regulations 
Each time a MNE sets transfer prices, as it must when members of the group in 
different countries do business with each other, the group is determining the income 
subject to the income tax of each country involved. A relatively small percentage 
change in the transfer prices of a large volume of exports or imports can make a 
significant difference in a country's taxable income. As trade between related parties 
in different countries grows, the stakes become even higher. According to previous 
research, MNEs have a motive for setting their transfer prices in such a way as to 
reduce the amount of income in high-tax countries and, concomitantly, to increase the 
amount of income in low-tax countries. 
Therefore, under the laws of most countries including the UK, the tax administration 
is given the authority to review and, if appropriate, to adjust the transfer prices of their 
taxpayers for the purpose of determining the income subject to tax, specifically in the 
case of transactions with related parties in foreign countries. 
Having determined that, in order to protect the income taxable income, the tax 
administration needs the authority to review and adjust transfer prices and determine 
the standard to be applied. Throughout the world, the "arm's length" standard has 
become the accepted benchmark for transfer pricing. The arm's length standard is 
mandated by OECD Guidelines and reflects the international consensus on transfer 
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pricing and the transfer pricing rules of most countries including the UK and US, but 
excluding Japan which has not expressly addressed the issue. Under the arm's length 
principle the prices charged in transactions between commonly controlled parties 
must be consistent with the consideration in, or results of, similar transactions 
between uncontrolled taxpayers. 
Transfer pricing issues typically arise in two different contexts. According to Cole 
(1999), the first scenario is transfer pricing between a taxpayer in a high-tax country 
and a related party in a low- (or no-) tax country. A country could be low-tax 
generally, it may provide tax holidays (or partial tax holidays) for certain types of 
activities, or the related party may have loss or other carryovers so that, for a time, it 
effectively is subject to a low rate of taxation. Such cases are of particular concern to 
tax authorities of high-tax countries as the MNE derives a benefit to the extent that it 
can allocate income away from the high-taxed taxpayer to the low-taxed related party. 
The second scenario includes circumstances where the related party is also in a high- 
tax jurisdiction and where the MNE as a whole has not avoided taxes (taking into 
account taxes it paid to all jurisdictions). 
In general, transfer pricing rules have become more strict and transfer pricing 
enforcement more intense over the past two decades as related party international 
trade has increased, and as more countries have focused on the enormous amount of 
tax revenue that is linked to transfer pricing. This trend toward expanded rules and 
tighter enforcement has been led by the US (Cole, 1999). 
Since the mid 1980s, the US has been the prime instigator of the introduction of more 
onerous and punitive transfer pricing rules and regulations, culminating in Section 
482 final regulations released July 1994. At the same time the OECD revised its own 
draft guidelines. Since then the OECD and the US have been refining their guidelines 
and regulations, respectively, and many fiscal authorities around the world have 
responded by introducing their own transfer pricing rules and regulations. Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu (1999) summarized the current transfer pricing positions in selected 
countries as of 1 January 1999. (See Table 4-1) 
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Table 4-1: Transfer pricing issues in selected countries (extract from Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu (1999)) 
OECD Japaii UK USA 
Tax authority Not applicable National Tax Inland Revenue Internal Revenue 
Administration Service 
Regulations, Transfer pricing STML- Sch 28AA, Taxes Act Reg sl. 482s, 1994 
Rulings Guidelines for Enforcement of 1998 Reg sl. 6662-6# 
Guidelines Multinational order 39-12 
Enterprises and tax STML- Circular 
Administrations 66-4-1 - 66-4-9 
Documentation Pricing decision No statutory Taxpayers should Must include 
requirement should be requirements, but keep records needed certain principal 
documented in strongly to deliver a correct documents, as well 
accordance with recommended for and complete return in as supporting 
prudent business audit defense no practice, burden documents 
practices reasonable contemporaneous shifting to taxpayer to contemporaneous 
for tax authorities to obligation demonstrate documentation 
expect taxpayers to reasonable transfer required 
prepare and pricing certain 
maintain such documents are 
material no required to be 
contemporaneous prepared and retained 
obligation contemporaneous 
documentation is 
expected 
Tax return Should be limited to Schedule 16-4: No separate Forms 5471 and 
disclosure information Detailed statement disclosure required 5472 require 
sufficient to allow concerning (i. e. on signing tax disclosure of 
tax administration to foreign affiliated return taxpayer will detailed 
determine which persons be implicitly information on 
taxpayers need confirming controlled 
further examination compliance with transactions with 
arm's length foreign entities 
principle) 
Table 4-1 gives selected extracts for the OECD, Japan, UK and US. The first two 
rows present the tax authority and the regulations, rulings and guidelines which are 
applicable in each country. The third row demonstrates how onerous documentation 
requirements have become globally and the importance of MNEs' ability to support 
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their transfer pricing policies with the appropriate documentation. The fourth row 
presents the variety of requirements concerning the transfer pricing information which 
should be disclosed on the tax return. In relation to disclosure, the UK is the least 
onerous, but there is a presumption that all transactions are at an arms' length and can 
be supported (Elliott and Emmanuel, 2000). For accounting periods ending on or 
after 1 July 1999, transfer pricing falls within the corporate tax self-assessment 
system. This means that taxpayers are required to: ensure their computation of taxable 
profits reflects arm's length prices; justify the transfer pricing policy; and, maintain 
sufficient and appropriate contemporaneous documentation. In addition, penalties 
might apply to certain tax adjustments based on non-arm's length pricing for selected 
countries (See Table 4-2). 
Table 4-2: Penalties on Transfer Pricing Assessment (Deloitte & Touche strategy 
matrix for Global Transfer Pricing (as of June 2000) 
Penalty Size o fTenalty Comments 
OECD 10-200% Notes that civil monetary penalties are frequently 
calculated as a percentage of the tax understatement 
Japan 10-40% + 14.6 p. a. Ordinary penalties of 10-40% of additional tax plus 
delinquency tax of 14.6% per annum 
UK Up to 100% Up to 100% of unpaid tax. No penalty if taxpayer has 
made an "honest and reasonable" attempt to comply 
USA 20% or 40% 20% or 40% of additional tax for adjustments 
exceeding objective thresholds 
4.2.1 Legislation to Minimize Tax Avoidance Practices 
Tax authorities remain aware of the incentive for transfer pricing manipulations by 
MNEs. Transfer pricing provisions were first introduced at the time of World War I 
(Pagan and Wilkie, 1993) in an attempt to counteract them. With war resulting in 
higher levels of taxation, there was the need to discourage tax avoidance by overseas 
associates who desired to keep their profits away from tax authorities in high-tax 
nations. The UK's 1915 pioneering start in this direction was closely followed by the 
US in 1917. Minimal activity however took place on the transfer pricing front 
between 1915 and the mid-1960s. Transfer pricing only became an issue of much 
general concern in the mid-1960s when international trade and investment began to 
reach new levels. This is not to suggest that international businesses made no use of 
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transfer pricing to transfer profits abroad. Despite the broad powers which many 
countries gave their tax authorities in the 1920s and 1930s, transfer prices were 
manipulated to shuffle profits internationally (probably to avoid what was considered 
unfair or double taxation) with British firms having subsidiaries in the US claiming, 
when pressing the government for a tax treaty in 1944 that high US taxes on 
dividends have forced them to repatriate profits by "unsatisfactory expedients such as 
invoicing goods at higher prices" (PRO file F0371/38588 reported in Picciotto, 1992; 
p. 770). 
4.2.2 Background - OECD 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), was founded 
in 1960. Its current members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The OECD is 
governed by a Council comprised of member representatives with its work mostly 
accomplished by committees of member country representatives, the OECD's "main 
tax policy body" the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (1995 OECD Guidelines, Preface, 
para. 10). Technically, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are a report of the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs that has been approved for publication by the Council. 
The present Guidelines are a successor to a 1979 report of the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs entitled "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises. " Between the 
publication of the 1979 report and the publication of the present Guidelines, the 
Committee issued three other reports that addressed transfer pricing issues: a 1984 
report entitled "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises-Three Taxation 
Issues, " a 1987 report entitled "Thin Capitalization, " and a 1993 report on the then- 
proposed U. S. transfer pricing regulations entitled "Tax Aspects of Transfer Pricing 
within Multinational Enterprises: The United States Proposed Regulations. " 
According to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, the current Guidelines are "intended to 
be a revision and compilation" of the 1979,1984, and 1987 reports, which "also draw 
upon" the 1993 report (1995 OECD Guidelines, Preface, paras. 13-14). 
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4.2.3 Background - United Kingdom 
In the UK, Inland Revenue (IR) is less specific as to the acceptable methods for arm's 
length pricing although a provision to tax a foreign parent on the basis of percentage 
of the turnover of the business undertaken by its UK subsidiary. S. 485 of the Taxes 
Management Act, 1970 (now S. 770 of the Income and Corporate Taxes Act 1988) 
empowers the Board of Inland Revenue to adjust the taxable income of a UK resident 
involved in artificial pricing to a figure that would have resulted if the parties to the 
transaction had been unrelated. The legislation was drafted to cover a wide range of 
transactions, both tangible and intangible, including lettings and hiring of property, 
grants and transfers of rights, interests or licenses and the giving of business facilities 
of whatever kind [S. 773(4)]. 
Once in a while, IR issues guidance notes stating its interpretation of transfer pricing 
rules. One of these, The Transfer Pricing of Multinational Enterprises: Notes by the 
UK Inland Revenue, issued in a press release in January 1981, provides guidance on 
the IR's interpretation of UK's TP legislation. Another note, Transfer Pricing New 
OECD Report: Guidance on Revenue Procedures, issued as IR Tax Bulletin Issue No. 
25 in October 1996, reflects IR's position on OECD (1995). IR upheld the arm's 
length principle as laid down in the (OECD) Guidelines and stated that their 
application of domestic legislation will be guided by the Guidelines. 
In October 1997, IR issued a consultative document, Modernization of the TP 
Legislation, which serves as a basis for revamping UK's cumbersome transfer pricing 
legislation. The document, which includes draft rules applied from 1999, was 
necessitated by the need to reform the system to fit into the new self-assessment 
regime operating for UK taxpayers and the increased level of cross-border intra-group 
trading by MNEs (Rolfe, 1997). In 1998 Finance Act introduced a comprehensive 
modernization of the United Kingdom's transfer pricing legislation. These changes 
were part of a wider reform of the Corporation Tax regime, which included the 
introduction of self-assessment for companies. For accounting periods ending on or 
after July 1,1999, and years of assessment 1999/2000 et seq., sections 770 to 773 of 
the Income and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA) 1988 have been replaced by sections 
108-111 and Schedule 16FA 98. The full text of the basic rule now appears as 
Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988. 
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The document proposed to bring the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Article 9 
of the OECD Model Tax Convention directly into UK statutory rules. For the first 
time in the history of UK transfer pricing law enforcement, penalties of up to 100% 
became imposable on adjustments for transfer pricing errors caused by fraud or 
neglect. Due to the continued importance of this regulation, more analysis of the 
effect of the new UK transfer pricing legislation will be provided in Chapters 6 and 7. 
4.2.4 Background - United States 
The US IRS' principal weapon up to 1990 had been S. 482 of the Internal Revenue 
Code which is the same as the old S. 45 of the Revenue Act of 1928. Approved in 
1968, it provided the basis for the US IRS's monitoring of transfer prices for two 
decades without substantial changes. It authorized the IRS to "distribute, apportion, or 
allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances between or among 
organizations, trades, businesses" in any case involving two or more organizations, 
trades or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests if 
the service determines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary 
to: 
a. clearly reflect the income of any of the organizations, trades or businesses; 
and, 
b. prevent the evasion of taxes. 
Section S. 482 required the transfer price to be at an arm's length price and which 
unrelated parties would charge and accept in the transaction. It is specified for each of 
five major categories of transaction that the primary test would be the comparable 
uncontrolled price (CUP), the amount that was charged or would have been charged 
in an independent transaction with or between unrelated parties dealing at arm's 
length. This was considered to be the arm's length pricing principle which was first 
promulgated for the valuation of inter company transactions by the Treasury 
Department in 1934. The relative insignificance of MNE intra corporate trade 
however made the section and its requirements almost redundant at that time. 
Attempts were made by different countries in the early 1950s to early 1970s to attack 
the aggressive use of tax havens by domestic corporations through the introduction of 
the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) provision, an anti-avoidance legislation that 
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attributes profit accumulated in offshore subsidiaries back to the parent company. 
US authorities, fully aware that the arm's length principle needed to be internationally 
agreed to substantially increase its level of potency, was actively involved in 
international meetings of professional bodies and intergovernmental organizations 
(Picciotto, 1992). This, among other factors, probably accounted for the continued 
popularity of the arm's length principle with international attempts at regulating 
transfer pricing along with the difficulty encountered in attempts to enforce the 
principle. 
The 1980s saw a strong push by the US to reform and upgrade TP regulations. The 
period 1986 to 1996 witnessed eleven years of additional provisions, commencing 
with the broadening of the legal provision, followed by the upgrading of compliance 
requirements, penalties for under-filing, interest deduction restrictions, issuance of 
new temporary regulations involving complex methodology, and ending with the 
enactment of final regulations released July 1994. 
4.2.5 Background - Japan 
Japan's transfer pricing environment has been shaped by its historical, political, and 
cultural influences. This can be seen in the tax authorities' often apparent desire to 
retain in Japan the profits of foreign affiliated Japanese corporations operating in the 
heavily regulated Japanese economy. The following provides a comprehensive 
overview of the historical, legislative, and practical aspects of Japan's transfer pricing 
environment. 
When comparing Japanese tax practices with those of other jurisdictions, it is 
important to note that notwithstanding the volume and entirety of the Japanese tax 
regulations, and administrative guidance, there still remains a great deal of uncertainty 
as to the precise manner of its application. Accordingly, Japanese tax authorities have 
considerably more discretion in the imposition and collection of taxes than their peers 
in other major industrialized nations (notably the United States) where the laws and 
regulations are more precisely laid out as to provide greater certainty for both the 
taxpayer and the enforcing tax administration. Therefore in recognition of the 
generally vague nature of Japanese legislation, within the Japanese tax environment, 
57 
practical experience in the manner in which the tax authorities apply the tax law and 
regulations is paramount (Feinschriber, 2000). 
The corporate tax system is essentially a self-assessment system. Taxable income is 
based on the accounting profits of the company, with net profit before tax adjusted for 
items that are not tax deductible and for items such as special allowances and tax 
losses brought forward. The tax year is the corporation's annual accounting period and 
can be a calendar year or a fiscal year, but cannot exceed 12 months (Kato et al, 
1994). 
4.3 OECD 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The OECD has recommended to its member countries that their tax administrations 
follow the guidance contained in the OECD's "Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and National Tax Administrations" set forth in 1995. 
Similar to US transfer pricing regulations, the OECD Guidelines adhere to the arm's- 
length standard and recommend the use of uncontrolled comparable transactions and 
specific transfer pricing methods to determine a range of arm's length prices for a 
controlled cross-border transaction. While OECD Guidelines acknowledge that 
taxpayers should base their controlled transfer prices on a sound analysis and should 
document the basis on which such prices are set, the amount of effort called for by 
OECD Guidelines is markedly less than what US regulations would require to avoid a 
tax penalty on a large transfer pricing adjustment (Feinschriber, 2001). 
Most OECD member countries, including major international traders such as the 
United Kingdom, have never issued detailed transfer pricing regulations. In those 
countries, the Guidelines may serve as the local transfer pricing regulations. Even 
when a member country has issued detailed regulations, the Guidelines will serve as 
the common point of reference for negotiations with the competent authorities of tax 
treaty partners over the proper allocation of taxable income from cross-border 
transactions (Feinschriber, 2001). 
4.3.2 Arm's Length Principle 
A principal purpose of the Guidelines is to endorse continued application of the arm's- 
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length standard in determining whether the results of cross-border transfer pricing 
should be adjusted by national tax administrations. According to the Guidelines, the 
arm's-length standard permits adjustments only insofar as the conditions that obtain 
between associated enterprises differ from those that would have obtained "between 
independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances" 
(OECD, 1995, Chap 1, para. 1.6). The Guidelines cite Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention as authority for this principle (OECD, 1995, Chap. 1, para. 1.6). 
The Guidelines identify certain administrative practices as departures from the arm's- 
length principle and recommend against their use. A comparison of controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions requires a consideration of all of the differences that might 
have affected the price charged in the uncontrolled transactions. Accordingly, the use 
of "unadjusted industry averages" to adjust the results of controlled transactions is 
expressly criticized (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. 1, para. 1.16). Restructuring a 
transaction into something other than what the associated enterprises actually 
undertook is described as an arbitrary and inequitable exercise unless either of two 
situations apply: (1) the substance of the transaction varies from its form or, (2) the 
form varies so far from what uncontrolled enterprises would have undertaken that it 
impedes the determination of an arm's-length price (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. 1, 
para. 1.37). 
4 . 3.3 
Comparability (OECD & US IRS) 
The Guidelines hold that the results of uncontrolled transactions can serve as a useful 
benchmark for adjusting the results of controlled transactions only if the 
"economically relevant characteristics" of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions 
are "comparable" (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.15). For this purpose, transactions 
are considered to be comparable only if. (1) any differences would have no material 
effect on the results or (2) any material effect can be eliminated by adjustments 
(OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.15). 
The attributes of a transaction that may affect comparability are as follows: 
" The specific characteristics of the product or service being sold; 
The functions performed by the parties; 
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" Any contractual terms; 
" The economic circumstances of the parties; and, 
" The business strategies of the parties. (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.17) 
These attributes are essentially the same as the factors identified by US transfer 
pricing regulations as relevant to comparability. One purely formal distinction 
between the Guidelines and US IRS regulations is that US regulations treat the risks 
assumed by the parties as a separate factor, while the Guidelines treat risk as part of 
the functional analysis (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.23). 
As to contractual terms, the Guidelines reflect US regulations in cautioning that 
substance may vary from form in a controlled transaction and that the national tax 
administration should analyze comparability based upon the true terms of the 
transaction (OECD, 1995, Chap. 1, para. 1.29). Among the relevant "economic 
circumstances" listed in the Guidelines are the levels (wholesale vs. retail) and 
geographic location of the markets in which the controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions take place (OECD, 1995, Chap. 1, para. 1.30), factors also emphasized in 
the U. S. regulations. Among the relevant "business strategies" listed in the Guidelines 
are "market penetration schemes, " whereby a taxpayer may charge lower prices than 
uncontrolled enterprises in order to enter or expand into a new market (OECD, 1995, 
Chap, I, para. 1.32). Similar to US transfer pricing regulations, the Guidelines affirm 
that lower prices do not warrant an adjustment if the market penetration strategy is 
plausible and reasonably limited in time (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.35). 
4.3.4 Arm's Len h Range (OECD & US IRS) 
The Guidelines specify that a range of prices or profit results may qualify as arm's 
length. It also observes that a range may be particularly appropriate when the 
transactional net margin method is applied. Substantial deviations within the range 
may reflect variations in the reliability of data supporting the various points within the 
range. By contrast, US regulations suggest that such deviations may reflect a lack of 
complete comparability. The Guidelines do not follow the US approach of adjusting 
for suspiciously wide ranges by applying statistical methods such as the inter-quartile 
range which consists of the results for which there is a 75 percent probability of a 
result falling below the upper end of the range and a 75 percent probability of a result 
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falling above the lower end of the range, but rather simply proposes "further analysis. " 
Moreover, while US regulations provide that controlled transactions that fall without 
the arm's-length range will ordinarily be adjusted to the midpoint of the range, the 
Guidelines simply note that there are arguments both for adjusting to the midpoint and 
for adjusting to the nearest end point (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, paras. 1.45-1.48). 
Adjusting the arm's length range is one of the major differences between the OECD 
and the US IRS. This research tests the adjustment of the range on the applications of 
TNMM and CPM. According to previous research, a wide range exists even after 
applying statistical methods such as the inter-quartile range. Horst (Cole et al, 1999) 
investigated return on assets of US independent wholesalers. Horst found that the 25th 
percentile average for the return on assets was 2.6%, while the 75th percentile was 
15.4%. Thus, the inter-quartile range between 2.6% and 15.4%. 
4.3.5 Transfer Pricing Methods 
Priority of Methods 
OECD Guidelines recognize five transfer pricing methods as potentially consistent 
with the arm's-length principle: the CUP method, the resale price method, the cost 
plus method, the profit split method, and the transactional net margin method. The 
traditional transaction methods are the three methods that were specifically endorsed 
in the 1968 US transfer pricing regulations. Under those regulations, other methods 
were to be applied only if the traditional methods could not be used. This priority of 
methods was abandoned in current US regulations, but it is preserved in the 
Guidelines, which describe the profit split and transactional net margin method as 
methods "of last resort" to be applied only when the complexities of real life business 
situations place practical difficulties in the way of application of the traditional 
transaction methods (OECD, 1995, Chap. II, para. 2.49; Chap. III, 3.1). 
The introduction of the profit based methods in the US was mainly due to the increase 
of the number of transactions among the national affiliates of a multinational 
company typically involve unique products or occur at different levels of the market 
from arm's length transactions, taxpayers or tax administrators could not identify or 
obtain pertinent information about comparable uncontrolled transactions and so could 
not apply anyone of the three traditional specified methods. By default, "fourth" 
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methods were widely applied in actual cases, but with no regulatory guidance as to 
what specific methods were or were not appropriate (Cole, 1999). 
This significant deficiency in the 1968 Regulations would likely have continued 
indefinitely were it not for the amendment of Section 482 in 1986 to require that for 
transfers of intangible assets, the royalty or other consideration received by the owner 
of the intangible should be commensurate with the income attributable to the 
intangible. In the 1988 White Paper on Transfer Pricing (A Study of Inter-company 
Pricing Under Section 482 of the Code, IRS Notice 88.123,1988-2 C. B. 458), the US 
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service concluded that in cases where 
no comparable uncontrolled transaction could be identified and the licensee had not 
itself developed or otherwise acquired valuable, non-routine intangibles, the 
commensurate with income royalty should be computed by allowing the licensee to 
earn a "basic arm's length return" (the BALR method). Under the BALR method; 
"the royalty would soak up any excess profits of the licensee, so the licensee's 
rate of profit would be comparable to the profits of comparable independent 
companies that owned only routine intangibles" (Cole, 1999, Pg. 9-3). 
In January 1992, the US Treasury Department and the IRS proposed Regulations 
(1992 Proposed Regulations) that included what has come to be called the comparable 
profits method (CPM). Confronted by a firestorm of criticism by foreign governments 
and U. S. taxpayers (including foreign-based multinational corporations) of the 
constructive profit interval as formulated in the 1992 Proposed Regulations, the US 
Treasury Department and the IRS scaled back the application of CPM in the 
Temporary Regulations promulgated in January 1993 (1993 Temporary Regulations) 
and further still in the final Regulations promulgated in July 1994 Regulations (Cole, 
1999). 
4.3.5.1 Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method 
The CUP method compares the price charged for controlled transfers to the price 
charged for comparable uncontrolled transfers. When comparable uncontrolled 
transactions can be identified, it is considered "preferable over all other methods" and 
can be applied to tangible property, intangible property, and services (1995 OECD 
Guidelines, Chap. II, paras. 2.6,2.7,2.11, Chap. VI, para. 6.23, Chap. VII, para. 
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7.31). Under US regulations, the CUP method applies only to transfers of tangible 
property. The regulations provide an analogous method for transfers of intangible 
property called the comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) method. US 
regulations presently contain nothing analogous to the CUP method for services. 
4.3.5.2 Resale Price Method 
The resale price method determines an arm's length price for an enterprise's controlled 
purchases of property by subtracting from the uncontrolled resale price an appropriate 
gross margin (the "resale price margin"). The appropriate resale price margin can be 
determined from uncontrolled purchases and resales by the enterprise or from 
uncontrolled purchases and resales by independent enterprises. The OECD Guidelines 
note that the activities of a reseller may range from a mere forwarding function to full 
ownership of the inventory and full responsibility for a variety of connected services 
such as advertising and guaranteeing the products, and that the level of activity will 
influence the size of the appropriate margin (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. II, paras. 
2.14,2.15,2.24). 
The resale price method tolerates larger differences between the products sold in 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions than does the CUP method, and greater 
weight may be given to functional comparability. The method may be difficult to 
apply when the reseller adds substantially to the value of the product. The 1995 
OECD Guidelines contemplate using the resale price method for both tangible and 
intangible property, the latter when the property is sublicensed to third parties (1995 
Guidelines, Chap. VI, paras. 2.19,2.22,6.23). By contrast, US regulations 
contemplate its use only for tangible property. 
4.3.5.3 Cost Plus Method 
The cost plus method determines the arm's-length price for a controlled sale by adding 
an appropriate markup to the costs incurred by the seller. The appropriate markup is 
ideally determined from uncontrolled sales by the enterprise, but markups realized by 
independent suppliers can also be used. As with the resale price method, product 
comparability is generally less critical than functional comparability (1995 OECD 
Guidelines, Chap. II, para. 2.32-2.34). While the US regulations limit the cost plus 
method to sales of tangible property, the Guidelines also contemplate its use for the 
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sale of services (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. VII, para. 7.31). Consistent with the 
aversion of the Guidelines to the use of net profits methods, adjustments in expenses 
are allowed if they reflect functional differences, but not if they reflect only different 
efficiency (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. II, para. 2.38). 
4.3.5.4 Profit Split Method 
The profit split method determines the division of profits from controlled transactions 
in accordance with how profits would have been divided between independent 
enterprises (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. III, para. 3.5). What the Guidelines refer 
to as "contributions analysis" allocates profit in accordance with the relative value of 
the functions performed by the parties. What the Guidelines refer to as "residual 
analysis" first assigns a basic market return to each party and then divides the residual 
profits, presumably attributable to unique and valuable assets based upon an analysis 
of the facts and circumstances (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. III, paras. 3.17,3.19). 
4 . 3.5.5 
Transactional Net Margin Method 
The transactional net margin method compares the net profit margins from controlled 
and uncontrolled transactions relative to an appropriate base such as sales, costs, or 
assets. Similar to the cost plus method, it is ideally applied to controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions of the tested enterprise but can also be applied using the 
margins on comparable transactions of an independent enterprise. More detail is 
provided on TNMM in the following chapter. 
43.6 Documentation (OECD & US IRS) 
Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines is devoted entirely to the subject of 
documentation and advocates an approach that sharply contrasts with US 
requirements in several particulars. The Guidelines hold that taxpayers should price 
controlled transactions in accordance with the arm's-length principle and should 
document their efforts in case the prices are examined. The Guidelines note that the 
documentation obligations of a taxpayer will depend in part upon where the burden of 
proof rests under domestic tax law, but conclude that even where the burden rests 
upon the tax administration, the taxpayer may be obligated to produce sufficient 
documentation to permit an examination of the taxpayer's transfer prices (OECD, 
1995, paras. 5.2-5.4). 
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The Guidelines recommend against requiring production of documents that became 
available only after the controlled transaction took place (OECD, 1995, Chap. V, 
para. 5.8). A premise of the documentation recommendations of the Guidelines is that 
taxpayers are not expected to take account of information that becomes available only 
after a controlled transaction has occurred (OECD, 1995, Chap. V, paras. 5.3,5.28). 
In relation to the disclosure, the Guidelines recommend against requiring production 
of transfer pricing documents when the return is filed beyond the minimum necessary 
to identify taxpayers needing examination (OECD, 1995, Chap. V, para. 5.11). An 
example of this would be a requirement to disclose on the return which transfer 
pricing methods were used by the taxpayer. 
4.4 United Kingdom 
4.4.1 Introduction 
There has been transfer pricing provisions in the UK tax code for more than 50 years. 
Transfer pricing changes were overhauled in 1998, as the 1998 Finance Act 
introduced a comprehensive modernization of the United Kingdom's transfer pricing 
legislation. These changes were part of a wider reform of the Corporation Tax regime, 
which included the introduction of self-assessment for companies. 
For accounting periods ending on or after July 1,1999, and years of assessment 
1999/2000 et seq., sections 770 to 773 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
(ICTA) 1988 have been replaced by sections 108-111 and Schedule 16 FA 98. The 
full text of the basic rule now appears as Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988. 
The introduction of the 1998 legislation began with the publication of a Consultative 
Document on 9 October 1997 in which the UK government unveiled its plans to 
update the laws on transfer pricing. The consultation was largely limited to peripheral 
matters and the main body of the proposed legislation went unchanged into Schedule 
28AA ICTA 1988. The alignment with Corporation Tax Self-Assessment (CTSA) 
was cited as the impetus behind the changes, but the 1998 legislation was clearly 
designed to protect the tax base from further erosion in an environment where other 
fiscal authorities were aggressively policing compliance with their own domestic 
transfer pricing rules. The Inland Revenue wished to level the playing field and to halt 
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the perceived migration of profits out of the United Kingdom to those fiscal 
jurisdictions where rules were tighter and aggressively policed. Inland Revenue 
believed the changes in the tax regime should not only promote voluntary compliance 
and fairness, but also minimize compliance costs (Feinschriber, 2001). 
The 1998 legislation contains a specific requirement that profits be calculated in 
accordance with the arm's length standard. Previously, there was no requirement to 
adhere to the arm's length standard in calculating profits for inclusion in a tax return. 
Instead, Inland Revenue had the power to replace transfer prices. This process was 
burdensome and included the issuance of formal Directives by the Inland Revenue 
Board to replace transfer prices. The IR Board addressed transactions that had 
resulted in the understatement of profits in the United Kingdom through non-arm's 
length pricing (Feinschriber, 2001). 
No penalties could ordinarily be attached to the tax on pricing increases made by the 
Inland Revenue since there was no statutory requirement to return profits calculated in 
accordance with the arm's length standard. The transfer pricing regime remained 
totally reactive for 50 years. Everything has changed for accounting periods ending 
on or after 1 July 1999, for which Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988 is now in effect. 
4.4.2 Implementing OECD Principles 
The 1998 UK transfer pricing rules are aligned with the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and Article 9 ("Associated Enterprises") of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. The new rules were to be interpreted in such a manner as best secures 
consistency with the OECD Model and Guidelines. This approach, of course, 
effectively imports the interest and meanings of the OECD text to the 1998 UK statute 
(Section 2 Schedule 28AA). 
The basic assertion of the arm's length principle is found within Article 9 of the 
OECD Model, the subject of which is the application of this principle. Article 9 states 
that adjustments can be made to dealings between certain parties if one of those 
parties participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of the 
other party (or other parties do so in both companies), and the terms and conditions 
between them are not at arm's length. The OECD did not define indirect control, but 
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Inland Revenue has attempted to define indirect control in a wide manner for the 
purposes of the 1998 legislation. Prior to the new rules, Inland Revenue had in the 
past, attempted to use Article 9 when unsuccessful under other articles, especially 
Article 11, which pertains to interest. Inland Revenue sought to impose a UK tax 
charge using Article 9 in conjunction with section 788(3)(c) TA 1988. There, 
deficiencies with the old transfer pricing law have prevented adjustment. Inland 
Revenue was only partially successful with this approach, mainly in the context of 
negotiated settlements (Feinschriber, 2001). 
4.4.3 Definitional Issues 
Schedule 28AA raises a number of definitional issues pertaining to provision, 
transaction, and the like. 
Provision 
The arm's length provision can be applied where dealings are between connected 
parties and where the actual provision has conferred a potential tax advantage on one 
or both of the persons. The provision may be made or imposed by means of a single 
transaction or series of transactions. The transfer of assets, creation of legal 
relationships, and the assumption of liabilities are all seemingly within the new rules, 
as well as mutual practices that are not legally enforceable. The wording of the 
legislation may enable Inland Revenue to raise two arguments: 
1. That a particular arrangement is not at arm's length; and, 
2. That a series of arrangements of which the arrangement forms one part 
is not at arm's length (Section 1 of Schedule 28AA). 
Returns must be made on a yearly basis and each must be considered separately. 
Transaction 
Transaction encompasses transactions for which no price has been set and 
transactions that would not have taken place between third parties. The 1998 rules 
include a series of transactions. Schedule 28AA includes transactions without cost 
price. Taxpayers contended that interest-free loans were not within the legislation 
(Paragraph 3 of Schedule 28AA). 
Inland Revenue takes the approach that it can ignore a transaction that, in its opinion, 
would not have taken place between third parties, an approach prone to difficulties 
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and which introduces subjectivity. Under the old law, Inland Revenue could not 
simply hypothesize a transaction that was different in form from the one that had 
taken place. Inland Revenue was, instead restricted to assigning an arm's length price 
to the actual transaction, however unusual the transaction may have appeared to them. 
The transfer pricing provisions include a series of transactions in which only one of 
the parties is involved, or transactions in which neither party is involved. These 
provisions would catch those situations wherein third party funding is provided say by 
a bank, but is guaranteed by a connected party. The transfer pricing provisions would 
seem to apply to those transactions that would have been carried out between the 
parties but are instead performed by others, perhaps even unconnected parties, 
interposed in the chain (Paragraphs 3(3) and (4) of Schedule 28AA). 
4.4.4 Joint Ventures 
A potential major participant may include joint venture participants. The UK tax law 
widens the control net such that certain joint ventures are included. Most significantly, 
joint ventures that previously relied on a 50-50 split are now within the purview of the 
tax law. Neither party in the joint venture may exercise control, an arrangement that 
is common in many commercial situations. Under the 1998 rules, any joint venture in 
which the parties each have a minimum 40 percent of the relevant interests, rights, 
and powers in or over the joint venture will now have to ensure that all their dealings 
with the joint venture are at arm's length. The joint venture participants must 
document the transactions as arm's length. 
A party is considered to have a 40 percent interest in the joint venture if, at any time 
in the future, the party is entitled to acquire or become entitled to acquire sufficient 
rights or powers. The party is considered to have this interest if another person can 
exercise sufficient rights or powers on the parties' behalf, under the parties' direction, 
or for the parties' benefit. This transfer pricing rule may be of concern to those 
companies that have only 40 percent interest in another company, but have little 
control over the pricing policy laid down by the major participant (Ernst & Young, 
2000). 
As a part of the investigation on the performance of foreign-owned companies 
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compared to UK companies, this study contains a test of the impact of joint ventures 
on the performance of foreign-owned companies. This research used individually 
matched Japanese/UK (Japanese joint venture), US/UK (US joint ventures), and 
UK/Other (UK joint ventures). 
Due to time and resource constraints which did not permit investigation of individual 
joint venture companies' percentages of interest, this research defined a foreign- 
owned joint venture as a foreign company (Japanese- or US-owned) with at least one 
British company as shareholder. A joint venture UK company is defined as a UK 
company with at least one foreign company as shareholder (excluding Japanese or US 
companies). 
4.4.5 Penalties 
These transfer pricing penalty provisions apply to the submission of an incorrect 
return or where there is fraudulent or negligent conduct on the part of the person 
making the return. Under the 1998 rules, a person will be considered to have been 
negligent if he or she fails to consider whether the transfer pricing arrangements are in 
accordance with the arm's length principle. That person must have made a reasonable 
attempt to comply with the condition and maintain appropriate records to demonstrate 
that they have not been negligent. Inland Revenue stated that they believe taxpayers 
will want to document what they do to the extent necessary to enable them to sustain 
the arm's length nature of their arrangements and prices in any subsequent discussions 
with Inland Revenue. Inland Revenue further stated that taxpayers who act in 
accordance with the published guidance on documentation should not face penalties 
on account of fraudulent or negligent conduct. However, Inland Revenue has 
confirmed that detailed documentation will not in itself free them from penalties if the 
documentation does not show that the taxpayers had good grounds for believing their 
arrangements and pricing to be in accordance with the arm's length principle (Ernst & 
Young, 2000). 
The Inland Revenue Board has the power to mitigate the 100 percent maximum, and 
the board will have regard to the size of the business, gravity of the acts, disclosure, 
and cooperation. Inland Revenue has issued some guidance as to the practical 
application of the mitigation criteria. This guidance was centered almost entirely on 
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size and gravity and a good deal of uncertainty remains. Thus, an MNE's best 
protection against penalties is a transfer pricing policy fully documented as arm's 
length in line with Inland Revenue's published guidance (Feinschriber, 2000). 
4.4.6 UK Documentation 
Documentation becomes important as penalties can reach up to 100 percent where the 
taxpayer has neglected the due consideration of a pricing policy such as the arm's 
length requirement. Documentation needs to demonstrate due process to Inland 
Revenue in affirming adherence with the arm's length standard. Inland Revenue has 
chosen to rely on the issue of Guidelines, which it published in final form in its 
October 1998 Tax Bulletin rather than on prescriptive rules and regulations on what is 
to be kept. 
4.5 US IRS 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The Treasury Department in the US adopted final income tax regulations under 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 482 on July 8,1994 which included all 
transaction-based and profit-based methods. In January 1992, the US Treasury 
Department and the IRS proposed Regulations (1992 Proposed Regulations) that 
included the comparable profit method and profit split method. The US Treasury 
Department and the IRS limited the application of CPM in the Temporary Regulations 
promulgated in January 1993 (1993 Temporary Regulations) and further still in the fi- 
nal Regulations promulgated in July 1994 Regulations (Cole, 1999). 
The final regulations allow for substantially greater flexibility in determining whether 
an inter-company transaction has been conducted at an arm's-length price. However, 
that flexibility is achieved at a cost. Multinational groups face greater uncertainty 
under the final rules because they must apply the "best method" of the various pricing 
methods which could be applicable. Taxpayers must be prepared to support transfer 
pricing policies with thoughtful economic analysis based on accurate data regarding 
the group's business. The regulations impose enhanced compliance requirements, 
which appear in the penalty provisions of regulations issued under Internal Revenue 
Code Section 6662(e) and (h) (Feinschriber, 2001). 
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4.5.2 Methods 
Transfer pricing in the US focuses on pricing or net income allocations among 
affiliated entities, primarily corporations with very little attention being paid to 
branches or divisions from a transfer pricing perspective. Transfer pricing focuses 
primarily on the legal ownership and control of legal entities, but US transfer pricing 
provisions permits the IRS to examine contractual relationships, corporate 
partnerships, and other relationships. Nevertheless, the US transfer pricing rules that 
define related parties are often narrower than the scope of related parties as defined in 
other national jurisdictions. Transfer pricing in the United States is perceived as 
having two, often conflicting objectives: 
1. Determining an equitable share of the profits between taxing jurisdictions; 
and, 
2. Determining equitable prices for inter-company transactions (Feinschriber, 
2000, pg. 11-2). 
(a) Comparability Analysis 
US transfer pricing rules do not establish transfer pricing priorities or the selection of 
transfer pricing methods. Instead, the taxpayer and the IRS undertake the following 
comparability analysis to determine the "best" transfer pricing method: 
" Functions 
" Contract terms 
9 Risks 
" Economic conditions 
" Property or services 
The detailed explanation of each of these steps were explained in the OECD 
comparability section. 
(b) Pricing Methods 
The transfer pricing regulations in the United States establish the following transfer 
pricing methods: 
" Comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method 
" Resale price method 
" Cost plus method 
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" Comparable uncontrolled transaction method 
" Additional transfer pricing methods described below 
These methods are similar to the OECD methods with minor differences. 
(c) Profit Split Methods 
Profit split methods focus on the entire activities of the transaction or group of 
transactions across international borders: 
" The comparable profit split method 
" The residual profit split method 
" Global dealing transfer pricing method 
(d) Comparable Profits Methods 
CPMs focus on US activities of the business in seeking comparative data between 
ostensibly similarly situated companies in the US. The CPM is similar to TNMM, 
detailed in section 5.2 in the following chapter. 
A number of adjustments are made to establish the CPM. These adjustments include 
the following: 
" Inventory adjustments 
" Accounts receivable 
" Accounts payable 
" Foreign exchange risk 
(e) Implementing the Standard Industrial Classification System 
Transfer pricing regulations in the US require the taxpayer to use the "best" transfer 
pricing method. In practice, both the taxpayer and US IRS auditors often deviate 
sharply from applying the best method analysis. The taxpayer or the US IRS auditor 
often applies the CPM procedure by using the steps that involve the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code: 
" Use the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code for the business or 
division most typically a four digit SIC code; 
" Include other businesses in that SIC code; and, 
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" Prepare and utilize CPM comparative formulas" (Feinschriber, 2002, 
pg. 11-3). 
For this research as detailed in Chapter 6, four-digit SIC codes were applied to 
determine the activities of the comparable company sets. The SIC approach to 
transfer pricing is fraught with difficulty. The following are the six most serious 
problems for the taxpayer or IRS examiner: 
1. The initial selection of SIC may be determined by a staff person in the 
company who is unfamiliar with the ramifications of SIC selection; 
2. Such individual may not be familiar enough with the operations of the 
business to adequately select the SIC code; 
3. A four-digit SIC code is too broad-based and encompasses activities vastly 
different from the taxpayer's under examination; 
4. The SIC process does not adequately reflect changes in the taxpayer's busi- 
ness. Many businesses continue on with the SIC code by habit, rather than 
by further analysis; 
5. The SIC process does not contain an established process for changing a 
business's SIC code; and, 
6. The SIC code may become obsolete as high-technology moves rapidly. 
Multiyear data might not be available in any event (Feinschriber, 2000). 
4.5.3 Contemporaneous Documentation 
A taxpayer can avoid a detailed transfer pricing audit under Section 482, and foreign- 
owned U. S. corporations can avoid audit under section 6038A and section 6038C by 
preparing and retaining primary documents and background documents. The 
documents are part of the "contemporaneous documentation" provisions and must be 
prepared as a matter of course, not prepared specifically for audit. Contemporaneous 
documentation are of two types: 
1. Principal documents-applies to foreign-owned U. S. corporations; and, 
2. Background documents-applies to foreign-owned U. S. corporations and 
transfer pricing transactions. 
Principal documents include business overview; organizational structure; Section 482 
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documentation; method selection; rejected methods; controlled transactions; 
comparables; and, general index. 
4.5.4 Penalties 
The US has a complex transfer pricing penalty regime that is separate from penalties 
that could apply to taxpayers in other contexts and from the special penalty rules that 
could apply to foreign-owned US corporations. These penalties are not deductible in 
determining gross income. There are, in fact, two transfer pricing penalties: 
1. The transaction penalty; and, 
2. The net adjustment penalty. 
There are two penalty levels: 
1. The substantial valuation misstatement penalty (20 percent); and, 
2. The gross valuation misstatement penalty (40 percent). 
All penalties apply to Section 482-related tax underpayments. Each type of penalty 
can apply at either of the two levels mentioned above. The penalty applies to the tax, 
not to underpayment itself. Tax underpayment is the difference between the result 
reflected on the tax return and the results as finally determined. The substantial 
valuation misstatement penalty applies if the price stated is twice as much as the true 
price or is half as much as the true price. 
Many foreign governments, in their direct discussions with US Treasury and the IRS 
and through the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, strongly criticized even the 
scaled-back version of CPM in the 1993 Temporary Regulations and final 1994 
Regulation as contrary to the arm's length standard and urged its elimination from the 
final Regulations. According to Horst (Cole, 1999 pg. 9-4): 
"the foreign governments' harsh criticism of the scaled-back version of CPM 
was based on a naive and ultimately insupportable assertion that the traditional 
transfer pricing methods could be applied in most cases". 
Given the frequent difficulty of identifying closely comparable transactions, taxpayers 
and tax administrators both benefit from being able to rely on a specified method 
(CPM) that can be used when the critical input to other transfer pricing methods is 
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missing (Cole, 1999). Similar to OECD methods with the exception of the priority of 
the method and the differences 
4.6 Japan 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The Japanese transfer pricing environment is unique and is fashioned to operate 
within the Japanese political, legislative, and economic context. Due to the nature of 
Japanese transfer pricing legislation and supporting regulations, the tax authorities 
retain a considerable degree of discretion in the manner of the imposition and 
collection of tax. Accordingly, despite the fact that Japan does not have a formal 
documentation policy enforced by a significant penalty regime, it is essential within 
the Japanese transfer pricing environment to have full and detailed documentation in 
place. Failure to undertake such documentation and planning in advance of a transfer 
pricing investigation places the taxpayer at a significantly increased risk of receiving 
transfer pricing assessment. 
Japan is a member of the OECD and actively participated in the drafting of both the 
1979 OECD Report (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
"Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, " and the 1995 OECD Guidelines 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. "Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, " As such, the 
Japanese tax authorities advocate the theory and practices set out by the OECD, 
including the OECD's arm's length principle. 
Japanese domestic transfer pricing legislation is based on the 1979 OECD Report 
rather than the later and more comprehensive OECD Guidelines. This arguably 
anachronistic feature of the Japanese domestic legislation results from the fact that the 
Japanese legislation was enacted in 1986 and has not been subsequently amended to 
incorporate the features of the 1995 OECD Guidelines. Unlike other transfer pricing 
guidelines or rules, including OECD Guidelines, the use of an arm's length range had 
not been expressly mentioned as acceptable in Japan. 
462 Use of Secret Comparables 
Japanese tax authorities place heavy reliance on comparable transactions as opposed 
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to comparable company financial performance, given the tax authorities' practice of 
reviewing transfer prices on a transaction specific basis. In most cases, these 
comparables are external uncontrolled comparables obtained by reverse audit of the 
taxpayer's competitors, who remain undisclosed throughout the audit process. In this 
situation, the taxpayer is immediately and significantly disadvantaged, because 
without knowing the source of the external comparable, the taxpayer stands little 
chance of assessing comparability and making meaningful adjustments between its 
own transactions and the comparable transactions (Feinschriber, 2000). 
4.6.3 Importance of the Japanese Intangibles 
The term "Japan Intangible" is the description given to the aggregate of a number of 
economic and business factors to which the Japanese tax authorities attach particular 
importance during a transfer pricing audit. The two main factors that have been 
commonly referred to in connection with the Japan Intangible are as follows, 
1. The Japanese entity's contribution to the development of the Japanese 
market for the goods it sells (e. g, Japan-specific marketing, Japan-- 
specific product development, the results of research and development 
performed in Japan, the relationships with key customers, etc. ); and, 
2. The economic benefit derived by foreign-owned companies from the 
relatively high prices in Japan's often regulated markets. 
4.6.4 Methods 
Methods Specified for Inventory Goods 
Japan has adopted the methods for computing the arm's length price outlined in the 
1979 OECD Report. SMTLArticle 66-4(2) provides three transactional methods and 
two "other methods" for calculating the arm's length price for "tested" (i. e., 
controlled) transactions involving inventory goods, namely: 
" Transactional Methods 
" Comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method 
" Resale price method 
" Cost plus method 
Other Methods 
"A method similar to the above three methods (the quasi methods) 
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" Methods prescribed by Cabinet Order (the profit split method) 
The legislation does not recognize either the US-style CPM or the OECD TNMM as 
an acceptable basis for establishing transfer pricing in Japan. However, it is thought 
that the transactional net margin method may be included in the legislation in the 
future in order for Japanese rules to maintain full consistency with the 1995 OECD 
Guidelines. 
There is no priority among the three transactional methods, or concept of the "best 
method" as required by the US Internal Revenue Code's 482 or the concept of the or 
"last resort" as adopted by OECD guideline. The other methods are to be used only as 
a last resort in the event that the traditional three methods cannot be used. 
4.6.4.1 Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method 
The CUP method establishes a comparison between the prices employed in actual 
transactions between unrelated parties that are similar in terms of the products or 
services handled, the transactional level, transactional quality, transactional time, and 
other criteria. 
The transactions to be used for the purpose of comparison under the CUP method 
could be either internal transactions (i. e., transactions by one of the persons engaged 
in the tested transaction) or external transactions (i. e., transactions between two 
unrelated persons, neither of which is involved in the tested transaction). 
4.6.4.2 Resale Price Method 
The Japanese resale price method establishes the amount of "normal profit" to be 
deducted from the resale price of the purchaser. The Japanese legislation refers to the 
"normal profit margin, " defining this as the amount computed by multiplying the 
resale price by a normal profit ratio to be prescribed by Cabinet Order. (SMTL article 
66-4(2)(i)(b)) The normal profit ratio prescribed by Cabinet Order is the ratio of gross 
profit to the total amount of sales revenue of a reseller from a similar transaction 
under similar circumstances with an unaffiliated person (SMTL EO, article 39-12(6). 
Either internal or external comparable transactions can be used to assess the arm's 
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length nature of the tested transaction as in the CUP method. These ratios are 
sometimes referred to as the internal profit margin and external profit margin 
respectively. 
In practice, many of the transfer pricing audits conducted in Japan have involved 
foreign-owned Japanese taxpayers whose primary functions are the marketing and 
distribution in Japan of products manufactured and developed outside Japan. The tax 
authorities have been particularly aggressive in pursuing companies that possess a 
large market share and high brand profile. In these cases, it has been usual to employ 
the resale price or quasi-resale price method (Borstell, et al, 1997). 
When using the resale price method, it is typical for Japanese tax authorities to apply 
an external comparable transaction for determining the appropriate gross margin. The 
tax authorities frequently obtain this information from the taxpayer's competitors 
through a reverse audit. SMTLArticle 66-4(2)(i)(b) specifically requires the tax 
authorities to make adjustments for the differences between the taxpayer's transaction 
and the comparable transaction(s). However, in practice, it is very difficult for the 
taxpayers to even identify the differences, due to the anonymity of the source of the 
external comparable (Borstell, et al, 1997). 
Taxpayers are able to surmise the external comparable transaction(s) used by the tax 
authorities in some cases. The number of third-party transactions similar to the 
taxpayer's transaction are often extremely limited and are familiar to businesses 
competitors within a narrow field. However, even in these cases, taxpayers are still 
disadvantaged due to the lack of access to comprehensive financial information and 
contractual terms relating to the external comparable(s) (Borstell et al, 1997). 
Furthermore, in some cases, the adjustment process amounts to a battle between tax 
authorities who claim that the taxpayer's large market share and high total sales 
volumes are due to the onshore party's unique marketing intangibles, and the 
taxpayer's contrary claim that their success in the Japanese market is due to product 
intangibles developed by the foreign affiliated party outside Japan (Borstell, et al, 
1997) 
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4.6.4.3 Cost Plus Method 
The Japanese cost plus method establishes the arm's length price as the amount 
computed by adding to the costs of the seller to acquire, manufacture, or perform 
other acts as to the inventory assets the normal profit margin (SMTLArt. 66- 
4(2)(i)(c)). As with the resale price method, the normal profit margin is defined as the 
amount computed by multiplying the cost of goods by a normal profit ratio to be 
determined according to the Cabinet Order (SMTLArt. 66-4(2)(i)(c)). The Cabinet 
Order then defines the normal profit margin as the ratio of the gross profit margin to 
the total amount of costs incurred by the seller when the same or similar assets are 
sold to an unaffiliated person. (SMTLEO 39-12(7)). As with the resale price method, 
either an internal profit ratio or external profit ratio can be utilized. 
Japan's National Tax Administration (NTA) has not published any formal statement 
that would suggest particular markups that would apply to specific situations or 
business activities. This approach is consistent with the general transaction-specific 
approach of the Japanese tax authorities. However, it places taxpayers at a 
disadvantage because they do not have any guidance as to the acceptability of their 
transfer prices until subject to a transfer pricing investigation (Roach et al, 1999). In 
practice, there are two main issues encountered in the application of the cost plus 
method in Japan. The first is the appropriate markup level to be used when applying 
the cost plus margin. The second issue is the appropriateness of the cost base that 
should be used in applying the cost plus markup. 
The cost plus method is normally used to assess the arm's length nature of transactions 
where the tested party is the manufacturer of tangible assets, and the tested party 
provides services to its foreign affiliated person, This approach is specifically relevant 
for a foreign-owned taxpayer. Language and cultural barriers to developing business 
in Japan have led to the common business structure in which many foreign 
companies, who sell their products directly to Japanese customers, have established a 
local service company to provide their foreign parent with services such as market 
research and liaison activities (Brostell et al, 1997). 
Buckley and Hughes (1996) suggested that the Japanese overseas subsidiary is not 
regarded as profit centre in its own right, therefore there is no incentive to increase 
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subsidiary profits. Buckley and Hughes explain the low profitability among Japanese 
companies operating overseas was due to the target costing system widely used by 
Japanese companies. An Investigation of the performance of the Japanese-owned 
companies compare to their UK counterparts is conducted as apart of this research. 
4.6.4.4 Other Methods 
It is possible to use other methods in the event that none of the traditional methods 
can be utilized. These other methods may either be a method corresponding to a 
prescribed transactional method or any method prescribed by Cabinet Order. (SMTL 
article 66-42(2)(i)(d)). The law or regulations provide no details in defining a 
"method corresponding to a proscribed transactional method. " In practice, the 
Japanese tax authorities have been known to cite the "quasi-resale price" in the 
official Notice of Assessment when significant adjustments were required to account 
for differences between the tested transaction and the comparable transaction(s). This 
practice is sometimes referred to by commentators as the Japanese tax authorities' 
practice of employing "loose comparables. " (Feinschriber, 2000) 
Japanese tax authorities have placed much greater emphasis on reviewing profit splits. 
This is so not only for foreign-owned companies in Japan, but also for Japanese 
MNEs. In many cases the outcome from applying the profit split approach can be 
markedly different from applying the comparable profits method adopted by the US 
(Kato et al, 1994). 
The profit split method is generally utilized by Japanese tax authorities during the 
field audit stage when conducting a transfer pricing investigation of Japanese 
multinationals. In such cases, the Japanese taxpayer holds all the essential cost data 
and the Japanese tax officials have access to the information necessary to evaluate the 
total system profit. This information is generally very difficult to access when the 
taxpayer is a foreign-owned Japanese subsidiary with an offshore parent. (Borstell et 
al, 1997). Nevertheless Japanese tax authorities focus on the profit split for foreign- 
owned companies in Japan. The authorities routinely request information to review 
how much profit is earned by foreign affiliates from transactions with Japanese 
affiliates (Kato et al, 1994). 
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4.6.5 Penalties 
Penalty taxes are imposed on the additional corporate taxes at the rate of 10 percent 
for additional taxes equal to the amount originally reported and 15 percent for 
additionally assessed taxes in excess of the amount originally reported. In the event 
of fraud, the penalty tax is increased to 40 percent. These penalties are not deductible 
and will not be waived, even where there was no intentional manipulation 
demonstrated by the taxpayer. 
Full understanding of the evolving transfer pricing regulatory environment, taxpayers 
and transfer pricing practitioners is important. Although Japanese transfer pricing 
rules are considered outdated and growing at a slower pace compared to the US and 
OECD, over the past few years circulars and small NTA guidelines have expanded 
significantly. Japanese transfer pricing rules are clearer and more easily applied, with 
the general consensus being that transfer pricing rules will continue to evolve 
(Horiguchi, 2002). 
4.7 Summary 
Globalization provides MNEs with more opportunities to manipulate transfer prices. 
An increased desire on the part of tax authorities faced with tight fiscal situations to 
protect and enhance their revenue base, has resulted in tightened regulatory 
frameworks, presumably due to the fact that individual fiscal jurisdictions are 
concerned that ITP abuse results in unfair profits being reported and tax revenues 
being reduced. Each jurisdiction allows profit methods and hence the need to compute 
comparables. Whether or not profit method is adopted, comparison of comparables 
may be prudent in order to justify and support the use of transaction methods. 
Different countries are subject to different rules, regulations, and recommendations 
from their tax authorities and governments and the exercise of discretion may be 
country oriented and/or facilitated by methods chosen. Hence, a focus on comparables 
under different regulations is deemed appropriate when determining whether MNE 
discretion is limited or safeguarded. 
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Chapter 5 
Comparables and TNMM vs. CPM 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a comparison between the OECD's TNMM and the US IRS' 
CPM, including the main features of each of these profit-based methods as well as 
their applications. These alternative regulations raise an important issue as to whether 
any of these regulations can reflect a real adjustment of function and risk differences. 
FDI theories suggest that MNEs have competitive advantage although the regulations 
reinforce that they should be equivalents. This chapter demonstrates the attempts 
made by various regulations to control function and risk differences. Additionally, 
this chapter defines comparables in relation to transfer pricing methods in general, 
and to the research method adopted by this study. 
5.2 OECD Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM ) vs. US IRS Comparable 
Profit Method (CPM) 
The transactional net margin method (TNMM) is a transfer pricing methodology 
adopted by the OECD in 1995. TNMM approximates arm's length conditions when 
traditional transaction methods cannot be reliably applied alone or, in exceptional 
circumstances, when these traditional methods cannot be applied at all. Unlike 
TNMM, CPM is a transfer pricing method adopted by the US IRS section 482 and can 
be used similar to any other transfer pricing method under the best method rule. 
5.2.1 Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) 
The transactional net margin method examines the net profit margin relative to an 
appropriate base (e. g., costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer realizes from a controlled 
transaction (OECD, 1995). TNMM is based on the concept that returns earned by 
firms operating in the same industry and under similar conditions tend toward equality 
over a reasonably long period of time. If one firm is earning higher returns than its 
rivals, it should be able to expand its production or sales at the expense of the less- 
efficient competitors. In the long run, the firm's competitors will either go out of 
business or become more efficient and thus increase their returns. Economic theory 
predicts what will happen in equilibrium over the long run, but is unspoken about the 
time needed to achieve equilibrium or what the rates of return ought to be in the 
interim. 
In TNMM, the profits earned by a taxpayer in a controlled transaction (or a group of 
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transactions that can be aggregated under the principles of Chapter I of the OECD 
Guidelines) are compared with the same measure of profitability from arm's-length 
uncontrolled transactions. As the Guidelines state, "The net margin of the taxpayer 
from the controlled transaction... should ideally be established by reference to the net 
margin that the same taxpayer earns in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Where 
this is not possible, the net margin that would have been earned in comparable 
transactions by an independent enterprise may serve as a guide" (OECD, 1995, 
B. 3.26). TNMM is based on the net profit margin, rather than the gross profit margin 
on which both the resale price and cost plus methods are based. The net profits are 
expressed relative to sales, costs, or assets with the most commonly employed 
measures being return on sales and return on assets. 
Only one party to the controlled transaction is analyzed when applying TNMM. The 
choice of which party to examine depends on the availability of comparable data. In 
general, TNMM is applied to the least complex entity involved in the inter-company 
transaction. There is usually more comparable data in existence for the least complex 
entities, and fewer adjustments will be required to account for differences in function 
and risk between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Substantial differences 
in intangible property ownership generally render a potential comparable unusable for 
TNMM, as well as for all other methods (Feinschriber, 2001). 
"TNMM can be used to determine transfer prices at the time those prices are set, or it 
can be used to test the reasonableness of transfer prices established by some other 
means. Tax authorities are likely to use TNMM as a test of reasonableness to 
determine whether a transfer pricing audit should be initiated" (Feinschriber, 2001, 
pg. 24). For this purpose, it is necessary to determine what profits will be analyzed 
before applying TNMM. 
When applying TNMM the following steps are required: 
" Performing a functional analysis; 
" Identifying comparables; 
" Choosing a profit measure; 
" Determining the appropriate time period for analysis; and, 
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" Testing the reasonableness of results. 
Performing a Functional Analysis and Identifying Comparables: 
The first step in applying TNMM is to analyze the functions performed by the affiliate 
in question and the risks borne by that affiliate, and to determine whether the affiliate 
owns valuable intangible property. 
The second step is to identify potentially comparable transactions or companies. 
OECD Guidelines recommend using internal comparables, which are uncontrolled 
transactions in which the affiliate participates. Transactions in which the taxpayer is 
not involved should be used only if there are no internal comparable transactions. 
The OECD Guidelines approach is consistent with Section 482 of US IRS regulations. 
Companies have much more detailed information about transactions in which they 
participate than unrelated transactions in which they do not participate. As a result, 
the comparability of the transactions can be evaluated with more accuracy than when 
data are limited to publicly available information from third-party transactions. 
A function and risk assessment should be performed once the comparables have been 
identified, whether the comparables are internally generated or the company is relying 
on external comparables. This function and risk analysis is necessarily less thorough 
for external comparables than for analysis of the affiliated party. Since the goal is to 
obtain the "correct" arm's-length answer, great care must be taken to ensure that all 
differences that can affect profitability are identified and accounted for through 
adjustments to the comparables. 
OECD Guidelines do not discuss adjustments for differences in functions and risks in 
much detail. Instead, they emphasize the need to carefully choose comparables that 
are as similar in function and product as is possible. "Where differences in 
characteristics of the enterprises being compared have a material effect on the net 
margins being used, it would not be appropriate to apply the transactional net margin 
method without making adjustments for such differences" (OECD, 1995, B. 3.53). 
After deciding which comparables are to be used, and whether to make adjustments 
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for differences in functions and risks, it is necessary to choose a particular measure of 
profitability in applying TNMM. OECD Guidelines are not very specific regarding 
the profit measures that can be employed. From the point of view of this study, it is 
feasible to employ more than one profitability measure, using one to test the 
reasonableness of the others. Using this additional measure to test the selected method 
provides additional assurance that the transfer pricing is reasonable, assuming, of 
course, that the other method yields a result consistent with the original method 
chosen. All the profit-level measures used in TNMM are based on operating income, 
which is net profit margin. Typically, return on assets (operating income/assets) or 
return on sales (operating income/net sales) are the two profit-level measures 
analyzed to determine transfer prices. 
OECD Guidelines state that "net margins are less affected by transactional differences 
than is the case with price, as used in the CUP method. " OECD Guidelines further 
state, "The net margins also may be more tolerant to some functional differences 
between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions than gross profit margins (1995 
OECD Guidelines, B. 3.27). In addition, the net margin may be less sensitive to 
differences in generally accepted accounting practices across countries and by 
companies within a country. 
Once the profit measure or measures have been chosen, they must be computed for 
each of the comparables and for the controlled transaction. The number of years of 
financial data that should be considered is open to question. OECD Guidelines 
provide no specific advice, merely stating, "Multiple year data should be considered 
to take into account the effects on profits of product life cycles and short-term 
economic conditions" (OECD, 1995, B. 3.44). There are many approaches in 
determining the appropriate number of years to be used in applying TNMM. The 
profitability amount is affected by the business cycle; sometimes it will vary 
significantly within the business cycle. In this situation, it is necessary to use the 
entire business cycle to determine the range of net margins under the transactional net 
margin method (Feinschriber, 2001). 
Multiple-year data provide many advantages. Companies are subject to one-time 
events that create an abnormal change in company profits. The use of multiple years 
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evens out the results and in general eliminates the short-run issues that may lead 
taxpayers or tax collectors to reach inappropriate conclusions regarding the adequacy 
of transfer pricing policies. 
Another advantage of using multiple years concerns companies that use market 
penetration strategies. During the market penetration period, profits of the company 
will be lower than normal. Ordinarily, it is expected that a company engaged in a 
market penetration strategy will earn above-normal profits after the market 
penetration period to provide a return on its investment, that is, the below normal 
profits it earned during the penetration period. However, sometimes the market 
penetration is merely market maintenance and is pursued to allow the company to 
remain in business in the face of intense competition. In such cases, no return to the 
investment accrues to the company because the market conditions do not allow it. In 
these cases, a multiple-year analysis may be required to adequately assess the 
company's transfer pricing policies (Feinschriber, 2001). 
An average can be computed in several ways using multiple-year data. Margins can 
be computed for each company, across time, with a simple average being calculated. 
Alternatively, margins can be computed using a weighted average, so that years with 
higher sales will have more weight. By contrast, a yearly average of all comparables 
(either simple or weighted) could be computed, with these averages then averaged 
across time. The method of averaging depends on the reasons for using multiple-year 
data. If the overall business cycle is considered, averaging the individual results for 
each year may be the preferred method. In this case, company-to-company differences 
within a year are covered up, so that the overall profitability across time becomes 
clearer. 
While the Guidelines do not stress the importance of testing the reasonableness of the 
resulting transfer pricing policy, this is considered essential. The final step in 
determining transfer prices using TNMM (or any other method) is to check the 
reasonableness of the results using alternative measures or methods. If the true arm's- 
length range has been determined, it will be supported by alternative pricing 
measures. If significant differences occur in application of multiple methods, it is 
almost always the result of errors in either the comparables selection or application of 
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the method. 
5.2.2 Comparable Profits Method (CPM) 
CPM evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm's 
length, based on objective measures of profitability (profit-level indicators), which are 
derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in similar business activities under 
similar circumstances (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a)) Profit-level indicators are "ratios that 
measure relationships between profits and costs incurred or resources employed 
(Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b) (4)). Several profit-level indicators can be used, depending 
on the facts and circumstances of the tested party. Common profit-level indicators 
include rate of return on assets and financial ratios such as operating profits to sales or 
gross profits to operating expenses. The taxpayer must decide which profit-level 
indicator is most appropriate, or if a combination of profit-level indicators should be 
used. If a combination is used, the taxpayer must then determine the weights given to 
the various indicators. 
The taxpayer must also decide which party to the transaction should be used as the 
tested party. The tested party is the participant in the controlled transaction whose 
operating profit attributable to the controlled transactions can be verified using the 
most reliable data and requiring the fewest and most reliable adjustments, and for 
which reliable data regarding uncontrolled comparables can be located (Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.482-5(b)(2)(i)). Generally, the tested party will not own valuable intangible 
property or have other attributes that would differentiate it from uncontrolled 
comparables. 
Profit-level indicators are applied to the tested party's actual financial data associated 
with the controlled transactions under study. The tested party's profit-level indicators 
are then compared to those of uncontrolled comparables. Adjustments may be needed 
if there are wide discrepancies between the tested party and the comparables or 
among the comparables 
In applying CPM, Wright (2000) notes that some practitioners believe that selection 
of broadly similar companies does not require function and risk differences to be 
accounted for prior to determining the arm's-length range. CPM and TNMM are 
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identical from the standpoint of adjustments to account for function and risk 
differences. In this case, the U. S. regulations require the use of the inter-quartile range 
for setting transfer prices. Wright (2000) also mentions that other practitioners view 
function and risk adjustments as mandatory, if a true arm's-length range is to be 
determined. If adjustments are made, US regulations allow the use of the entire range. 
5.2.3 Comparison of TNMM and CPM 
MNEs should be interested in achieving a common worldwide approach to transfer 
pricing. Without a common approach, the probability of double taxation is 
unacceptably high and between TNMM and CPM can lead to double taxation. The 
main issue when comparing TNMM and CPM is the priority of these methods. While 
the 1994 US IRS regulations kept CPM and subjected the choice of methods to the 
best method rule, OECD guidelines issued in 1995 contained TNMM and specified 
that TNMM is a case of last resort. 
The principal distinction between TNMM of the OECD Guidelines and the CPM of 
the US regulations is their approach to aggregation of financial data about controlled 
and uncontrolled transactions. The CPM requires that the analysis be based on the 
"most narrowly identifiable business activity" for which financial data is available. By 
contrast, the OECD Guidelines start from the presumption that transactions are ideally 
analyzed individually and that each level of aggregation must be justified. Critics of 
the CPM in some OECD countries are concerned that "the most narrowly identifiable 
business activity" may exceed the degree of aggregation that would be acceptable 
under the OECD Guidelines (Taly, 1996). 
There are substantial similarities between TNMM and CPM. Highlights of the two 
methods are shown in Table 5-1. One minor difference is between TNMM and CPM 
is that OECD Guidelines recommend using uncontrolled transactions entered into by 
the taxpayer (internal comparables) to determine margins, if possible, before using 
comparable transactions between unrelated parties whereas US IRS regulations have 
no such suggestion. The use of internal comparables is certainly consistent with US 
regulations and, no doubt, would be determined to be more reliable as defined by the 
US regulations than would purely third-party data (external comparables). 
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A second difference between TNMM and CPM is that US IRS regulations specifically 
recommend using three years of data, whereas OECD Guidelines merely suggest the 
use of multiple years. This difference, likewise, should not be fatal to efficient 
worldwide tax administration as US regulations are broad enough to allow the use of 
an appropriate number of years so long as they are adequately explained. 
Table 5-1: Comparison of Comparable Profit Method (CPM) and Transactional Net 
Margin Method (TNMM) 
Profit-level indicators Three specified: None stated explicitly Numerator can 
" Operating income/ operating assets be net margin Denominator can be 
" Operating income/sales " Sales 
" Gross profit/operating expenses " Assets 
Others allowed " Costs 
Years of data used Recommended current plus two previous Recommended multiple years 
years 
Preferred Nothing stated Uncontrolled transactions of 
comparables taxpayer, then third-party 
comparables. 
Arm's length range Use of inter-quartile range if no Full range of results 
adjustments are made 
Adjustment point To median, or mean, if outside range None 
A third difference between TNMM and CPM is that OECD Guidelines require the 
numerator of all the profit-level indicators to be the net margin, whereas the US IRS 
regulations propose the ratio of gross profit to operating expenses as one of the profit 
level indicators (Berry ratio). The US IRS thus allows an additional profit indicator 
that can be helpful when comparables have different levels of operating expenses or 
when data from many countries are being used to determine transfer prices. 
The more substantive differences between OECD Guidelines and US IRS regulations 
lie in their treatment of ranges. OECD Guidelines state that it is important to take into 
account a range of results when using the transactional net margin method (OECD, 
1995, B. 3.45). The use of the range in this context could help reduce the effects of 
differences in the business characteristics of associated enterprises and any inde- 
pendent enterprises engaging in comparable uncontrolled transactions, because the 
range would permit results that occur under a variety of commercial and financial 
conditions. 
90 
For example, suppose the range of acceptable returns on assets for a manufacturer is 
three to seven percent of assets. If a tax authority, following OECD Guidelines, au- 
dited a manufacturing company in a year in which the company's actual return fell 
outside that range, the tax authority might be willing to consider arguments that would 
place the controlled manufacturing company at one or the other extreme within the 
range. For example, the tax authority might consider arguments that the appropriate 
return is 3 percent during weak years (that is, when the company was seeking to 
penetrate or maintain a market), while the appropriate return might be 7 percent 
during good years. The US IRS, on the other hand, according to the language of US 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(e)(2), requires the adjustment to the midpoint of 
the range (mean or median) under all circumstances. This difference can be extremely 
important and should be reconciled by the two taxing bodies. (More details will be 
forthcoming in the methodology and data analysis chapters 7 and 8. ) 
A further, important difference between TNMM and CPM is the use of the inter- 
quartile range, which excludes the top and bottom 25 percent of the range. The inter- 
quartile range is in US IRS regulations, but not OECD Guidelines. In essence, the US 
IRS allows taxpayers to use comparable data without adjustments for differences in 
functions and risks. In this case, the taxpayer is limited to the inter-quartile range for 
determination and evaluation of transfer prices with three issues arising as a result: 
1. Whether reliable results that may determine an arm's length price occur when 
no adjustments are made for function and risk differences; 
2. Whether narrowing the range to the inter-quartile range achieves the same 
results as would have occurred had the appropriate adjustments been made; 
and, 
3. Whether narrowing the profit range results in an arm's length price that 
increases/decreases companies' discretion. 
5 .3 
Comparables 
5.3.1 Overview 
OECD Guidelines hold that the results of uncontrolled transactions can serve as a 
useful benchmark for adjusting the results of controlled transactions only if the 
"economically relevant characteristics" of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions 
are "comparable" (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.15). For this purpose, transactions 
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are considered to be comparable only if. (1) any differences would have no material 
effect on the results; or, (2) any material effect can be eliminated by adjustments 
(OECD, 1995). 
The attributes of a transaction that may affect comparability are as follows: 
" The specific characteristics of the product or service being sold; 
" The functions performed by the parties; 
" Any contractual terms; 
" The economic circumstances of the parties; and, 
" The business strategies of the parties. (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.17) 
These attributes are essentially the same as the factors identified by US transfer 
pricing regulations as relevant to comparability. One purely formal distinction 
between OECD Guidelines and US IRS regulations is that US regulations treat the 
risks assumed by the parties as a separate factor, while OECD Guidelines treat risk as 
part of the functional analysis (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.23). 
As to contractual terms, OECD Guidelines reflect US regulations in cautioning that 
substance may vary from form in a controlled transaction and that the national tax 
administration should analyze comparability based upon the true terms of the 
transaction (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. 1, para. 1.29). Among the relevant 
"economic circumstances" listed in OECD Guidelines are the levels (wholesale vs. 
retail) and geographic location of the markets in which the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions take place (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. 1, para. 1.30), 
factors also emphasized US regulations. Among the relevant "business strategies" 
listed in OECD Guidelines are "market penetration schemes, " whereby a taxpayer 
may charge lower prices than uncontrolled enterprises in order to enter or expand into 
a new market (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. I, para. 1.32). Similar to US transfer 
pricing regulations, OECD Guidelines affirm that lower prices do not warrant an 
adjustment if the market penetration strategy is plausible and reasonably limited in 
time (1995 OECD Guidelines, Chap. I, para. 1.35). 
The use of comparables, by definition, means that one is using historical data to 
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determine a transfer price. A comparable transaction is a transaction between 
independent parties involving similar products/services and taking place under similar 
conditions. Comparables consist of two main types (See Figure 5-1): 
1. Internal comparable transaction -a transaction that takes place between the 
tested party and independent third parties which are used to make comparisons 
to a transaction that takes place between the tested party and its affiliates. 
Usually it contains information about the comparable transaction provided by 
the client, occurs within the context of the tested party's business and applied 
to the CUP method, but also applicable to the other transactional methods. 
2. External comparable transaction -a transaction that takes place between 
unrelated third parties which are used to make comparisons to a transaction 
that takes place between the tested party and its affiliates. It often contains 
information found via external sources (e. g., commercial databases, 
standardized financials, US SEC filing, trade journals, internet, etc), 
comparable search selection is subjective, and is normally applied when using 
the resale price, cost plus, profit split and transactional net margin methods. 
When companies consider which method allows the best result from the variety of 
methods for computing arm's length transfer pricing, they should consider the degree 
of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions that could be 
assessed by functions performed, contractual terms, risk undertaken, economic 
conditions, and nature of goods and services supplied. In addition, the quality of the 
available data could be assessed for completeness and accuracy, the quality of the 
assumptions in terms of their reliability should be considered, and the sensitivity of 
the results to deficiencies in either data or assumptions should be taken into account 
(Tyrrall et al., 1999). 
When the controlled transaction can be compared to a transaction between 
independent parties, the arm's length price is determined by a transactional analysis. 
Since comparability between a controlled and uncontrolled transaction is rarely exact, 
the uncontrolled transaction must ordinarily be adjusted to provide a reliable measure 
of an arm's length result. Alternatively, when comparable uncontrolled transactions 
cannot be identified, a profit-based analysis is used, comparing the profitability of a 
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transaction or a group of transactions to the profitability of similar uncontrolled 
companies. In such a case, the MNE does not search for comparable transactions, but 
rather for comparable companies. 
Figure 5-1: Types of Comparables Transactions 
......................................... ............................ 
Controlled Affiliate Controlled Controlled Affiliate 
.......................................: Transaction :............................. 
Compare with: 
............................ 
Controlled Affiliate Internal yýý 
............................: Comparable 
External 
It is impossible to prescribe exactly how comparables are determined, especially since 
every transaction and every company is so different that even transfer pricing 
regulations themselves do not offer specifics on the process for obtaining comparable 
sets which, according to Horst (Cole, 1999) remain vague. In addition, the transfer 
pricing method chosen will determine, to a large extent, how the search will be 
developed. 
Developing comparables may have two main problems. The first is simply that 
comparable prices and profits may have been higher or lower in previous years. The 
second is that the number of potential comparables may be distorted such as where 
companies cease trading and evidence either fails to enter public record or is deleted 
from publicly available databases. The latter is particularly problematic when dealing 
with transfer pricing investigations. If a comparable company ceased trading or fell 
into bankruptcy during a certain period, the comparable data in publicly available 
databases when the tax audit had started would only be that relating to companies that 
had survived. Thus while it is possible in hindsight to look for comparable data over 
the same years as those covered by an audit, the evidence may be somewhat distorted 
and distorted to the disadvantage of the taxpayer. 
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Problems may also arise when using commercially available databases to apply 
thresholds to determine whether a company will be included in the comparable set. 
Two of these thresholds are function and risk which include factors that should be 
considered such as size, industry, activity, profits, and others. 
Searching for comparable companies is a process that requires both qualitative and 
quantitative economic and financial analysis of a large number of potentially 
comparable companies with the overall process summarized as follows: 
1. Locate comparable companies from financial databases; 
2. Filter comparables based on qualitative and quantitative criteria; 
3. Obtain companies' full accounts from the databases; 
4. Adjust financial data, if necessary, to improve comparability; and, 
5. Establish a multi-year average (Casley et al, 2002, pg. 139). 
Before answering questions regarding the availability of data and its use, it is first 
necessary to consider the question of comparability. If a company does not have 
comparable transactions with third parties or when a comparable uncontrolled 
transaction cannot be found and there is no suitable open market price, one must find 
data on comparable companies. Utilizing the OECD's definition of "comparable 
transactions or companies" accepting data, comparable companies may be used if: 
" There are no differences which would significantly affect the price or profit 
margin; or, 
" There are such differences, where reasonable adjustments can be made to 
eliminate their effect. (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.15). 
5 . 3.2 
Company Size 
One of the major factors to be considered when developing comparable companies is 
obtaining data for a group of companies similar in size and nature to the "tested 
party". If a tested party has a higher level of sales, the results can be adjusted by 
removing those companies, previously considered comparable, with a materially 
lower level of sales. If on the other hand the tested party has a lower level of sales, 
further work is required to determine to what extent the range obtained is the correct 
result or whether the results are distorted. 
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The most compelling reason for excluding companies with the lowest levels of 
turnover is that they may be owner-managed businesses and thus run for the benefit of 
the owner, who may prefer to take dividends rather than salary. Therefore, all 
companies with particularly low levels of turnover ought to be excluded. The question 
of what an appropriate cut-off might be must be determined on a case-by-case basis 
and depends on the nature of the industry. Therefore, reviewing the industry involved 
remains good practice regardless of concerns about profitability (Casley et al, 2002). 
By excluding companies with low turnover and assets, much of the distortion that 
may result from the inclusion of smaller companies is removed. It then becomes a 
matter of judgment as to whether further elimination is necessary. Given that what is 
being sought in line with OECD recommendations is often a range (OECD, 1995, 
Para. 1.45), the question is not whether one company's results are right or wrong but 
whether the range is materially affected. 
5.3.3 Companies Ceasing/Starting to Trade 
It is important that when a company ceases to be included in publicly available 
databases, all of its results are removed from the dataset. Performing a search for 
comparables for a specified year might include a listing of companies that have 
ceased to trade. The company may have filed for bankruptcy, ceased to trade (activity 
change; industry classification change; name change, etc. ), or its results for a 
particular year when reported the following year have fallen below the thresholds for 
inclusion. For this reason, this research only included companies active and not 
newly formed, in the search for comparables. 
Whichever of these circumstances applies, the fact remains that there may be 
comparable companies whose results for the year will not be reported because their 
profits or profitability is too low. The same does not hold true in reverse. Companies 
with higher levels of turnover and higher profits will never be excluded in this 
manner. 
Another factor which may distort results is the arrival of companies which have 
started to trade or have formed new subsidiaries, such as those with start-up losses, or 
lower profitability. It is expected in the normal run of business that when some 
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companies exit a market others enter. Other than during periods of recession, 
problems that arise by companies ceasing to trade should be offset by that of 
companies entering the market (Casley et al, 2002). 
5.3.4 Matching Years 
The final problem to be considered in relation to comparable data is that of the results 
reported by comparable companies for the years prior to an economic condition and 
the presumably lower/higher results which would be appropriate for a specified year. 
If current prices were set prospectively on the basis of budgets or projections that do 
not predict the effects of economic conditions, then the effects of future economic 
conditions may generate the correct result. Specifically, if a gross margin was set 
using comparable data and was expected to give a particular return, lower sales or the 
greater effort required to make constant sales will result in lower profits. 
Other issues can be considered in the situation companies face when setting prices for 
a specified year when an economic condition is upon them, but in the absence of 
much of the detailed data for the previous year. To alleviate this problem, the OECD 
recommends the use of multiple year data (OECD, 1995, Para. 1.49) to examine data 
over a complete business cycle, or for as much of it as there is data to be found. 
Business cycles, however, can be long (possibly ten years from peak to peak) and the 
amount of data required to do this in full can be overwhelming. In many cases, 
however, it may not be necessary to collect data for the full cycle since half the cycle 
should eliminate any major imbalances in the data reported and give a fair result. 
Taking the assumption of a ten-year cycle for a given industry, in general terms this 
would imply that three to five years of data would give a reasonably reliable result. 
The effect of using multiple year data is that profits will be lower than they would 
otherwise be in a prosperous year and will be somewhat higher than they would be in 
a poor one. 
5 .4 
Applying TNMM and CPM 
5.4.1 Classification 
In selecting broadly comparable companies, both TNMM and CPM emphasizes the 
functions and risks of the tested party relative to those of the uncontrolled companies. 
These function-based and risk-based comparability standards are relatively relaxed, 
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and allow more flexibility for product comparability compared to traditional 
transaction-based methods (comparable uncontrolled price method, resale price 
method, and cost plus method). 
The focus on operating profitability makes CPM less sensitive to accounting 
classification differences than the traditional transaction-based methods. Therefore, 
CPM may be more appropriate than other methods in cases in which the financial data 
of the uncontrolled comparables are not sufficiently detailed to make reliable 
judgments about differences in accounting classifications between the uncontrolled 
comparables and the tested party. 
Classification differences are only one example of a data issue that taxpayers may 
face when testing their transfer prices. Taxpayers operating in countries outside of 
OECD member countries, specifically in countries that lack stringent financial 
reporting requirements, may find themselves dependent on erroneously reported 
financial data or reported information that lacks sufficient relevant income statement, 
balance sheet, and financial ratio data to perform a CPM or TNMM analysis using 
local comparables (Feinschriber, 2001). In addition to including companies with 
similar size in the datasets, this research uses four-digit SIC (standard industry 
classification) code and considers the business activity description of each company 
in order to obtain valuable comparable sets. 
5.4.2 Adjustment 
It is required that appropriate adjustments should be made for differences in functions, 
risks, economic conditions, and other factors for which reliable adjustments are 
possible, before performing comparisons. OECD and US IRS regulations do not 
provide specific formulas for incorporating adjustments into the analysis. Practitioners 
typically adjust for differences in terms of payment and inventory, as measured by 
relative accounts payable, accounts receivable, and inventory ratios. Based on the 
availability of reliable data and the relevance to the functions performed by the tested 
party, adjustments based on additional financial statement items may be incorporated 
into the analysis (Feinschriber, 2001). The adjusted data for the comparable 
companies establish the arm's-length range. The arm's-length range may consist of the 
results of all of the uncontrolled comparables that meet the following conditions: 
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"The information on the controlled transaction and the uncontrolled compara- 
bles is sufficiently complete that it is likely that all material differences have 
been identified, each such difference has a definite and reasonably 
ascertainable effect on price or profit, and an adjustment is made to eliminate 
the effect of each such difference" (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (e)(2)(iii)(A)). 
OECD Guidelines specify that a range of prices or profit results may qualify as arm's 
length. It also observes that a range may be particularly appropriate when TNMM is 
applied. Substantial deviations within the range may reflect variations in the reliability 
of data supporting the various points within the range. By contrast, US regulations 
suggest that such deviations may reflect a lack of complete comparability. OECD 
Guidelines do not follow the US approach of adjusting for suspiciously wide ranges 
by applying statistical methods such as the inter-quartile range, but rather simply 
proposes "further analysis. " Moreover, while US regulations provide that controlled 
transactions that fall without the arm's-length range will ordinarily be adjusted to the 
midpoint of the range, OECD Guidelines simply note that there are arguments both 
for adjusting to the midpoint and for adjusting to the nearest end point (OECD, 1995, 
Chap. I, paras. 1.45-1.48). 
Where differences in the characteristics of the companies being compared have a 
material effect on the net margins being used, it would not be appropriate to apply 
TNMM without making adjustments for such differences. OECD Guidelines 
emphasize that the methods are applied to "particular controlled transactions" out of 
concern that the methods might otherwise be applied on the basis of aggregate 
financial data of controlled and uncontrolled enterprises without sufficient regard to 
differences that may exist between their actual transactions (OECD, 1995, Chap. III, 
paras. 3.5,3.53). 
US IRS transfer pricing regulations suggest that, if it is not possible to make all 
adjustments, the arm's-length range should be statistically reduced to increase the 
reliability of the analysis. One method to statistically reduce the range that is 
presented in the regulations involves using an inter-quartile range (Treas. Reg. § 
1.482-5 (e)(2)(iii)(B)). The inter-quartile range includes the 25th to the 75th percentile 
of the results derived from the uncontrolled comparables (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 
(e)(2)(iii)(C)). Under this method of statistical reduction, the arm's length range for 
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the tested party's profitability is the inter-quartile range of the PLIs calculated using 
the financial data of the comparable companies. 
When employing CPM, transfer pricing regulations suggest that PLIs should be 
derived from data covering a sufficient period of time (multiple-year data) "to 
reasonably measure returns" to those parties (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (B)(4)). The time 
period generally recommended is at least three years, including the taxable year at 
issue. The use of multiple-year data may help to adjust for the effect of short-term 
variations unrelated to transfer prices that may affect a company's operating 
profitability. 
Following OECD, US IRS and practitioner guidelines, full ranges and quartile ranges 
were developed for this research sample (detailed in Chapter 6). In addition, five 
different PLIs, recommended by OECD Guidelines and the US IRS, were selected 
(detailed in 5.4.4). 
5.4.3 Performing a Functional Analysis and Identifying Comparables 
The first step in applying TNMM and CPM is to analyze the functions performed by 
the affiliate in question and the risks borne by that affiliate, and to determine whether 
the affiliate owns valuable intangible property. The second step is to identify 
potentially comparable transactions or companies. OECD Guidelines recommend 
using internal comparables, which are uncontrolled transactions in which the affiliate 
participates. Transactions in which the taxpayer is not involved should be used only if 
there are no internal comparable transactions. The OECD Guideline's approach is 
consistent with Section 482 of US IRS regulations. Companies have much more 
detailed information about transactions in which they participate than unrelated 
transactions in which they do not participate. As a result, the comparability of the 
transactions can be evaluated with more accuracy than when data is limited to 
publicly available information from third-party transactions. For the purpose of this 
research, all data was gathered from publicly available sources due to the restrictive 
nature of internal data. 
A function and risk assessment should be performed once the comparables have been 
identified, whether the comparables are internally generated or the company is relying 
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on external comparables. This function and risk analysis is necessarily less thorough 
for external comparables than for analysis of the affiliated party. Since the goal is to 
obtain the "correct" arm's-length answer, great care must be taken to ensure that all 
differences that can affect profitability are identified and accounted for through 
adjustments to the comparables. 
OECD Guidelines do not discuss adjustments for differences in function and risk in 
much detail. Instead, they emphasize the need to carefully choose comparables that 
are as similar in function and product as is possible. "Where differences in 
characteristics of the enterprises being compared have a material effect on the net 
margins being used, it would not be appropriate to apply the transactional net margin 
method without making adjustments for such differences" (OECD, 1995, B. 3.53). 
In applying CPM, the selection of broadly similar companies does not require 
function and risk differences to be accounted for prior to determining the arm's-length 
range. CPM and TNMM are identical from the standpoint of adjustments to account 
for function and risk differences. In this case, US regulations require the use of the 
inter-quartile range for setting transfer prices. Function and risk adjustments are 
viewed as mandatory if a true arm's-length range is to be determined. 
Due to the absence of a tested party and the lack of defined information, this research 
uses four-digit SIC codes and qualitative descriptions of the companies in order to 
control for functions of the companies in the comparable datasets. 
5.4.4 Choosing, Profit-Level Indicators (Profit Measures) 
After deciding which comparables are to be used, and whether to make adjustments 
for differences in functions and risks, it is necessary to choose a particular measure of 
profitability in applying TNMM and CPM. OECD Guidelines are not very specific 
regarding the profit measures that can be employed. In general, it is a good idea to 
employ more than one profitability measure, using one to test the reasonableness of 
the others. Using this additional measure to test the selected method provides 
additional assurance that the transfer pricing is reasonable, assuming, of course, that 
the other method yields a result consistent with the original method chosen. The 
choice among profit level indicators generally depends on the nature of activities of 
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the tested party, the reliability of available data, and the extent to which the profit 
level indicators produce a reliable measure of an arms' length result (Treas. Reg. § 
1.482-5 (b)(4)). All the profit-level measures used in TNMM are based on operating 
income, which is gross profit less operating expenses. Typically, return on assets 
(operating income/assets) or return on sales (operating income/net sales) are the two 
profit-level measures analyzed to determine transfer prices. 
OECD Guidelines state that "net margins are less affected by transactional differences 
than is the case with price, as used in the CUP method. " The Guidelines further state, 
"The net margins also may be more tolerant to some functional differences between 
the controlled and uncontrolled transactions than gross profit margins" (OECD, 1995, 
B. 3.27). In addition, the net margin may be less sensitive to differences in generally 
accepted accounting practices across countries and by companies within a country. 
OECD Guidelines list several considerations to take into account when deciding 
which profit measure to use, including "how well the value of assets employed in the 
calculations is measured" (e. g., to what extent there is intangible property, the value 
of which is not realized on the books), and "the factors affecting whether specific 
costs should be passed through, marked up, or excluded entirely from the calculation" 
(OECD, 1995, B. 3.41). The language does not provide much guidance as to the 
choice of a profitability measure, with the measure chosen possibly having a 
significant impact on the validity of the transfer prices. Profit margin might be a good 
measure when evaluating a distributor (or other type of selling company) and can be 
justified to use for other similar activities in determining an arm's length profit range. 
To establish an arm's-length range of operating profitability, CPM examines the PLIs 
achieved by companies whose function and risk are broadly similar to those of the 
tested party. These comparisons are typically performed on a period-weighted average 
basis, using multiple-year data for both the broadly comparable companies and the 
tested party during the same time period. 
CPM presents specific examples of PLIs that may provide a reliable basis for 
comparing operating profits of the tested party and uncontrolled comparables in the 
transfer pricing regulations. These measures are the return on capital employed, the 
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net margin (operating margin), and the Berry ratio. 
Transfer pricing regulations also allow the use of other PLIs appropriate to the facts 
and circumstances of the controlled company and its inter-company transactions. 
Specifically, transfer pricing regulations permit the use of other PLIs if such measures 
reliably indicate the income that the tested party would have earned had it dealt with 
companies at arm's length (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (b)(4)(iii)). Under this provision, 
any measure of profit based on objective measures of profitability, derived from 
uncontrolled comparables that engage in sufficiently similar business activities under 
similar risks and circumstances, may be employed. 
Transfer pricing regulations do not express a strong preference for choosing among 
PLIs. However, consistent with selecting the best method of analysis under the 
regulations, a critical factor to consider in selecting an appropriate PLI is the extent to 
which that PLI is likely to produce a reliable measure of an arm's-length result. This 
may be determined based on the criteria described under the best method rule for 
CPM (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (C)(2)). Factors that may affect the reliability of the 
results achieved may include the functions performed by the tested party and the reli- 
ability of the available tested party data relative to the data of the uncontrolled 
comparables (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (C)). 
Several profit-level indicators can be used, depending on the facts and circumstances 
of the tested party. Common profit-level indicators include rate of return on assets and 
financial ratios such as operating profits, sales or gross profits, operating expenses, 
and others. The taxpayer must decide which profit-level indicator is most appropriate, 
or if a combination of profit-level indicators should be used. If a combination is used, 
the taxpayer must then determine the weights given to the various indicators. For the 
purpose of this research, five different profit measures (PLIs) based on 
recommendations by OECD Guidelines and the US IRS and used by practitioners 
were obtained (Tyrrall et al, 1999). The rationale for selecting multiple PLIs being to 
provide a more in-depth analysis to demonstrate how the five PLIs perform within 
each comparable set (detailed PLI descriptions and formulas provided in 5.4.4.1-5) 
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5.4.4.1 Profit margin 
Profit margin %, calculated as follows: 
Average 3-year (1998-2000) profit before tax /Average 3 year (1998-2000) turnover 
Profit before tax = Turnover - Total expenses +other income - Interest paid +/_ Exceptional Items 
5.4.4.2 Profit margin on sales 
Profit margin on sales %, calculated as follows: 
Average 3 -year (1998-2000) operating profit/Average 3 -year (1998-2000) turnover 
Operating profit a Turnover- Cost of Sales 
5.4.4.3 Net margin 
Net margin (%), calculated as follows: 
Average 3 -year (1998-2000) operating profit/Average 3 -year (1998-2000) total cost 
Operating profit - Turnover - Cost of Sales 
Total Cost - Cost of Sales + Other Expenses 
5.4.4.4 Berry ratio 
Berry ratio (%), calculated as follows: 
Gross profit average (1998-2000) / Cost of sales average (1998-2000) 
Gross profit - Turnover - Cost of sales average 
5.4.4.5 Return on assets 
Return on assets, calculated as follows: 
Profit before tax average (1998-2000) /Assets 3 -year average (1998-2000) 
Profit before tax -Turnover -Total expenses +other income -Interest paid +/ Exceptional Items 
5.4.5 Determining the Appropriate Time Period for Analysis 
Once the profit measure or measures have been chosen, they must be computed for 
each of the comparables and for the controlled transaction. The number of years of 
financial data that should be considered is open to question. OECD Guidelines 
provide no specific advice, merely stating, "Multiple year data should be considered 
to take into account the effects on profits of product life cycles and short-term 
economic conditions" (OECD, 1995, B. 3.44). For the purpose of this study the most 
recent and comprehensive data was used covering the years 1998,1999, and 2000. 
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(A) Decision to Use Multiple Years 
Multiple-year data provide many advantages. Businesses are subject to one-time 
events that create an abnormal change in company profits. The use of multiple years 
evens out the results and in general eliminates the short-run issues that may lead 
taxpayers or tax collectors to reach inappropriate conclusions regarding the adequacy 
of transfer pricing policies. 
Another advantage of using multiple years concerns companies that use market 
penetration strategies. During the market penetration period, profits of a company will 
be lower than normal. Ordinarily, it is expected that a company engaged in a market 
penetration strategy will earn above-normal profits after the market penetration period 
to provide a return on its investment, that is, the below normal profits it earned during 
the penetration period. However, sometimes the market penetration is merely market 
maintenance and is pursued to allow the company to remain in business in the face of 
intense competition. In such cases, no return to the investment accrues to the company 
because the market conditions do not allow it. In these cases, a multiple-year analysis 
may be required to adequately assess the company's transfer pricing policies. These 
advantages are factored in the design of this research and averages are developed for 
the selected period. In addition, a more in-depth analysis of low profitability (average 
operating losses) companies will be provided in Section 3 of Chapters 6 and 7 due to 
the large number of companies with operating losses identified. 
(B) Determining the Average or the Range 
An average can be computed in several ways using multiple-year data. Margins can 
be computed for each company, across time, with a simple average being calculated. 
Alternatively, margins can be computed using a weighted average, so that years with 
higher sales will have more weight. By contrast, a yearly average of all comparables 
(either simple or weighted) could be computed, with these averages then averaged 
across time. The method of averaging depends, to some degree, on the reasons for 
using multiple-year data. If the overall business cycle is considered, averaging the 
individual results for each year may be the preferred method. In this case, company- 
to-company differences within a year are suppressed, so that the overall pattern of 
profitability across time becomes clearer. 
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Averaging results within a year is not as meaningful if the profitability of companies 
within an industry is highly affected by the product life cycle and different companies 
are in different portions of the product life cycle in any given year. The two 
techniques will give the same answer if simple averages are employed. For the 
purpose of this research, a simple three-year (1998-2000) average has been calculated 
using the yearly data from the companies' annual accounts. 
5.4.6 Selecting the Appropriate Data Source 
The effect of selecting TNMM or CPM is usually driven largely by the nature of the 
data available. Both TNMM and CPM require the availability of a great deal of data 
on a wide range of private and public companies in addition to a high level of 
disclosure and detailed data. In the US, gross margin data is quite likely to be 
available in both public and private companies but not at a transactional level, nor 
even by product line or business segment. The UK recognizes the US position (and 
the OECD's concern) that small differences in product or level of the market are likely 
to have a greater effect on prices and gross margins than they have on operating 
margins. Operating profits, defined as turnover less cost of sales, for suitably 
comparable companies may well be the most reliable data a taxpayer has available. 
Two factors distinguish the UK (OECD) position from the US (IRS) position. First, in 
the absence of the level of detail available in the US it is often impossible to apply 
TNMM in quite the precise way the OECD seems to envisage in its Guidelines. Of 
necessity, then, the mechanism by which TNMM is applied looks very similar to the 
US application of CPM. Specifically, the operating profits of a number of companies 
are reviewed and a range of results is determined which is then used to set prices 
and/or evaluate the effects of transfer prices set. 
The second factor is one that renders the result of this process, similar to CPM, closer 
to the OECD's explanation of TNMM. Since there is a great deal of data available on 
the profitability of private as well as public companies it is possible to ensure that the 
companies being used for the purposes of comparison are not the larger and more 
diverse businesses which are generally quoted on a stock market exchange. In practice 
then, it is likely that the use of private company data in the UK means that the 
application of this process does indeed conform to the narrower profitability analysis 
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which the OECD recommends (Casley, 1999). 
The use of private company data is not without its problems. There is, for example, a 
risk that results will be affected by non-arm's length transactions with shareholders. 
These non-arm's length transactions may take the form of inter-company transactions 
or appropriations in the form of salaries. This factor is common to all countries where 
private company data is available but in the UK at least, accounting standards are 
tightening up in this area requiring greater disclosure of such transactions. In addition, 
the risk is greatest in relation to small and mid-size companies that have turnover less 
than £11.2m; balance sheet total less than £5.6m; and, less than 250 employees. For 
this study, these smaller and mid-size companies have been excluded from the 
comparables analysis. 
Because MNEs need to provide documentation on the property being transferred, as 
well as on the economic and market conditions surrounding the controlled versus 
uncontrolled transactions and the contractual terms that have been agreed upon, the 
use of databases has become noticeably more important in the search for comparables 
by MNEs. Databases are useful tools since they contain information from public 
disclosures on a large number of sectors and companies. In addition, the dependent 
and independent transactions need to be evaluated in terms of the functions 
performed, risks assumed and intangibles held by the parties involved (Cools, 1999). 
Searching databases for comparables usually starts on very general terms with an 
initially broad sector definition resulting in a large number of potentially comparable 
companies. More specific industry codes can then be used to gradually refine the 
delineation of the sector and to eliminate all companies which are not concentrated in 
the defined activity. A number of suggested criteria (Cools, 1999; Tyrrall et al, 1999) 
were used by this study to filter a small selection of the most similar companies. First, 
companies engaged in a variety of different activities are excluded from the 
comparables group. Second, companies lacking important financial data can be elimi- 
nated. The similarity of the products transferred by the comparable company is 
another factor to evaluate, as is the maturity of the comparable company, its size (in 
terms of sales volume, earnings levels or number of employees), growth prospects and 
competitive position. 
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Functional similarity (in terms of the activities carried on, the assets owned and the 
risks undertaken by the relevant parties) of the remaining companies should be 
incorporated explicitly in the documentation which is maintained for the tax 
authorities. The final aspect of the search for comparables often consists of a review 
of the annual reports (Must be consistent with UK GAAP) of the potential 
comparables. The resulting selection should consist of companies engaged in 
activities which approximate as much as possible the activity which is the subject of 
the search. Available prices and margins will be used as comparables. Based on all 
relevant evaluation points, necessary adjustments can be made to the comparable sets 
and ratios in order to construct an arm's length range. 
"In the context of comparables and functional analysis, the information 
elements included in a database are very important. While some databases 
focus on annual reports, others offer descriptive business information or 
provide shareholder links. The presentation of financial statements varies 
significantly from database to database. Complete accounts are sometimes 
reported, along with precalculated financial ratios, while other databases 
report only abstracts from annual accounts. Consolidated and separate income 
statements per company product line are sometimes provided. " (Cools, 1999, 
pg. 169). 
When developing comparables for this research, the search for an appropriate 
database was conducted in order to obtain independent private and public companies 
that fulfilled the minimum requirements: annual financial statements for the years 
ended 1998-2000; description of business activity; standard industrial classification 
(SIC) code; unconsolidated accounts; and, other qualitative and quantitative 
information. 
There are several sources of third party comparable data available for developing 
comparables in the UK. By way of comparison it is worth noting that whilst a typical 
US database would contain data on roughly 15,000 companies, the principal databases 
used in the United Kingdom contain data on over 200,000 (Casley, 1999). Thus, the 
large number of companies available offers the answer to the problem of detailed 
disclosure. Examining TNMM and CPM on UK data provides a comprehensive 
analysis as it ensures coverage of large numbers of companies. It is necessary to 
obtain a sufficiently large sample to ensure that the resulting range is not materially 
distorted by a few companies which are not truly comparable. 
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"The practical effect of these considerations is that CPM and TNMM, 
carefully applied, are not so far apart in the UK as might be the case in other 
jurisdictions. As a result, TNMM is increasingly used by taxpayers to set or 
evaluate transfer prices. Inland Revenue is not permitted to disclose data 
obtained from other taxpayers meaning that they could not use it in tax court 
proceedings. The practical effect of this is that "secret comparables" are not 
used in the UK although IR is quite adept at transferring the experience it 
gains in dealing with one taxpayer to its investigation of the next. " (Casley, 
1999, pg. 6) 
If the distinction between CPM and TNMM is that a TNMM analysis is performed on 
a narrower income statement, then it would appear that the nature of the data available 
in the UK goes a long way towards ensuring that the main concerns of the OECD are 
largely met. Whether it is called CPM or TNMM, any method which selects a suitable 
profit level indicator and establishes a range of results from a reasonably sized sample 
of companies is, in fact, an acceptable method. 
5.5 Summary 
The transactional net margin method endorsed in OECD Guidelines and the 
comparables profit method used by the IRS are conceptually the same method of 
determining transfer prices. The differences between the two methods lie in the 
nuances of their application, particularly the priority in applying these methods (best 
method rule vs. last resort) and the US IRS emphasis on the inter-quartile range and 
adjustment to the midpoint. Several factors must be carefully considered when 
applying TNMM and CPM. Many of the same factors must be considered in applying 
any transfer pricing method. 
In theory, comparables face tension which would suggest that MNEs have a 
competitive advantage whereas the regulations reinforce that they should be 
equivalents. Given this theoretical tension, the comparable should include function 
and risk of indigenous company and data. The conceptual implication of examining 
different methods of creating comparables should relate to the function and risk 
profile. That raises the question whether different methods of creating comparables 
comply to a greater or lesser extent to function and risk? 
By more closely inspecting comparable ranges by differing regulations among 
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different industries, testing performance of foreign-owned companies (profit and 
taxes), and examining the loss making companies which are ignored under the new 
profit methods, this study helps to answer whether the new methods curb MNE 
discretion. Even if discretion is safeguarded, the regulations may change MNE 
behavior in respect of taxes. Thus, contemporaneous documentation may cause 
existing methods to be re-evaluated. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Method and Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
One of the main lessons to be drawn from different regulatory frameworks adopted by 
different countries as discussed in Chapters Four and Five is that different countries 
are subject to different rules, regulations, and recommendations from their tax 
authorities and governments. The exercise of discretion may be country based and can 
be possible by methods chosen. The importance of comparables and comparables data 
is strengthened through the adoption of profit based methods. 
The lack of experience with the application of transactional profit methods across a 
representative number of OECD member countries makes it difficult to precisely fix 
all the limitations on the use of these methods. Transactional profit methods are being 
recognized as methods that assist in determining cases of last resort whether transfer 
pricing complies with the arm's length principle. In addition, testing profit-based 
methods will illuminate the quality of the recommended documentation including 
comparables that companies are required to prepare under the new UK requirements 
corporation tax self-assessment. This chapter addresses the methodology adopted 
throughout this research and provides a detailed description of each of the four 
sections of this research including the related hypotheses for each individual section, 
and an explanation of each of the relevant statistical tests used. 
6.2 Research Methodology 
This research adopts a more positivist methodological paradigm. It is structured upon 
the ontological position that reality is external and objective (Easterby et al, 1996), 
and that the patterns and regularities that are exhibited in society are not simply 
random (Rose & Sullivan, 1996). This study is primarily faced with the task of 
identifying the causal explanations and the fundamental laws that underlie these 
regularities in human social behavior. Nearer to the objectivist end of the subjective- 
objective continuum put forward by Morgan and Smircich (1980), this research takes 
on a methodological approach that is principally based on the ontological assumption 
that the social world is an evolving process, concrete in nature, but ever-changing in 
detailed form. Everything is seen as interacting with everything else, making as such 
the endeavor to find determinate causal relationships between constituent processes an 
extremely difficult task. 
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Within this ontological context, human beings are seen as existing in an ongoing 
interactive relationship with their contextual world, influencing and being influenced 
by it. The process of exchange that operates between the individual and the 
environment is essentially a competitive one; the individual is seen as seeking to 
interpret and exploit the environment to satisfy important needs, and hence survive. 
Following classic empirical social sciences research, and on the premises of the 
theory-testing, hypothetico-deductive approach, this study begins with theory - seen 
as a form of selective focusing, a means of separating out from a complex, confusing 
world those elements of social reality that warrant special attention and investigation, 
and then aims, on the basis of the selected theory, to deduce and further test 
hypotheses about relationships which ought to exist if the theory is correct. It is 
specifically within this positivist methodological context of theory statement, concept 
operationalization, and hypothesis testing via prediction and empirical observation, 
that the present research endeavour progresses (Figure 6-1). 
This study seeks to investigate the phenomenon of comparables of the profit-based 
method of ITP, profits and losses of foreign-owned companies (Japanese- and US- 
owned) compared to domestic owned companies in the UK and, tax payments of 
foreign-owned companies (Japanese and US-owned) compare to domestic companies 
in the UK through the use of the secondary data source FAME database. In the 
course of this study, and within the selected methodological path: 
1. An initial research problem has been identified. 
2. The theoretical concepts that form the propositions have been initially 
clarified (operational definitions of the concepts involved, each conceptual 
proposition of the previous stage has been usefully restated in testable 
terms in order to develop a set of research hypotheses). 
3. On the basis of the concept operationalization, and by means of 
observation, relevant data have been collected, processed and analysed in 
an attempt to falsify the stated hypotheses, that is, in an attempt to reach a 
conclusion about whether or not (and to what extent) the results obtained 
lend support to the hypotheses. 
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4. Finally, an effort has been made, so that the conclusions drawn from the 
findings, as well as any further insights gained in the overall process of the 
study, are brought to bear on the initial research problem. 
In addition to the main research method, this study conducted interviews to check the 
validity of the findings. As defined by Denzin (1970) triangulation is the combination 
of methodologies in study of the same phenomenon. Denzin argues multiple and 
independent methods, especially if investigating the same problem and reaching the 
same conclusion, have greater validity and reliability than a single methodological 
approach to a problem. 
Figure 6-1: The process of deduction 
Theory /Hypothesis Formulation 
Operationalization 
translation of abstract concepts into indicators or measures that enables 
I Testing of Theory Through Observation of I 
the Empirical World 
Falsification and Discarding 
Theory 
Creation of, as yet Unfalasifled 
Covering Laws that Explain Pass 
and Predict Future 
Observations 
Source: (Gill, J. - Johnson 2002, Pg. 39) 
While the methodological core of this research for Section 1 is limited to the rules and 
recommendations of OECD and US IRS regulations, the remaining three sections are 
based on the shortcomings of previous empirical studies. Data was collected by 
means of electronic database (FAME) and was designed to obtain measurements of. 
- Profit ranges (PLIs); 
- Size; 
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- Operating performance, 
- Ownership; and, 
- Taxation. 
The research design only considers null hypotheses. Alternative hypotheses such as 
Japanese subsidiaries reporting lower profits than their UK counterparts could not be 
adequately tested by this research at this time for a number of reasons. Most 
empirical evidence is US-based with a limited number of UK-based studies. In 
addition, very few empirical studies (Munday & Peel, 1997) were conducted based on 
1993-1994 data (before the introduction of profit based methods), while others 
(Oyelere and Emmanuel) did not focus on comparables. US evidence was monitored 
under different tax systems than the UK and was subject to substantial changes i. e. 
IRS 1986 Changes. 
This research tests comparables based on PLIs suggested by profit methods. 
Alternative hypotheses might require different profit measures than the ones used by 
comparable methods. It is entirely possible that other elements such as government 
policy could influence whether higher or lower profits were reported overseas or at 
home. As noted from Chapter Three, empirical studies are limited in testing MNEs' 
discretion. Although alternative hypotheses have been recognized, there is no 
foundation either theoretically or empirically to test them in UK settings. 
The FAME database was chosen as the most suitable method given the particular 
characteristics and ends of the research endeavour. One strong argument for the 
employment of a database with annual accounts data is to test the profit-based 
methods TNMM and CPM, which requires data on a wide range of private and public 
companies in addition to a high level of disclosure and detailed data. Financial 
information is necessary to examine comparables and the performance of foreign. 
owned companies. 
From a methodological point of view, the use of secondary data (financial statements) 
carries a number of advantages. Because it is formalized and published, secondary 
data often comes to be attributed with an exaggerated status of 'truth'. Its objectivity 
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is taken at face value, and its reliability is considered equivalent to that of the 
publication in which it appears. Thus greater integrity is accorded to information from 
a recognized and accepted source such as the FAME database which obtain the data 
from records filed at Companies House, consistent with UK GAAP, accepted by the 
IR, and used by practitioners. 
According to Thietart et al, (2001), formalization of data in a ready to use format can 
lead researchers to take the validity of this data, which they are manipulating, for 
granted. Similarly received ideas exist about the impact secondary data has on the 
research's internal validity. The apparently strict organization of available data can 
suggest that it would be easier to control the internal validity of research based on it. 
However, internal validity should be demonstrated through the validity of the 
constructs it uses, that is, by clarifying and justifying the connections between the 
construct and the operational procedure through which it is manipulated (Stablein, 
1996). Podsakoff and Dalton (1987) found that only 4.48 percent of authors provided 
proof of the validity of their constructs in the published articles they examined. The 
formalization of secondary data can thus be wrongly assimilated to an intrinsic 
soundness. This last received idea leads researchers to believe their research will 
somehow be made secure by the use of secondary data. But, by attributing an a priori 
degree of confidence to the secondary data they manipulate, researchers are in fact 
simply externalizing (by passing this responsibility to others) the risks connected to 
the internal validity of their work (Thietart et al, 2001). 
The same shortcomings apply to the use of secondary data to increase the validity of 
results and their generalization. External validity is also conditioned, by the validity of 
the work the secondary data has been drawn from. 
"The greater accessibility of secondary data is another disputable received 
idea. Such a belief can give researchers an impression of the completeness of 
their research, convinced they have had access to all available data. The 
apparent ease of accessing secondary data can lead researchers either to be 
quickly inundated with too much data, or to be too confident that they have 
'gone over the whole question" (Thietart et al, 2001, pg. 75). 
Parallel to the common acceptance that secondary data is fairly inflexible (thus 
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making such data difficult to manipulate), which can in turn cause researchers to 
believe that secondary data must be more reliable than primary data. This is, however, 
a naive belief as the fact that secondary data is fixed and formalized does not in any 
way signify that the phenomena it describes are similarly fixed and formalized. As 
shown previously in Chapter Five, developing comparables and obtaining data on 
different group of companies is complicated and involves researcher judgment. In 
other words, the use of secondary data such as databases can bring with it greater 
exposure to a maturation effect. 
To increase the study's ecological validity, this research collected data from a primary 
source by the mean of series of interviews that could enrich and provide triangulation 
for and authentication of the findings that emerged from the use of the database. The 
participants were mainly consultants and tax and ITP experts. 
6.3 Research Design 
The research design consists of four different sections: a comparison of the OECD'S 
TNMM and the US IRS' CPM; a comparative analysis of foreign-owned vs. UK- 
owned companies; an analysis of operating losses, and, a tax analysis. Figure 6-2 
outlines the main research questions, identifies the sequence of the research 
questions, states the data obtained and the matching criteria for each research 
question, and presents the linkage between the research questions and the findings. 
The first section provides an investigation of comparable companies in the UK. By 
applying profit-based methods of transfer pricing (TNMM and CPM), Section 1 
highlights OECD profit ranges and compares them to US IRS profit ratios using the 
same data sets. It also presents the variation between these two methods in practice 
and offers comparisons between profit measures for the purpose of providing 
comparable ranges. Finally, Section 1 provides analysis of the PLIs for each of the 
sample industries in an attempt to draw a conclusion on TNMM and CPM in terms of 
the alternatives they provide for MNEs' compliance. 
117 
Figure 6-2: Research Map 
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The second section extends previous research by presenting a comparative analysis 
between the performances (profitability measures) of foreign-owned companies (US- 
and Japanese-owned) against the performance of domestic UK-owned companies. In 
addition, Section 2 attempts to highlight the importance of the form of the investment 
represented by joint ventures on the performance of foreign-owned companies. 
The third section of this research endeavors to provide some lessons by comparing 
foreign-owned companies (US-owned and Japanese-owned) with negative operating 
profits to UK-owned companies. Section 3 attempts to provide some evidence on the 
existence of large number of loss making foreign companies since non-profitable 
companies cannot remain perpetually active. 
The fourth section focuses on the latest UK transfer pricing regulations introduced in 
1998 corporation tax self-assessment and its impact on the behavior of both foreign- 
owned and UK-owned companies. By comparing the amount of tax expense reported 
by foreign-owned companies (US- and Japanese-owned) and UK-owned companies 
prior and subsequent to the latest UK 1998 regulations, Section 4 provides an 
overview of the ramifications of the contemporaneous documentation. 
Finally, a number of interviews were conducted with ITP specialists in order to 
validate the findings in the prior four sections as well as to obtain an update on ITP 
developments on both theoretical and practical matters. 
6.3.1 Section 1: OECD (TNMM) vs. US IRS (CPM) 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, TNMM shares several common principles with 
the CPM. For example, both CPM and TNMM indicate the use of a range of 
operating profitability measures to test whether a transfer price 
is consistent with an 
arm's length standard, allow for the use of multiple-year data, require adjustments for 
differences between the tested party and uncontrolled comparables that would affect 
price, emphasize functional comparability in selecting uncontrolled comparables, and 
require examination of data from only one side of the transaction. OECD Guidelines 
state, "it is important to take into account a range of results when using TNMM 
(OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.45). The use of a range of adjusted results controls for 
unique business circumstances among the comparable companies and the tested party. 
119 
CPM similarly suggests the use of a range of results derived from all comparable 
companies identified, once appropriate adjustments have been incorporated. CPM 
discussion in the transfer pricing regulations recommends the statistical reduction of 
the range of observations of the comparables if it is not possible to make all 
adjustments, and provides the inter-quartile range as an example of a statistical 
reduction method. TNMM also does not prescribe a specific method for narrowing the 
range of comparables identified. OECD Guidelines acknowledge "because transfer 
pricing is not an exact science, there may be many occasions when the application of 
the most appropriate method or methods produces a range of figures which are 
relatively reliable. " (OECD, 1995, Chap. I, para. 1.45). 
OECD Guidelines, similar to US IRS transfer pricing regulations, suggest that 
multiple-year average data be examined for both the controlled and uncontrolled 
parties to the extent that operating profitability is compared using a profit-based 
method such as TNMM or CPM (OECD, 1995, Chap. III, paras. 3.44). Use of 
multiple-year data provides information about relevant business or product cycles that 
may have a material effect on transfer pricing conditions assessed in determining 
comparability. TNMM, similar to CPM, is more tolerant of functional differences 
than transaction based methods because "differences in functions performed between 
enterprises are often reflected in variations in operating expenses. " (OECD, 1995, 
Chap. III, para. 3.27). Therefore, a set of independent companies may display wide 
disparities in PLIs but similar levels of operating profits. 
TNMM also recommends the use of several financial ratios in establishing an arm's- 
length range. The financial ratios presented in the TNMM discussion in OECD 
Guidelines include the return on capital employed (referred to as the "return on 
assets"), operating income to sales (which is equivalent to the net margin described in 
the CPM discussion), and other possible measures of net profit (OECD, 1995, Chap. 
III, para. 3.27). 
Similar to CPM, under TNMM, the choice of financial ratios is based on available 
financial data. For example, the extent to which the value of the assets employed in 
the business activities may be measured is essential to the application of the return on 
assets. If the income, costs, and assets of the relevant business activity and the other 
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activities cannot be isolated, OECD Guidelines state that: 
The principal distinctions between TNMM and CPM are the application of method 
(TNMM (last resort) vs. CPM (best method)) and their approach to aggregation of 
financial data concerning controlled and uncontrolled transactions. CPM requires that 
the analysis be based on the "most narrowly identifiable business activity" for which 
financial data is available. By contrast, OECD Guidelines begin on the presumption 
that transactions are ideally analyzed individually and that each level of aggregation 
must be justified. "Aside from the issue of when it is appropriate to use, a careful 
application of CPM is fully consistent with the TNMM rules of the OECD 
Guidelines" (Cole, pg, 9-35). Critics of CPM in some OECD countries are concerned 
that "the most narrowly identifiable business activity" may exceed the degree of 
aggregation that would be acceptable under the Guidelines (Taly, 1996). 
6.3.1.1 Hypotheses - Section 1 
UK based Companies that incurred 3-yr. (1998-2000) average operating losses, or 
maintained consolidated accounts (in the case of a group of companies with a 
common parent company) were eliminated from this test. 
Hypothesis 1: Full Profit Range vs. Inter-Quartile Profit Range 
The two methods of regulating transfer price are the OECD's TNMM and the US 
IRS's CPM. The OECD describes TNMM as computing the appropriate net profit on 
particular transactions or groups of transactions. TNMM is usually applied when 
comparing the net margin resulting from a group of related party transactions with the 
net profit margins of independent companies that are engaged in broadly comparable 
transactions. Under CPM, the profitability of the user affiliate's closest competitor 
(operating in the same or similar market as the user affiliate but without the 
intangible) is used to compute a "normal" profit for the user affiliate. The user 
affiliate's profitability net of royalty payment must be equal to the profitability of its 
closest competitor which does not have the intangible. Essentially the principle 
underlying this arm's length return concept is that a user affiliate may earn the same 
return (or profitability) as a competitor who does not have the intangible. 
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This section attempts to answer several issues that arise as a result of the OECD's 
adoption of TNMM and the US IRS' adoption of CPM including, whether there are, 
in fact, substantial differences between TNMM and CPM; how TNMM and CPM is 
applied in practical situations; the relative strengths and weaknesses of TNMM and 
CPM. This leads to the question of whether OECD and US IRS international transfer 
pricing (ITP) regulations as represented by TNMM and CPM, where applied, are able 
to determine the arm's length price? To help answer this research question, a null 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hol: There are no differences between OECD profit ranges (represented by a full 
range) and IRS profit ranges (represented by inter-auartile ranges). 
Hypothesis 2: Profit Level Indicators (PLIs) in All Industries Combined 
After deciding which comparables are to be used, and whether to make adjustments 
for differences in functions and risks, it is necessary to select a particular measure of 
profitability in applying TNMM and CPM. OECD Guidelines are not very specific 
regarding the profit measures that can be employed. In general, it is feasible to 
employ more than one PLI or profitability measure. Using this additional measure to 
test the selected method provides additional assurance that the profit range is 
reasonable, assuming, of course, that the other method yields a result consistent with 
the original method chosen. 
Several profit-level indicators can be used, depending on the facts and circumstances 
of the tested party. The taxpayer must decide which profit-level indicator is most 
appropriate, or if a combination of profit-level indicators should be used. If a 
combination is used, the taxpayer must then determine the weights given to the 
various indicators. For the purpose of this research, five different PLIs were obtained 
from recommendations by OECD Guidelines and the US IRS as follows: profit 
margin; profit margin on sales; net margin; Berry ratio; and, return on assets. The 
underlying principle for selecting multiple PLIs being to provide a more in-depth 
analysis to demonstrate how the five PLIs perform within each comparable set 
(detailed PLI descriptions and formulas provided in 5.4.4.1-5.4.4.5). The argument 
that can be put forward is whether there is any difference in using one PLI over 
another? Additionally, do different PLIs result in different profit ranges and, 
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therefore, a different arm's length price? To answer these two questions, a null 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Ho2: There are no differences between profit measures in different industries. 
Hypothesis 3: Profit Level Indicators (PLIs) in Individual Industries 
Lall (1979) suggested that transfer pricing problems differ greatly in scope and 
intensity amongst different industries. Potential manipulation of transfer pricing is 
greater in industries where there is advanced technology and products are highly 
specialized as open market prices are either unavailable or difficult to determine. To 
evaluate the comparable data sets across individual industries and to examine 
different PLIs at the individual SIC level, the main question is whether comparables 
for individual industries provide profit ranges that result in an arm's length price? To 
answer this question, a null hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Ho3: There are no differences between profit measures when providing a 
comparable range. 
6.3.1.2 Data Sample - Section 1 
Due to the importance of both regulatory frameworks for MNEs worldwide, this 
research focuses on the OECD's TNMM and the US IRS's CPM by applying the two 
methods using the same data in order to uncover the practical variation. The sample 
consists of UK based companies that are used to obtain profit measures that might be 
used in their internal pricing. This can be done through consulting firms that provide 
client companies with profit measures that can be used when pricing internal 
transfers. For the purpose of this research, quantitative data and non-quantitative data 
used, including financial data and key profit level indicators for the UK-based 
companies, were obtained from Jordan's FAME database. 
The information on Jordan's FAME database has been compiled from records filed at 
Companies House in Cardiff, London and Edinburgh. Companies House provides 
both the legal framework within which all companies operate and the means by which 
those companies are formally registered (incorporated) and dissolved. Jordans has put 
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together one of the largest and most complete financial databases of British 
companies. Its financial database of the Major Public and Private British Companies 
is contained on the Fame database. The database has been compiled from records filed 
at Companies House and supplemented with information taken from the London and 
Edinburgh Gazettes. The information included on the Fame database has been 
carefully checked by the financial analysts at Jordans. 
As suggested by Lall (1979), an effective investigation of transfer pricing should 
focus on large public and private companies as they account for a substantial 
proportion of intra-firm trade. The data obtained to develop the comparables sets 
excluded all small and medium size companies and included companies which 
satisfied two of the following three criteria: 
1. Turnover more than £11,200,000; 
2. Balance sheet total exceeding £5,600,000; and, 
3. Number of employees exceeding 250. 
This research initially used the database to eliminate small and medium size 
companies in the UK within the randomly selected 12 manufacturing and 6 
wholesaling industries. Manufacturing and wholesaling industries were chosen to be 
consistent with previous research undertaken in the US (Collin et al, 1997; 
Tworkowski, 1999). US Congress concerns of abuses associated with tax haven 
manufacturing using US developed intangibles had led the Congress to amend Section 
482 in 1986 with respect to intangibles (H. R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 420,1985 (as 
reported by Cole, 1999, pg. 1-6)) and the perception in US Congress of abuses in the 
transfer prices of foreign manufacturers selling to their US subsidiaries resulted in a 
congressional suggestion in the 1986 legislative history that Treasury reviewed its 
transfer pricing Regulations generally (H. R. Conf. No. 99-841, vol. II, at 11637,1986 
(as reported by Cole, 1999, pg. 1-6)). This research furthers previous studies by 
examining whether transfer pricing abuses are also prevalent in the UK within the 
manufacturing and wholesale industries. 
Since large companies are more likely to involve transfer pricing practices in their 
operations and are usually not owner-managed businesses, this research used large 
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companies within the twelve manufacturing industries and six wholesale industries 
selected. The database was consequently used to obtain comparable companies and 
profit measures for UK companies. 
The application of TNMM and CPM involves a search for independent UK-based 
companies with a key requirement being that these UK-based companies were 
functionally similar. In developing comparables, this research ensured that 
companies: 
1. had active business operations; 
2. had not been newly formed (active for a minimum of four years) ; 
3. were independent; 
4. had not been acquired in the period; 
5. did not license products to third parties; 
6. did not have another company as shareholder; 
7. had sufficient accounts for a range of years; 
8. had no average 3-yr. (1998-2000) after tax losses; and, 
9. had activities similar to their four-digit SIC classifications. 
After locating comparable companies through the FAME database, the second stage 
grouped comparable companies within the selected 12 manufacturing and 6 wholesale 
industries based on qualitative and quantitative criteria to obtain relevant PLIs 
(Comparables set for SIC 2416 - Manufacture of plastic in primary forms in Table 5 
in Appendices). 
For this research, averages for the three-year period 1998-2000 were calculated 
following OECD guidelines and US IRS regulations. Full ranges and quartile ranges 
were then developed for the sample. Five different PLIs recommended by OECD 
Guidelines and the US IRS were developed as mentioned earlier. Through the 
acquisition of the full OECD profit ranges and US IRS inter-quartile profit ranges, 
this research intends to evaluate OECD Guidelines as well as US IRS regulations on 
profit-based methods to determine the level of discretion they provide in terms of 
assessing the arm's length price. 
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6.3.2 Section 2: Foreign-Owned vs. UK-Owned Companies 
There have been a number of studies concerning the economic impact of Japanese 
FDI in the UK. For example, previous research has examined the spatial distribution 
of Japanese investment in the UK (Taylor, 1993), trends in subsidiary growth (Morris 
et al., 1993), and the impact of increased competition from Japanese subsidiaries on 
domestic firms (Brech and Sharp, 1984; Strange, 1993). Studies have also 
investigated the contribution of Japanese FDI to both regional and national 
development for example, in terms of job creation, skill development and technology 
transfer (Trevor, 1985; Dillow, 1989; Munday et al., 1995; Morris, 1988; Strange, 
1993). 
Research on the relative performance of Japanese enterprises in the UK has proceeded 
in several directions. A number of studies have examined the general productivity of 
Japanese plants in the UK in comparison to plants located in Japan (Dunning, 1986; 
Strange, 1993). A further line of research has investigated the financial characteristics 
and marketing performance of Japanese subsidiaries located in the UK. For example, 
using UK cross-sectional data, Doyle et al. (1992) examined the characteristics of 
matched samples of 90 US, Japanese and indigenous subsidiaries in the consumer 
goods, industrial goods and financial services sectors. 
Doyle et al. also reported that the increased commitment of Japanese firms to long- 
term performance objectives created greater support and confidence in employees 
within their subsidiaries. The managers of UK and US firms tended to view cost- 
cutting as a means of improving productivity, whereas Japanese managers perceived 
increases in market share as a key strategy to reduce costs and increase productivity. 
Further evidence of the commitment of Japanese firms in the UK to longer-term 
strategic objectives comes from the research of Bromwich and Inoue (1994), who in a 
1991 interview survey of Japanese subsidiary managing/finance directors reported 
that the most important strategic objectives in their sample firms were return on sales 
and increasing market share. The study also reported that in terms of the achievement 
of stated objectives, the managers interviewed were most satisfied with their sales 
growth, and least satisfied with earnings growth and return on investment. On a 
similar theme, the KPMG (1996) survey of the managers of 70 of the 'top' Japanese 
manufacturing subsidiaries operating in the UK reported that 53% of respondents 
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considered their subsidiary was characterized by 'low' profitability, with none 
considering their company's profitability to be 'high'. 
In summary, a number of research approaches have been used to examine the 
performances of foreign-owned companies in the UK: macro-level and regional 
studies, comparisons at the company and micro-level (plant level) studies using 
primary data drawn from questionnaires and/or case studies. This research extends 
previous research, by examining the comparative performance of Japanese-owned, 
US-owned companies and UK domestic companies within manufacturing and 
wholesale industries with reference to a wide range of profit level indicators. UK- 
owned companies and US-owned companies were selected in an effort to obtain a 
better comparable basis as UK-owned companies would provide a suitable match for 
home-based companies, while US-owned companies would provide a suitable match 
for foreign-based companies. 
This section focuses on performance as measured by the same five PLIs used in 
Section 1 on individually matched foreign-owned (Japanese- and US-owned) 
companies and UK companies. 
63.2.1 Hypotheses - Section 2 
Hypothesis 4: Performance (PLIs) of Foreign-owned Companies (Japanese and US) 
vs. UK Companies 
Most of the MNE theories reviewed in Chapter 2 and others such as Hymer, 1960; 
Vernon, 1971; Buckley and Casson, 1976,1991; Magee, 1977 suggest that the main 
pre-condition for the propagation of FDIs is the ability of a company to internalize 
certain advantage(s), transport them across national boundaries and translate them 
into returns that are over and above what an indigenous company in the host country 
can make. This higher return is necessary to compensate the foreign MNE for 
developing, internalizing and transporting the advantage(s). The theory therefore 
supports a superior level of performance by foreign-owned companies. Available 
empirical evidence however points in the opposite direction. Wheeler (1988,1990) 
was able to show that indigenous companies in the US outperform their foreign- 
owned counterparts six times over in terms of return on assets. Munday and Peel 
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(1997) also reported similar evidence in the UK. Their study related to Japanese- 
owned companies with the suggestion that research could be extended in future 
studies to cover foreign-owned companies of other nationalities and for periods 
extending beyond one year. The main concern is whether UK-owned companies 
substantially out-perform foreign-owned (Japanese and US owned) companies. Are 
the reported profits of large UK-owned companies significantly and consistently 
greater than those of foreign-owned (Japanese and US) companies of similar size and 
industry? To answer the above questions, a null hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Ho4: There are no differences between the performances (profitability measures) of 
foreign-owned companies (Japanese and US) and their domestic counterparts. 
Hypothesis 5: Performance (PLIs) of Joint venture (Japanese/UK and US/UK) 
companies vs. UK/Other Companies 
The form of investment in the host countries has been considered in the literature as 
one of the organizational factors influencing MNEs transfer pricing policies. Several 
empirical studies (Kim and Miller, 1979; Tang and Chan, 1979: Tang, 1981) rank the 
interests of local partners of a foreign subsidiary as an important variable in the abuse 
of transfer pricing. A local partner in a joint venture plays a monitoring role which 
restricts the latitude of transfer pricing strategy practiced by the foreign investor 
(Lecraw, 1985; Emmanuel and Mehafdi, 1994). 
The influence of a local partner as a factor on transfer pricing decisions is however, 
not conclusive and is difficult to generalize, depending on the management role of a 
local partner in the joint venture. The presence of local partners may motivate foreign 
investors to use transfer pricing to reduce the abuse in reported profits of the joint 
venture, which partially accrue to the local partners (Lall, 1973; Lyn et al., 1993; 
Emmanuel and Mehafdi, 1994). Another effect of having local partners is that they 
may have political influence to shield the joint venture from tax audits. As found by 
Chan and Chow (1997), absence of the local partner is one of the factors that most 
triggers tax audits. 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter Four Section 4.4.4, time and resource constraints did 
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not permit investigation of individual joint venture companies' roles, interests, rights, 
and powers within the joint venture. This research defined foreign-owned Japanese 
joint venture as a Japanese company with at least one British company as shareholder 
(Japanese/UK) and foreign-owned US joint venture as a US company with at least 
one British company as shareholder (US/UK). A joint venture UK company is 
defined as a UK company with at least one foreign (not Japanese or US) company as 
shareholder (UK/Other). 
A major concern is whether foreign-owned joint venture (Japanese and US) 
companies with at least one British company as shareholder substantially under- 
perform UK joint ventures companies with at least one foreign company shareholder 
(UK/other). Thus, are the reported profits of large UK joint ventures companies 
significantly and consistently greater than those of foreign-owned joint ventures 
(Japanese- and US-owned) of similar size and industry? To answer, a null hypothesis 
is stated as follows: 
Ho5: There are no differences between the performances (profitability measures) of 
joint venture foreign-owned companies (Japanese/UK- and US/UK-owned) 
and the performances of UK/other-owned companies. 
6.3.2.2 Data Sample - Section 2 
Of the 1602 Japanese-owned companies listed, 1309 were active. From the 1309 
active companies, 512 were selected based on their size as measured by turnover in 
addition to the availability of data. These 512 companies were then grouped 
according to 1992 four-digit SIC codes. These 512 companies were classified by 
four-digit SIC codes based on their primary activity in order to obtain the best 
possible match of companies' functions. It can 
be noted that the top Japanese 
companies were disproportionately represented within the SIC code classification. 
This research focused on developing comparisons of the performance as measured by 
profits in a manner similar to that used 
in developing comparables in Section 1. 
Twelve manufacturing and six wholesale industries were selected due to the large 
presence of Japanese-owned companies within these 
industries. Of the Japanese- 
owned companies, 512 were represented within the 44 selected industrial sectors. 
Through further elimination based on whether a company had: active business 
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operations; not been acquired in the period; not been newly formed; not licensed 
products to third parties; independent ventures; sufficient accounts for a range of 
years; no 3-yr. Average (1998-2000) after-tax losses; and, activities similar to their 
SIC classifications, 76 Japanese-owned companies and 58 Japanese joint ventures 
(companies that have at least one UK company as a shareholder) were represented in 
eighteen industries (see Table 6-1). 
Tab 
No. 
le 6-1: Classification o 
SIC 92 UK UK-Other 
2416 46 8 
f the Sam le Corn anies 
JPN JPN-UK USA USA-UK Total Without Loss Making 
2216 65 51 
2 24 66 99 13 3 3 4 6 48 42 
3 2524 29 5 2 3 9 6 54 44 
4 2862 22 1 0 4 1 7 35 24 
5 2875 44 15 2 2 11 21 95 72 
6 3002 27 4 6 4 15 3 59 39 
7 3162 39 10 10 8 17 20 104 75 
8 3210 33 10 12 4 12 8 79 51 
9 3220 22 14 3 0 3 4 46 31 
10 3230 8 5 4 3 2 3 25 15 
ll 3320 40 6 2 1 13 13 75 58 
12 3410 15 10 2 1 2 7 37 24 
13 5142 45 8 3 1 5 2 64 38 
14 5143 45 7 10 13 9 10 94 70 
15 5146 33 14 3 3 4 6 63 45 
16 5155 88 11 3 3 4 1 40 32 
17 5164 20 3 4 1 3 5 36 27 
18 5165 10 3 5 2 5 3 28 21 
Total 515 147 76 58 120 131 1047 759 
The FAME database was consequently used to obtain companies comparable for the 
Japanese-owned companies. UK-owned companies and US-owned companies were 
selected in an effort to obtain a better comparable basis as UK-owned companies 
would provide a suitable match for home-based companies, while US-owned 
companies would provide a suitable match for the foreign-based companies. 
Unlike some of the previous studies which used unmatched companies to compare the 
performance of foreign-owned companies with domestic-owned companies, this 
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section of the research evaluates the performance of MNEs using three different 
matching methods as follows: 
1. Individually matched by growth in turnover (+, - 2.5%) over the 3-yr 
period 1998-2000, factoring in similar strategies, product cycles, etc; 
2. Individually matched by operating profit over the 3-yr average 1998-2000 
(+, - 10%), factoring in similar profitability levels, cost of goods sold, 
ability to make profit, etc; and, 
3. Individually matched by turnover (similar to Munday and Peel, 1997) over 
the 3-yr average period 1998-2000 (+, - 10%), factoring in similar size of 
operations, market, share, etc. 
The basis for choosing matching criteria to compare the performance of foreign- 
owned (Japanese and US) companies to UK-owned companies being that each of the 
matching criteria had its limitations and through the use of multiple matching factors 
the quality of the sets would increase (a sample of the matched companies in Table 6 
in Appendices). 
6.3.3 Section 3: Analysis of QRerating Losses 
One of the main theoretical arguments that explain growth, is the ability of a company 
to internalize certain advantage(s), carry them overseas and convert them into superior 
returns. Figure 6-3 illustrates foreign-owned companies in the UK as represented in 
this research by Japanese- and US-owned companies with average operating losses. 
The percentage of the total number of Japanese-owned companies with operating 
losses over the total number of active Japanese-owned companies in the UK is the 
highest compare to the percentage of the total number of US-owned companies with 
operating losses over the total number of active US-owned companies and the 
percentage of the total UK companies with operating losses over the total number of 
active UK companies. The ratios of loss making companies for the years 1998-2000 
raised concerns regarding the low performance of foreign-owned companies, 
especially Japanese-owned companies. 
As comparables are the main focus of this research and loss-making companies 
cannot be used as a part of comparable set to obtain profit ranges, this section 
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compares foreign-owned companies (Japanese and US) with negative operating 
profits to UK-owned companies with negative operating profits. By examining loss- 
making companies not included in previous studies (Kim and Lyn, 1990; Gideon, 
1990; Crain and Stills, 1994; Wheeler, 1988,1990; and, Munday and Peel, 1997) this 
study opens an important avenue when testing foreign-owned (Japanese and US) 
companies compared to their domestic UK counterparts. 
Figure 6-3: Companies with Operating Losses (Japanese- 
owned, US-owned, and UK companies) 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 1 1998 1999 2000 
  Japanese-Owned 29% 32% 34% 
Companies 
  US-Owned Companies 17% 21% 26% 
0 UK Companies 15% 17% 19%71 
* Source: FAME DATABASE, June 2003 
Companies cannot continuously lower their profitability or increase their costs under 
market penetration strategies. Therefore for this research it was assumed that the 
companies included in the sample did not implement the market penetration strategy 
since during the market penetration period companies' profits are lower than normal 
although it is expected that they would earn higher than normal profits after the 
market penetration period. These higher than and lower than normal profits should be 
phased out through the use of the multiple year averages 1998-2000. 
"Business strategies also could include market penetration schemes. A 
taxpayer seeking to penetrate a market or to increase its market share might 
temporarily charge a price for its product that is lower than the price charged 
for otherwise comparable products in the same market. Furthermore, a 
taxpayer seeking to enter a new market or expand (or defend) its market share 
might temporarily incur higher costs (e. g. due to start-up costs or increased 
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marketing efforts) and hence achieve lower profit levels than other taxpayers 
operating in the same market" (OECD, 1995, Chap, I, para. 1.32). 
As found by Chan and Chow (1997), persistent losses are one of the factors that most 
triggers tax audits. A possible explanation for companies with average operating 
losses is that these companies remain in business because of the benefits they provide 
to their international group of companies (ITP policy) and make use of the flexibility 
provided by regulatory bodies such as the OECD, US IRS, or UK regulations. 
By comparing foreign-owned (Japanese and US) companies with negative operating 
profits to UK-owned companies with negative operating profits, this section of the 
research highlights the extent of the use of certain permissible practices allowed by 
the regulatory bodies such as the business strategies "market penetration strategy" to 
purposely lower the profitability of the companies since non-profitable companies 
cannot remain perpetually active. By comparing the performances of joint ventures 
(Japanese- or US-owned companies with at least one UK shareholder to UK-owned 
companies with at least one foreign shareholder) this section also highlights the 
effects of the form of the investment in relation to foreign-owned companies' 
performance. 
In the opposite direction, TNMM guarantees that a transaction will always be 
profitable to one of the participants. This does not always occur in arm's-length 
relationships between unrelated parties. Neither cost plus, resale price, or the CUP 
methods guarantee net profits to any participant in a given transaction. The OECD 
Guidelines make this point more generally "There is no justification under the arm's 
length principle for imposing additional tax on enterprises that are less successful than 
the average when the reason for the lack of success is attributable to commercial 
factors" (OECD, 1995, B. 3.4). 
"Foreign governments objected to the use of US IRS CPM in cases where the 
multinational group overall had a loss on a product being distributed in the 
United States. They argued that if there was an overall loss, it was wrong to 
require a US distribution subsidiary to report a typical distributor's profit" 
(Cole, 1999 p. 9-31). 
By focusing on companies with operating losses, this research provides analysis of 
companies that are not able be included in any comparable set and have been 
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bypassed thus far in empirical studies with the exception of Chan and Chow (1997). 
6.3.3.1 Hypotheses - Section 3 
Hypothesis 6: Performance (PLIs) of Foreign-owned (Japanese and US) companies 
with operating losses vs. UK companies with operating losses 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 and Hypothesis 4 of this chapter, MNE theories 
suggest that a MNE's superior performance can be achieved due to the internalization 
of certain advantage. Evidence from the literature and data collection, however, 
points in the opposite direction as data obtained from the FAME database as 
presented in Figure 6-3. The main question is whether loss-making companies of 
different countries of ownership (Japanese- and US-owned companies) display 
different patterns of performance as measured by a wide range of profit level 
indicators? To answer the above question, a null hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Ho6: There are no differences between the performance (profitability measures) of 
foreign-owned companies with average negative operating profit (Japanese- 
and US-owned) and UK-owned companies with negative operating profit. 
Hypothesis 7: Performance (PLIs) of Foreign-owned Joint ventures (Japanese/UK and 
US/UK) with operating losses vs. UK/other companies with operating losses 
As mentioned earlier in hypothesis 5, The importance of joint venture investments in 
ITP is due to the form of the investment influencing the tax audits of transfer pricing. 
Thus, the main question is whether loss-making companies of different countries of 
ownership (Japanese- and US-owned companies with at least one British company as 
shareholder) display different patterns of performance as measured by a wide range of 
profit level indicator? To answer this question, Hypothesis 7 is as follows: 
Ho7" There are no differences between the performance (profitability measures) of 
joint venture foreign-owned companies with average negative operatingpro it 
(Jananese/UK- and US/UK owned) and UK/other-owned companies with 
negative operating profit. 
134 
6.3.3.2 Data Sample - Section 3 
From this section of the research the data sample consisted of all Japanese-owned 
companies, US-owned companies and UK domestic companies with three-year 
average (1998-2000) operating losses obtained from the previous sections (see Table 
6-1) in the same twelve manufacturing and six wholesale industries without matching 
methods due to the limited number of companies with average operating losses. 
6.3.4 Section 4: Tax Analysis 
Transfer pricing affects many aspects of a MNE's business. The enormous increase in 
global commerce with the significant portion of worldwide commerce occurring 
between related businesses, transfer pricing has increased in importance 
(Tworkowski, 1999). A review of the literature found no studies that address the 
effects of the latest transfer pricing regulations introduced in the 1998 corporation tax 
self-assessment. This study adds to the body of knowledge in this area. 
As explained in detail in Chapter 4, there has been transfer pricing provisions in the 
UK tax code for more than 50 years. Transfer pricing changes were overhauled in 
1998, as the 1998 Finance Act introduced a comprehensive modernization of the UK's 
transfer pricing legislation. These changes were part of a wider reform of the 
Corporation Tax regime, which included the introduction of self-assessment for 
companies. 
For accounting periods ending on or after July 1,1999, and years of assessment 
1999/2000 et seq., sections 770 to 773 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
(ICTA) 1988 have been replaced by sections 108-111 and Schedule 16 FA 98. The 
full text of the basic rule now appears as Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988 and can be 
accessed through the internet at www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk. 
No penalties could ordinarily be attached to the tax on pricing increases made by 
Inland Revenue since there was no statutory requirement to return profits calculated in 
accordance with the arm's length standard. The transfer pricing regime remained 
totally reactive for 50 years. Everything has changed for accounting periods ending on 
or after July 1,1999, for which Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988 is now in effect (detailed 
previously in Chapter 3). 
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This section of the analysis sought to determine (a) if foreign-owned companies 
reported more or less taxes as reported in their annual profit and loss accounts than 
UK-owned companies; and (b) if there were any significant changes as a result of the 
1998 UK tax revisions. 
Because of the differences in financial characteristics of various industries, it is 
important to compare companies on an industrial basis. For instance, companies 
classified in the wholesale trade industry generally report large amounts of sales 
compared to their end-of-year assets. It is also very important when comparing the 
performance of foreign-owned companies with domestic UK companies that these 
companies are individually matched. Whereas previous studies, for the most part, 
ignored matching procedures, this research matched individual companies of gross 
profit, defined as turnover less cost of sales. The main reason for selecting gross 
profit to be used as a matching method is to be consistent with previous sections of 
this study which focused on companies' profitability. Exact matching on the basis of 
gross profit proved difficult, hence matching was conducted on the basis of gross 
profit range of plus or minus 10%. 
6.3.4.1 Hypotheses - Section 4 
Hypothesis 8: Performance (reported taxes) of Foreign-owned (Japanese and US) 
Companies vs. UK Companies 
Since it is generally not possible for researchers to observe the actual transfer price, 
understanding more about the objectives of the transfer pricing method alleviates the 
need to consider the specific direction of the effect of the transfer price (Cravens and 
Shearon, 1996). As taxation is one of the several considerations that influence a 
company organization's decisions (Abdallah, 1989), this study examines the tax 
expense figures as they appeared on the companies' annual accounts. Grubert et al. 
(1993) documented that foreign-controlled subsidiaries in the U. S. "report strikingly 
less taxable income than do their domestically controlled counterparts" (p. 269). Crain 
and Stitts (1994) and Kim and Lyn (1990) also provide supporting evidence that 
foreign-owned companies report lower profits. 
Clearly a significant problem exists even given UK or the US tax regulations 
prohibiting manipulation. Transfer pricing manipulations are not exclusive to foreign- 
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owned companies in the UK. Most developed nations have laws in effect to prevent 
the manipulation of transfer prices solely to avoid taxation. Also, from an 
international perspective, taxation issues may include tariffs levied by customs 
authorities on the entry or exit of goods into a country. Companies may employ 
transfer pricing to alter the value of the goods transferred. Transfers to affiliates in 
countries with high import duties may be accomplished with a lower transfer price to 
avoid inflating the value of the goods being imported. 
The financial distributions that companies make after the declaration of profits or 
losses are expected to be a function of their recent financial performance. Reported 
tax is an important variable and is expected to be a fair reflection of performance. Tax 
has long been recognized as a key variable in the decision making process of MNEs 
(Belkaoui, 1994; Emmanuel and Mehafdi, 1994) especially in relation to the location 
of their subsidiaries. In the US, empirical evidence suggesting the use of ITP for 
shifting income out of high tax or tax-inefficient locations has been widely reported. 
Some of the studies mentioned earlier in this section reveal that foreign-owned 
companies' taxes are drastically below those of their domestically owned counterparts. 
This position is yet to be empirically explored within the UK context. 
Although foreign-owned company have always been accused of using ITP to shift 
income from the UK, little empirical evidence is available in the literature. An 
empirical comparison of the reported tax expense by foreign-owned (Japanese and US 
owned companies) operating in the UK with those of their UK-owned counterparts 
needs to be undertaken. Are there substantial differences between the two groups? Do 
companies of different countries of ownership report different amounts of tax? To 
examine this question, Hypothesis 8 is as follows: 
Ho8" There is no difference in the amount of reported tax expense by foreign-owned 
companies (Japanese- and US-owned) compared to the amount of reported tax 
expense by domestic companies. 
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Hypothesis 9: Effects of UK Transfer Pricing Regulations Introduced in 1998 
Corporation Tax Self-Assessment on Foreign-owned (Japanese and US Companies 
and Domestic UK Companies 
Although alignment of transfer pricing with Corporation Tax Self-Assessment 
(CTSA) was cited as the impetus behind the changes, the 1998 legislation was clearly 
designed to protect the tax base from further erosion in an environment where other 
fiscal authorities were aggressively policing compliance with their own domestic 
transfer pricing rules. 
The economic theory of noncompliance attributable to the model of Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973) suggests that taxpayers analyze the economic 
benefits and costs of noncompliance and that income levels, tax rates, audit rates, 
penalty rates and risk attitudes are the primary determinants of noncompliance. The 
purpose of this section is to examine whether the latest UK transfer pricing 
regulations affects compliance by foreign-owned (Japanese and US) companies and 
domestic UK companies. In other words, are there any effects of the latest UK 
transfer pricing rules introduced in 1998 corporation tax self -assessment on the 
patterns of reported tax by companies of different ownership? To answer this 
question, a null hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Ho9: There are no differences in the amount of reported tax by foreign-owned 
companies prior and subsequent to the latest UK transfer pricing regulation 
introduced in 1998 corporation tax self-assessment compared to domestic 
companies. 
6.3.4.2 Data Sample - Section 4 
Using the FAME database, the data for this section was obtained to answer the 
research question regarding the implications of the latest UK transfer pricing 
regulation using a sample of UK-based companies (Japanese-, US-, and UK-owned) 
during two selected time periods. An event history analysis, as suggested by 
Shackleford (1993), was used employing a comparison of the years prior and 
subsequent to the 1998 UK regulations which was effective for accounting periods 
ending on or after July 1,1999. The data consisted of companies' tax liability, gross 
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profits, turnover, and operating profits for the individual companies for the time 
periods, fiscal years ended 1996-1997 and fiscal years ended 1999-2000. The time 
periods were chosen so that the intervening years would cover the period when the 
changes in the tax and transfer pricing regulations in the UK, including the latest 1998 
regulations, occurred and were being widely discussed. The rationale for choosing 
US-owned and Japanese-owned companies was to be consistent with previous 
sections of this research. 
Since the number of Japanese-owned companies represented is smaller compared to 
US-owned and UK-owned companies, Japanese-owned companies provide the basis 
for which the other companies are matched. To avoid the tax credits which may 
distort the data sets, this research included only companies with positive tax figure. 
Previous research randomly selected groups of foreign and domestic companies and 
compared their reported tax, regardless of their activities, size, or profitability. In 
addition and unlike some of the previous studies, this research uses the same set of 
sample companies when comparing periods prior and subsequent to the latest UK 
transfer pricing regulations. 
6.3.5 Interviews with ITP Specialists 
This study conducted a number of interviews to authenticate the findings of the 
different parts of this research. It was the intention of this research to use a sample of 
carefully selected (non random) interviews with academics, consultants and ITP 
experts. Each interview was recorded and transcribed and lasted (on average) an hour 
each. The interviewees were identified based on their academic achievement, 
employment, published works and, above all, their ITP experience. 
6.4 Data Measurement and Statistical Tests 
The four data sets collected for the first four different sections of this research were 
ratio scaled. As the distances between the values of the data sample are meaningful, a 
ratio scale measurement demonstrates how much larger or smaller one value is 
compared to another. In order to disprove the null hypotheses, this study selected the 
most appropriate statistical test as determined by the following issues: 
1. The research questions; 
2. The nature of the data; and, 
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3. The design or the plan of the research. (Kinnear and Gray, 1997) 
The research question relates to the type of relationship being investigated, whether 
the nature of data establishes the level of measurement of the observations in the data 
set. Finally, the research design is concerned with the number and type of sample(s) 
and whether they are related or independent. A particular statistical test is most 
appropriate for each separate combination of these three key issues. For this research, 
the choice of the statistical tests was limited to the tests for the differences with a brief 
description of the selected statistical tests as follows: 
1. T-Test 
T-tests are most commonly used to examine whether the means of two groups of data 
are significantly different from one another. With a t-test, the independent variable is 
nominal or categorical and the dependent variable is measured at an interval or ratio 
scale of measurement. The populations from which the two groups are drawn can be 
independent (unrelated) or matched (related). T-tests indicate the sample differences 
by using means and the distribution of sample scores around the mean. The t-test 
assumes that the distribution of average difference is approximately normal and can 
be used for large sample sizes and for all samples from a normal population. 
There are two main t-tests. The first type of t-test is used with unmatched data and is 
known under a number of names including: independent samples t-test, t-test for two 
independent means, independent t-test, and t-test for unrelated samples. Regardless of 
the name, with this type of t-test there are two distinct categories for the independent 
variable and one dependent variable measured at the interval or ratio level. The 
independent samples t-test examines whether the mean of the dependent variable for 
each group defined by the independent variable is significantly different. 
The second t-test is used with matched data and is also known under a number of 
names including: paired samples t-test, t-test for related measures, related t-test, and 
correlated t-test. This test can be used in a number of circumstances where the 
question calls for the repeated measurement of responses from the same respondent. 
The paired-samples t-test will be testing whether the means of each of the paired or 
'before/after' variables are significantly different or not. 
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Since the majority of the hypotheses examine the differences between the mean of the 
variables, this research uses various types of Wests to examine Hol-Ho8. 
2. Sig Test 
This test is normally used when the sample size is small and the distribution of values 
is far from normal or, if the data might have outliers. This test is a nonparametric 
alternative to the paired t-test. The null hypothesis for the sign test signifies that the 
median difference between the two members of a pair is 0. There is no need to make 
any assumptions about the shape of the distributions from which the data is obtained. 
The only requirement is that the different pairs of observations are selected 
independently and the values can be ordered from smallest to largest as the test is 
based on seeing which of a pair of values is larger. 
3. Wilcoxon Test 
This sign test looks at which of the two numbers for a pair is larger while ignoring the 
magnitude of the difference. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test uses the 
information about the size of the difference between the two members of a pair, 
thereby making it more likely to detect true differences when they exist. However, 
the Wilcoxon test requires that the differences be a sample from a symmetric 
distribution, a less stringent assumption than requiring normality, since there are 
many other distributions besides the normal distribution that are symmetric. 
As the non-parametric alternative to the paired t-test, the sign and Wilcoxon tests 
were selected for Hol and Hot for Section 1 of this research given that the number of 
profit level indicators is small and the data presented in matched pairs (OECD full 
range vs. US IRS inter-quartile range). 
4. Pearson Correlation 
The Pearson correlation is a measure of the linear relationship between variables. It 
examines the relationship that exists between two or more variables. There are a 
number of ways in which these variables are related: 
a. The variables are positively related, when one variable moves in one 
direction the other variable moves in the same direction; 
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b. The variables are not related at all, one variable remains the same 
regardless of the movement of the other variable; and, 
c. The variables are negatively related, when one variable moves in one 
direction the other variable moves to the opposite direction. 
The Pearson correlation test proves appropriate for Ho3 to examine the linear 
relationship between the PLIs, which is essential when explaining the movements of 
different profit measures. 
5. One Way ANOVA 
This statistical technique, called analysis of variance (ANOVA), examines the 
variability of the sample values. It looks at how much the observations within each 
group vary as well as how much the group mean vary. Based on these two estimates 
of variability, the conclusions about the population means can be drawn. If the sample 
means vary more than expected based on the variability of the observations in the 
groups, it can be concluded that the population means are not all equal. It is a one-way 
analysis of variance because cases are assigned to different groups based on their 
values for one variable. Analysis of variance requires the following assumptions: 
" Independent random samples have been taken from each population; 
9 The populations are normal; and, 
The population variances are all equal. 
The One Way ANOVA test was selected for Ho9 to compare the reported tax means 
prior and subsequent to the 1998 UK regulations. 
6 .5 
Summary 
This chapter detailed the major four sections of this study. In Section 1 of this 
research, averages were developed for all data obtained, five different PLIs were used, 
quantitative and non-quantitative data was used to develop comparables, and industry 
classifications were considered. Section 2 used three-way matching criteria to 
compare the performance of foreign-owned companies with domestic companies. 
Section 3 illustrated the role of companies with negative operating profits in ITP 
applications. Section 4 used the same set of sample companies when comparing 
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periods prior and subsequent to the UK regulations introduced in 1998 corporation tax 
self-assessment, matching criteria for company sets, and industrial classifications 
codes. 
This chapter provides justification for each of the four relevant sections in order to 
develop comparables and detect the ownership effects on both profitability and taxes 
and test the level of discretion that can be exercised by MNEs under different 
regulations. In addition, this chapter provides details of the regress procedures 
conducted in developing comparables and testing comparable companies' 
performance as measured by both profits and taxes. This research is designed to 
eliminate the limitations of previous research as well as satisfy the comparables test. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis and Results 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data analysis for this research in order to answer the research 
question whether OECD TNMM and US IRS CPM methods, where applied, can 
determine transfer pricing while maintaining the arm's length principle and, whether 
feasible comparables are available to justify the arms length principle. In addition, the 
data analysis addresses the question of whether companies of different countries of 
ownership display different patterns of performance as measured by a range of PLIs, 
operating losses, and reported taxes. Table 7-1 provides a synopsis of the hypothesis, 
data and sample used for the four sections with a detailed analysis to follow. 
7.2 Data Analysis 
7.2.1 Section 1: OECD (TNMM) vs. US IRS (CPM) 
The objective for this section was to test whether there were any differences between 
the OECD's TNMM and the US IRS' CPM. In addition, this section examined the 
accountability of the different PLIs (profit measures) for the total sample 18 
manufacturing and wholesale industries combined as presented in the following null 
hypotheses: 
Hol: There are no differences between OECD profit ranges (represented by a full 
range) and IRS profit ranges (represented by inter-quartile ranges). 
Ho2" There are no differences between profit measures in different industries. 
The initial investigation of the difference between the OECD TNMM full ranges and 
the US IRS CPM inter-quartile ranges was conducted using the paired sample t-test. 
In the t-test for each profit measure, the difference was calculated between the lower 
and upper point of the full range (OECD full gap) and compared with the difference 
between the lower quartile and upper quartile range (IRS inter-quartile gap) across all 
18 manufacturing and wholesale industries. The paired sample t-test was used to 
assess whether or not the means of each paired or 'full range/quartile range' was 
significantly different. The test was done 
in two stages. The first stage included all 
comparable companies, while the second stage excluded companies with average 
operating losses. This was done to determine whether excluding the loss making 
companies would have any effect on the profit ranges for these industries. 
(Appendices, Tables 1 and 2). 
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The paired t-test revealed that there were significant differences at the 5% level 
between the OECD full range and the US IRS quartile ranges for the profit margin, 
return on assets, net margin and Berry ratio. Conducting the same test excluding the 
loss making companies showed that there were significant differences between the 
OECD full range and US IRS inter-quartile range at the 5% level for the profit 
margin, profit margin on sales, Berry ratio, and return on assets. 
Wilcoxon and Sign tests were also used to investigate whether there was a difference 
between the OECD TNMM full ranges and the US IRS CPM inter-quartile ranges. In 
the Wilcoxon and Sign tests, for each profit measure the difference was calculated 
between the lower and upper point of the full range (OECD full gap) then compared 
with the difference between the lower quartile and upper quartile range (IRS inter- 
quartile gap) across all 18 manufacturing and wholesale industries. The Wilcoxon 
and Sign tests were used to confirm the results obtained from the paired t-test. Similar 
to the paired t-test, the Wilcoxon and Sign tests were done in two stages. The first 
stage included all comparable companies (Appendices, Table 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D), 
while the second stage excluded companies with average operating losses. 
(Appendices, Table 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D) 
The Wilcoxon and Sign tests revealed that there were significant differences between 
the OECD full range and the US IRS inter-quartile ranges for the profit margin, profit 
margin on sales, net margin, Berry ratio, and return on assets. Conducting the same 
test excluding the loss making companies showed that there were significant 
differences between the OECD full range and US IRS inter-quartile range for profit 
margin, profit margin on sales, net margin, Berry ratio, and return on assets. 
To further investigate whether there was a difference between the OECD TNMM full 
range (OECD full gap) and the US IRS CPM inter-quartile range (IRS inter-quartile 
gap), a ratio analysis was conducted for the individual industries as shown in Table 7- 
2. The ratio analysis revealed that the ratios of inter-quartile ranges over the full range 
varied notably from one industry to another. Although both SIC 5164 (Wholesale of 
Office Machinery and Equipment) and SIC 5155 (Wholesale of Chemical Products) 
are wholesale industries, SIC 5164 reports the highest ratio (the least distance from 
the full range and more logical distribution as it is close to the 50th percentile) while 
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SIC 5155 reports the lowest ratio (the widest distance as it is 8 `h percentile). These 
ratio distributions illustrate how industries vary in terms of their comparable profits. 
Table 7- 
Industry 
2: Ratio 
OECD 
Lower 
Prof it 
Analysis of Pull vs. In 
OECD IRS Lower 
Upper Quartile 
Profit Profit 
ter-Quartile Kanes (Sect 
IRS Upper 
Quartile Distance 
PProfit Margin Full 
ion 1-H 
Inter- 
Quartile 
othesIs 1) 
Ratio 
Quartile/Full 
2416 -11.2 31.03 3.2 8.75 42.23 5.55 13% 
3002 -6.8 21.77 3.16 9.72 28.57 6.56 23% 
2875 -12.1 27.92 2.5 10.7 40.02 8.2 20% 
2862 -2.54 18.82 2.49 8.45 21.36 5.96 28% 
2524 -7.21 26.46 2.34 11.27 33.67 8.93 27% 
2466 -25.03 21.2 0.81 10.87 46.23 10.06 22% 
3162 -4.89 43.56 3.76 15.16 48.45 11.4 24% 
3210 -3.01 42.74 1.69 12.09 45.75 10.4 23% 
5142 -3.03 17.2 1.56 8.41 20.23 6.85 34% 
3410 -5.6 7.99 1.17 3.83 13.59 2.66 20% 
3320 -1.09 43.79 4.25 13.13 44.88 8.88 20% 
3230 -1.47 14.41 0.25 6.04 15.88 5.79 36% 
3220 -3.24 36.3 3.08 13.42 39.54 10.34 
26% 
5143 -1.18 41.01 2.04 6.11 42.19 4.07 10% 
5146 0.13 26.67 2.28 9.84 26.54 7.56 28% 
5164 0.36 25.98 1.76 14.17 25.62 12.41 48% 
5155 -2.53 28.46 1.51 3.84 30.99 
2.33 8% 
5165 0.89 51.01 5.47 13.15 50.12 7.68 15% 
Based on the findings in Section 1, this research rejects both the first null hypothesis 
that there are no differences between the OECD full range and IRS quartile range for 
all the profit ranges used and the second null hypothesis that there are no differences 
between profit measures for the 18 total sample manufacturing and wholesale 
industries. TNMM endorsed in OECD Guidelines and CPM endorsed by the US IRS 
are conceptually the same method of determining transfer prices. Differences 
between the two methods lie in the nuances of their application, particularly the US 
IRS' emphasis on the inter-quartile range and adjustment to the midpoint. This 
research shows that the application of different regulations affords MNEs differing 
degrees of discretion in terms of compliance. Whereas the US IRS limits a 
company's ability by restricting the profit ranges to inter-quartile profit ranges as 
opposed to the full range used by the OECD, the OECD allows a wider range but 
emphasizes comparison on function and risk. The US IRS emphasizes less control for 
function and risk through the use of inter-quartile ranges thus moving towards 
industry standards. 
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The US IRS view is that when inter-quartile ranges are used, no precise adjustment 
for function and risk is necessary. This finding supports the US IRS argument that the 
range must be adjusted through the application of a valid statistical method, if 
possible, to increase the reliability of the analysis. US IRS regulations state that 
reliability is satisfied if statistical methods are applied to establish a range of results in 
which the limits of the range will be determined such that there is a 75% probability 
of a result falling below the upper end of the range. The inter-quartile range will thus 
satisfy the reliability portion of the test. 
These findings also suggest that larger sets of comparable companies can be obtained 
when companies with operating losses are included. In addition, the results presented 
the effects of loss making companies on the PLIs (Appendices, Table 1 and Table 2). 
As the use of the inter-quartile range limits PLI ranges to the middle 50`h percentile, 
the main argument that can be put forward is that due to the OECD's awareness of the 
level of assurance that TNMM can provide, the OECD recognizes TNMM as method 
of last resort while the US includes CPM as part of the best method rule. 
The importance of this finding is that companies that use CPM to test the arm's-length 
nature of their transfer pricing therefore face the possibility that European tax au- 
thorities may reject an analysis developed using profit-based methods since many 
European tax authorities view CPM as inconsistent with OECD Guidelines. An 
example of a comparables set, SIC 2416 (Manufacturing of Plastic in Primary Forms) 
is shown in Table 5 (Appendices). 
Ho3" There are no differences between profit measures when providing a 
comparable range. 
To validate Ho3 related to the measurement of different PLIs, this study tested each of 
the 18 industries separately. After excluding companies with 3-yr. (1998-2000) 
average operating losses, this research individually developed descriptives and 
Pearson correlations for each of the 18 industries with the analysis focusing on the 
differences and relationship between the PLIs. The descriptive statistics for each of 
the 18 industries showed the minimum and the maximum values for each of the profit 
measures and the mean value of each of the PLIs. 
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The Pearson correlation presented the relationship between the different PLIs was 
based on individual industries in order to determine whether the PLIs were different 
from each other and providing alternatives for companies when selecting the preferred 
PLI. The correlation examined whether the relationship between different PLIs was 
significantly different from positive correlation. Specifically, the Pearson correlation 
tested whether the correlation coefficient differed significantly from +1. As the 
coefficient could not be above +1 (perfect positive correlation) a one tailed test was 
used. The results of each individual industry are summarized in Table 7-3. 
Table 7 
No. 
1 
-3: Ana 
SIC 
1992 
2416 
lysis of i 
Sample 
Size 
51 
ndividual in 
Statistical 
Test 
dustries (Section 1- Hypo 
No. of PLIs Significance at 
0.01 or 0.05 level 
9 
thesis 3) 
*Table 
7B 
2 2466 42 9 8B 
3 2524 44 6 9B 
4 2862 24 7 lOB 
5 2875 72 8 II B 
6 3002 39 9 12B 
7 3162 75 7 13B 
8 3210 51 7 14B 
9 3220 31 7 15B 
10 3230 15 4 16B 
11 3320 58 9 17B 
12 3410 24 8 18B 
13 5142 38 0. 7 19B 
14 5143 70 7 20B 
15 5146 45 7 21B 
16 5155 32 4 22B 
17 51 4 - 27 7 23B 
18 5165 21 5 24B 
*All 1 ables in Appenaices. 
Through the statistical test of the individual industries it can be concluded that 
different PLIs provide different profit ranges and are statistically significant from 
each other in providing a comparable profit range. Therefore, this research can 
confidently reject the null hypothesis that there are no differences between profit 
measures in providing a comparable range. The number of comparables differed 
between industries (some industries might have a limited number of companies). 
Significant gaps existed within the comparable results despite attempts to control for 
differences in functions and risks. The significance of this finding is that companies 
have the ability not only to adjust their profit level within a range, they may also 
decide which PLI or profit measure to use. 
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In the absence of detailed instructions in the application of TNMM or CPM, a series 
of choices should address the following, 
1. Which independent companies should be considered comparable to the tested 
party; 
2. Which profit level indicator should be used; 
3. Over what time period can financial data be averaged; 
4. How can the results be adjusted to accommodate differences vis a vis the 
tested party; 
5. How can the arm's length range of results be determined; and, 
6. What happens when the tested party's profit falls outside the arm's length 
range. 
These significant results might be due in part to the fact that ranges of profitability are 
affected by a multitude of factors: competitive position, management efficiency, 
business cycles in the industry and on a global basis, currency fluctuation, age of plant 
and equipment, intangible property, research and development, cost of capital, and 
marketing efficiency which can not be easily accounted for. This finding illustrates 
that the discretion of profit indicators is enhanced as the measures themselves give 
differing degrees of profitability within each industry. Industries offer a vast number 
of comparable companies in which comparable sets can be obtained and a great 
number of PLIs can be selected, thereby allowing companies not only to adjust their 
profit level within a range, but also leeway to decide which PLI or profit measure to 
use. Companies may opt to use any PLI and any point within their respective 
comparable industry range to their optimum benefit. 
72 Section 2: Foreign-owned vs. Domestic-owned Companies 
This section sheds light on the performance, as measured by PLIs, of foreign-owned 
and domestic-owned companies. The independent sample t-test was used to assess 
whether the means of each of the PLIs between the groups were significantly different 
or not. This section tests the following null hypothesis: 
Ho4" There are no differences between the performances (profitability measures) of 
foreign-owned companies (Japanese- and US-owned) and their domestic UK 
count e S" 
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To validate the hypothesis comparing the performance of foreign-owned companies 
represented by US- and Japanese-owned companies, a three-way match was used to 
minimize the limitation of using individual matching criteria. The matching methods 
used were as follows: 
Individually matched by growth in turnover (+, - 2.5%) over the 3-yr 
period 1998-2000, factoring in similar strategies, product cycles, etc; 
2. Individually matched by operating profit over the 3-yr average period 
1998-2000 (+, - 10%), factoring in similar profitability levels, cost of 
goods sold, ability to make profit, etc; and, 
3. Individually matched by turnover over the 3-yr average 1998-2000 (+, - 
10%), factoring in similar size of operations, market, share, etc. 
For each of the matching methods, a group of Japanese-owned companies was 
individually matched with a group of UK-owned companies and a group of US- 
owned companies was individually matched with a group of UK-owned companies. 
The investigation of the differences between the groups conducted using the 
independent sample t-test. The independent sample t-test was used to assess whether 
the means of each of the PLIs was different for the foreign-owned companies 
compared to the domestic UK companies. Table 7-4 shows a summary of the matched 
data, matching method, the number of matched companies, and the table number. 
Tah1P 7-4 Data and Matching (Section 2- Hvnothesis 4) 
Data 
Japanese-owned vs. UK-owned 
Matching methods 
Growth in Turnover 
A'mither of Pain; 
52 
Tahle 
25 A&B 
Japanese-owned vs. UK-owned Operating profit 26 26 A&B 
Japanese-owned vs. UK-owned Turnover 42 27 A&B 
US-owned vs. UK-owned Growth in Turnover 88 28 A&B 
US-owned vs. UK-owned Operating profit 53 29 A&B 
US-owned vs. UK-owned Turnover 68 30 A&B 
*All Tables in Appendices. 
Javanese-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies 
In order to compare the performance of the Japanese-owned companies and their UK 
counterparts the growth of the turnover was used. The first step was the calculation of 
the growth, done by looking at the growth of the sales between the year ended 1998 
and the year ended 2000 for all Japanese-owned and UK-owned companies classified 
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under the same individual industry SIC codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing 
industries and 6 wholesale industries). The second step was to individually match 
Japanese-owned companies with UK-owned companies within each SIC four-digit 
code and with similar growth (+, - 2.5%). The result of this method was 52 paired 
matches of Japanese- and UK-owned companies. The independent sample t-test was 
used to examine the PLIs of both Japanese- and UK-owned companies. The t-test of 
the mean of each PLI showed that the means of all PLIs were lower for Japanese- 
owned companies compared to that of the UK-owned companies. In addition, the 
return on assets ratio was statistically significantly lower for the Japanese-owned 
companies compared to the UK sets (Table 25 A&B in Appendices). 
The second method used to match individual Japanese-owned and UK-owned 
companies was operating profit matching criteria. By looking at the companies with 
similar operating profit figures (+, - 10%) for all the Japanese-owned and UK-owned 
companies classified under the same industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 
manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale industries), this research identified 26 pairs 
of individually matched Japanese- and UK-owned companies within each SIC four- 
digit code and with similar operating profit. The independent sample t -test was used 
to examine the PLIs of both Japanese-owned and UK-owned companies. The t-test of 
the mean of each PLI showed that the means of all PLIs were lower for the Japanese- 
owned companies compared to that of the UK-owned companies with no statistically 
significant results found (Table 26 A&B in Appendices). 
The last method used to match individual Japanese-owned and UK-owned companies 
was by turnover. By looking at the companies with similar turnover figure (+, - 10%) 
for all the Japanese-owned and UK-owned companies classified under the same 
industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale 
industries), this research identified 42 pairs of individually matched Japanese-owned 
companies with UK-owned companies within each SIC four-digit code and with 
similar turnover. The independent sample t -test was used to examine the PLIs of 
both Japanese-owned and UK-owned companies. The t-test of the mean of each PLI 
showed that the means of the PLIs were lower for the Japanese-owned companies 
compared to that of the UK-owned companies. Berry ratio was statistically 
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significantly lower for the Japanese-owned companies (Table 27 A&B in 
Appendices). 
US-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies 
In order to compare the performance of the US-owned companies and their UK 
counterparts, the growth of the turnover was used. The first step was the calculation of 
the growth, done by looking at the growth of the sales between the year ended 1998 
and the year ended 2000 for all the US-owned and UK-owned companies classified 
under the same industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing industries and 6 
wholesale industries). The second step was to individually match US-owned 
companies with UK-owned companies within each SIC four-digit code and with 
similar growth (+, - 2.5%). The result of this method was 88 matched pairs of US- and 
UK-owned companies. The independent sample t-test was used to examine the PLIs 
of both US-owned and UK-owned companies. The t-test of the means of four PLIs 
were lower for the US-owned companies compared to that of the UK-owned 
companies. Profit margin on sales ratio was statistically lower for the US-owned 
companies compared to the UK-owned sets (Table 28 A&B in Appendices). 
The second method used to match individual US-owned and UK-owned companies 
was through operating profit matching criteria. By looking at the companies with 
similar operating profit figures (+, - 10%) for all the US-owned and UK-owned 
companies classified under the same industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 
manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale industries), this method identified 53 pairs 
of individually matched US- and UK-owned companies within each SIC four-digit 
code and with similar operating profit. The independent sample t -test was used to 
examine the PLIs of both US-owned and UK-owned companies. The t-test of the 
mean of each PLI showed that the mean of four PLIs was higher for the US-owned 
companies compared to that of the UK-owned companies with no statistically 
significant results found (Table 29 A&B in Appendices). 
The last method used to match individual US-owned and UK-owned companies was 
by turnover. By looking at the companies with similar turnover figures (+, - 10%) for 
all the US-owned and UK-owned companies classified under the same industrial 
codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale industries), this 
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research identified 68 pairs of individually matched US- and UK-owned companies 
within each SIC four-digit code and with similar turnover. The independent sample t 
test was used to examine the PLIs of both US-owned and UK-owned companies. The 
t-test of the mean of each PLI showed that the means of four of the PLIs were lower 
for the US-owned companies compared to that of the UK-owned companies with net 
margin being statistically significant (Table 30 A&B in Appendices). 
Based on the results of the statistical tests of the different matching methods, it can be 
concluded that differences between the performance as measured by PLI of foreign- 
owned companies (Japanese- and US-owned) exist. This research used the two PLIs 
for the Japanese-owned companies and the two PLIs for the US-owned companies to 
reject the null hypothesis and can be confident that evidence of lower profitability by 
foreign-owned companies was presented. Even after accounting for matching 
individual companies based on turnover, operating profit, and growth of turnover, 
Japanese- and US-owned companies reported lower profits than UK-owned 
companies. 
Ho5: There are no differences between the performances (profitability measures) of 
joint venture foreign-owned companies (Japanese/UK- and US/UK-owned 
and the verformances of UK/other-owned companies. 
To validate the hypothesis related to the comparison of the performance of jointly 
owned foreign companies (with at least one British company in the shareholders) with 
UK partners represented by US/UK- and Japanese/UK-owned companies, the same 
three matching methods were obtained to ensure the limitation of using individual 
matching criteria. The matching methods were as follows: 
1. Individually matched by growth in turnover (+, - 2.5%) over the 3-yr period 
1998-2000, factoring in similar strategies, product cycles, etc; 
2. Individually matched by operating profit over the 3-yr average period 1998- 
2000 (+, - 10%), factoring in similar profitability levels, cost of goods sold, 
ability to make profit, etc; and, 
3. Individually matched by turnover over the 3-yr average 1998-2000 (+, - 10%), 
factoring in similar size of operations, market, share, etc. 
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For each of the matching methods a group of Japanese/UK jointly owned companies 
were individually matched with a group of UK/other-owned companies. In addition, 
a group of US/UK jointly owned companies were individually matched with a group 
of UK-owned companies. Table 7-5 shows a summary of the matched data, matching 
method, the number of matched companies and the table number. 
Table 7-5: Data and Matching (Section 2- Hypothesis 5) 
' 
vs. UK/other-Owned Japanese/UK-Owned Growth in Turnover 21 31 A&B 
Japanese/UK-Owned vs. UK/other-Owned Operating profit 9 32 A&B 
Japanese/UK-Owned vs. UKlother-Owned Turnover 11 33 A&B 
US/UK-Owned vs. UK/Other-Owned Growth in Turnover 46 34 A&B 
US/UK-Owned vs. UK/Other-Owned Operating profit 26 35 A&B 
US/UK-Owned vs. UK/Other-Owned Turnover 33 36 A&B 
*All Tables in Appendices. 
Japanese/UK-Owned Companie vs. UK/Other-Owned Companies 
To compare the performance of the Japanese/UK-owned companies with their 
UK/Other counterparts the growth of the turnover was used. The first step was the 
calculation of growth, done by looking at growth of the sales between the year ended 
1998 and the year ended 2000 for all Japanese/UK-owned and UK/other companies 
classified under the same industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing 
industries and 6 wholesale industries). The second step was to individually match 
Japanese/UK-owned companies with UK/other companies within each SIC four-digit 
code and with similar growth (+, - 2.5%). The result of this method was 21 matched 
pairs of Japanese/UK- and UK/other companies. The independent sample t-test was 
used to examine the PLIs of both Japanese/UK- and UK/other companies. The t-test 
of the means of each PLI showed that the means of all PLIs were lower for the 
Japanese/UK-owned companies compared to that of the UK/other companies with no 
statistically significant results (Table 31 A&B in Appendices). 
The second method used to match individual Japanese/UK- and UK/other companies 
was operating profit matching criteria. By looking at the companies with similar 
operating profit figures (+, - 10%) for all the Japanese-owned and UK companies 
classified under the same industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing 
industries and 6 wholesale industries), this research matched 9 pairs of Japanese/UK- 
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owned companies with UK/other companies within each SIC four-digit code and with 
similar operating profit. The independent sample t-test was used to examine the PLIs 
of both Japanese/UK and UK/other companies. The t-test of the mean of each PLI 
showed that the means of all PLIs were lower for the Japanese/UK-owned companies 
compared to that of the UK/other companies with no statistically significant results 
(Table 32 A&B in Appendices). 
The last method used to match individual Japanese/UK- and UK/other companies was 
matching by turnover. By looking at the companies with similar turnover figures (+, - 
10%) for all the Japanese-owned and UK/other companies classified under the same 
industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale 
industries), this research identified 11 matched Japanese/UK-owned companies with 
UK/other companies within each SIC four-digit code and with similar turnover. The 
independent sample t -test was used to examine the PLIs of both Japanese/UK- and 
UK/other companies. The t-test of the mean of each PLI showed that the means of the 
PLIs were lower for the Japanese/UK-owned companies compared to that of the 
UK/other companies with no statistically significant results found (Table 33 A&B in 
Appendices). 
US/UK-Owned Companies vs. UK/Other-Owned Companies 
In order to compare the performance of the US/UK-owned companies with their 
UK/other counterparts the growth of the turnover was used. The first step was 
calculation of growth, done by looking at the growth of sales between the year ended 
1998 and the year ended 2000 for all the US/UK- and UK/other companies classified 
under the same industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing industries and 6 
wholesale industries). The second step was to individually match US/UK companies 
with UK/other companies within each SIC four-digit code and with similar growth (+, 
- 2.5%). The result of this method was 
46 matched pairs of US/UK- and UK/other 
companies. The independent sample t-test was used to examine the PLIs of both 
US/UK- and UK/other companies. The t-test of the mean of all PLIs was higher for 
the US/UK-owned companies compared to that of the UK/other companies. In 
addition, net margin (operating margin) ratio was, statistically, significantly higher for 
the US/UK-owned companies compared to the UK/other-owned sets (Table 34 A&B 
in Appendices). 
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The second method used to match individual US/UK- and UK/other companies was 
operating profit matching criteria. By looking at the companies with similar operating 
profit figures (+, - 10%) for all US/UK- and UK/other companies classified under the 
same industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale 
industries), this research matched 26 pairs of US/UK-owned companies with 
UK/other companies within each SIC four-digit code and with similar operating 
profit. The independent sample t-test was used to examine the PLIs of both US/UK- 
and UK/other companies. The t-test of the mean of each PLI showed that the means of 
all PLIs were higher for the US/UK-owned companies compared to that of the 
UK/other companies. Profit margin on sales and net margin (operating margin) ratios 
were, statistically, significantly higher for the US/UK-owned companies compared to 
the UK/other sets (Table 35 A&B in Appendices). 
The last method used to match individual US/UK- and UK/other companies was 
matching by turnover. By looking at the companies with similar turnover figure (+, - 
10%) for all the US-owned and UK/other companies classified under the same 
industrial codes used in Section 1 (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale 
industries), this research identified 33 pairs of individually matched US/UK-owned 
companies with UK/other companies within each SIC four-digit code and with similar 
turnover. The independent sample t-test was used to examine the PLIs of both 
US/UK- and UK/other companies. The t-test of the mean of each PLI showed that the 
mean of three PLIs was lower for the US/UK-owned companies compared to that of 
the UK/other companies with no statistically significant results (Table 36 A&B in 
Appendices). 
From the statistical test of the different joint ventures groups using different matching 
methods, it is visible that the form of the investment represented by joint ventures or a 
domestic partner has an effect on the performance as measured by PLIs of the MNEs. 
These effects seem to change according to differences in the ownership of MNEs. 
Japanese-owned companies having a domestic partner reduced the gaps in profits 
between Japanese- and UK/other companies given that the results indicated no 
significant differences. In the opposite direction, the joint venture form of investments 
had positive effects on PLIs of US/UK-owned companies compared to their UK/other 
counterparts. Two PLIs were statistically significantly higher for the US/UK-owned 
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companies compared to the UK/other sets. Due to the differing characteristics of the 
ownership, this research can not rejects the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences between the performances (profitability measures) of joint venture 
foreign-owned companies (US- and Japanese-owned) from the performances of 
foreign-owned companies (US- and Japanese-owned). 
7.2.3 Section 3: Analysis of Qperating Losses 
This section is similar to Section 2 in highlighting the performance of foreign-owned 
and domestic-owned companies and focusing on companies with average operating 
losses. The investigation of the differences between the groups was conducted using 
the independent sample t -test. The basis for using the independent sample t-test was 
to assess whether the means of each of the PLIs was different for the foreign-owned 
companies compared to the UK-owned companies. This section tests the following 
null hypothesis: 
Ho6: There are no differences between the performance (profitability measures) of 
foreign-owned companies with average negative operating profit (Japanese- 
and US-owned) and UK-owned companies with negative operating profit. 
Japanese-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies 
In order to compare the performance of Japanese-owned companies with operating 
losses with their UK-owned counterparts, averages of the PLIs were used for both 
groups for the years 1998-2000 for all Japanese- and UK-owned companies classified 
under the 18 industrial codes (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale 
industries). The sample consisted of 27 Japanese-owned companies and 115 UK- 
owned companies. The independent sample t -test was used to examine the PLIs of 
both Japanese-owned and UK-owned companies. The t-test of the mean of the PLIs 
showed that the mean of all PLIs was lower for the Japanese companies compared to 
that of the UK companies. Profit margin, profit margin on sales, net margin (operating 
margin), and Berry ratio PLIs were statistically significantly lower for the Japanese- 
owned companies compared to the UK sets (Table 37 A&B in Appendices). 
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US-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies 
To compare the performance of the US-owned companies with operating losses to 
their UK-owned counterparts, averages of the PLIs were used for both groups for the 
years 1998-2000 for all the US-owned and UK-owned companies classified under 18 
industrial codes (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale industries). The sample 
consisted of 36 US-owned companies and 115 UK-owned companies. The 
independent sample t-test was used to examine the PLIs of both US-owned and UK- 
owned companies. The t-test of the means of the PLIs showed that the mean of four 
PLIs were lower for the US companies compared to that of the UK-owned companies. 
The profit margin ratio was statistically significantly lower for the US-owned 
companies compared with the UK-owned companies (Table 38 A&B in Appendices). 
Although this section did not use precise matching methods due to the limited number 
of companies with 3-yr average (1998-2000) operating losses, it appeares from the 
statistical tests that the profitability of MNEs differed based on country of ownership. 
For the Japanese-owned companies, the result revealed that four of the PLIs were 
statistically significantly lower than the UK-owned companies indicating that for the 
companies with Japanese citizenship the null hypothesis could only be rejected if the 
tests were conducted on only the Japanese companies. On the other hand, the 
statistical results found one profit level indicator significantly different for the US- 
owned companies compared to the UK-owned companies. Therefore, this study 
neither rejects nor accepts the null hypothesis that there are no differences between 
the performance (PLIs) of foreign-owned companies with negative operating profit 
and UK-owned companies. Similar to previous portions of this research, this finding 
further confirms that Japanese-owned companies have consistently lower profitability 
unlike the US-owned companies, presumably due to country of ownership 
Hol: There are no differences between the performance (profitability measures) of 
joint venture foreign-owned companies with average negative operating profit 
(Japanese/UK- and US/UK owned) and UK/other-owned companies with 
negative operating profit. 
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Japan/UK-owned companies vs. UK/other companies 
In order to compare the performance of the Japanese/UK-owned companies with 
operating losses to their UK/other counterparts, averages of the PLIs were used for 
both groups for the years 1998-2000 for all the Japanese/UK- and UK/other 
companies classified under 18 industrial codes (12 manufacturing industries and 6 
wholesale industries). The sample consisted of 18 Japanese-owned companies and 47 
UK companies. The independent sample t -test was used to examine the PLIs of both 
Japanese/UK- and UK/other companies. The t-test of the mean of the PLIs showed 
that the means of three PLIs were lower for Japanese/UK-owned companies 
compared to that of the UK/other companies with no statistically significantly results 
(Table 39 A&B in Appendices). 
US/UK-owned companies vs. UK/other companies 
To compare the performance of the US/UK-owned companies with operating losses 
and their UK-owned counterparts, averages of the PLIs were used for both groups for 
the years 1998-2000 for all the US/UK- and UK/other companies classified under the 
18 industrial codes (12 manufacturing industries and 6 wholesale industries). The 
sample consisted of 42 US-owned companies and 47 UK companies. The 
independent sample t-test was used to examine the PLIs of both US/UK-owned and 
UK/other companies. The t-test of the means of the PLIs showed that the means of all 
PLIs were lower for the US/UK-owned companies compared to that of the UK/other 
companies. In addition, the profit margin ratio was statistically significant (Table 40 
A&B in Appendices). 
It can be concluded from the statistical tests that the form of the investment 
represented by Japanese/UK- and US/UK-owned companies with 3-yr (1998-2000) 
average operating losses affected the performance as measured by PLIs of the MNEs. 
This was a repeated occurrence for these and previous samples as the role of the 
domestic UK partner in the joint venture minimized gaps in the PLIs. As there was 
one significant ratio between the two groups (Japan/UK- vs. UK/other and US/UK- 
vs. UK/other), this research can not reject the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences between the performance (PLIs) of joint venture foreign-owned 
companies with negative operating profit and UK-owned companies. The explanation 
being that by having a local partner in a joint venture management, differences 
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between the performance of foreign and domestic-owned companies are eliminated. 
7.2.4 Section 4: Analysis of Tax 
This section sheds light on the impact of the latest UK transfer pricing regulations 
introduced in 1998 corporation tax self-assessment reform and its influence on 
performance as measured by tax payment of both foreign-owned and domestic-owned 
companies in the UK. The time periods examined are fiscal years 1996-1997 and 
fiscal years 1999-2000. These fiscal years cover the period prior and subsequent to 
the 1998 transfer pricing regulations in the UK. The rationale for choosing US-owned 
and Japanese-owned companies was to be consistent with previous sections of this 
research and to follow the evidence in previous literature that has led to the suggestion 
that Japanese-owned companies tend to improperly use transfer pricing tax laws to 
reallocate income from their overseas operations to Japan. 
Unlike previous research which randomly selected groups of foreign and domestic 
companies and compared their tax payments regardless of their activities, size, 
profitability, or used the same set of companies when comparing periods prior and 
subsequent to the new regulations, this study eliminated the differences in financial 
characteristics of various industries and compared companies on an industrial basis. 
The sample for this section was obtained using the FAME database covering the fiscal 
years 1996,1997,1999, and 2000. Table 7-6 shows a summary of the matched data, 
matching method, and the number of matched companies. 
Table 7-6: Data and iviatcnin k3ecnon'+) 
Japanese-owned vs. UK-owned Manufacturing 47 41 A &B 
US-owned vs. UK-owned Manufacturing 202 42 A &B 
Japanese-owned vs. UK-owned Wholesale 41 43 A &B 
US-owned vs. UK-owned Wholesale 80 44 A &B 
*A11 'Fables in Appenaices. 
This section tested the following null hypothesis: 
Ho8: There is no difference in the amount of reported tax expense by foreign-owned 
companies (Japanese- and US-owned) compared to the amount of reported tax 
expense by domestic companies. 
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Japanese-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies (Manufacturing Industries) 
In order to compare the tax payment of the foreign-owned companies and their UK 
counterparts, this research matched individual foreign-owned companies by both SIC 
two-digit codes (rather than the SIC four-digit code used in the previous section to 
allow for a greater number of individually matched companies) and gross profit (+, - 
10%) located in all manufacturing industries. The result of this matching method was 
47 pairs of Japanese- and UK-owned companies. The independent sample t -test was 
used to examine the tax payment (net tax liability paid to Inland Revenue) of both 
Japanese-owned and UK-owned companies. The t-test for the four financial years 
tested suggested that the tax paid by Japanese companies to the UK government was 
lower than the mean of the tax payment paid by the matched UK companies. The 
results for the years 1999,1997, and 1996 were, statistically, significantly lower for 
Japanese companies (Table 41 A&B in Appendices). 
US-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies (Manufacturing Industries) 
To compare the tax payment of the US-owned companies and their UK-owned 
counterparts, a match of individual foreign-owned companies by both SIC two-digit 
codes (rather than the SIC four-digit code used in the previous section to allow for a 
greater number of individually matched companies) and gross profit (+, - 10%) 
located in all manufacturing industries was used. The result of this matching method 
was 202 pairs of US- and UK-owned companies. The independent sample t-test was 
applied to examine the tax payment of both US-owned and UK-owned companies. 
The t-test for the four financial years tested suggested that the mean of the tax paid by 
US-owned companies to the UK government was lower than the tax payment paid by 
the matched UK-owned companies for three financial years. The result for the year 
1999 was statistically significantly lower for US-owned companies (Table 42 A&B in 
Appendices). 
Japanese-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies (Wholesale Industries) 
To evaluate the tax payment of the foreign-owned companies and their UK 
counterparts, this research matched individual foreign-owned companies by both SIC 
two-digit codes (rather than the SIC four-digit code used in the previous section to 
allow for a greater number of individually matched companies) and gross profit (+, - 
10%) located in all wholesale industries. The result of this matching method was 41 
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pairs of Japanese- and UK-owned companies. The independent sample t-test was 
used to examine the tax payment of both Japanese- and UK-owned companies. The t- 
test of the financial years tested suggested that the tax paid by Japanese-owned 
companies to the UK government was lower than the mean of the tax payment paid 
by the matched UK-owned companies. The results for the years 2000,1999, and 1997 
were statistically significantly lower for Japanese companies (Table 43 A&B in 
Appendices). 
US-owned companies vs. UK-owned companies (Wholesale Industries) 
To assess the tax payment of the US-owned companies and their UK-owned 
counterparts, a match of individual foreign-owned companies by both SIC two-digit 
codes (rather than the SIC four-digit code used in the previous section to allow for a 
greater number of individually matched companies) and gross profit (+, - 10%) 
located in all manufacturing industries were used. The result of this matching method 
was 80 pairs of US- and UK-owned companies. The independent sample t -test was 
applied to examine the tax payments of both US- and UK-owned companies. The t- 
test of the financial years tested suggested that the mean of the taxes paid by US- 
owned companies to the UK government was lower than the tax payment paid by the 
matched UK-owned companies for all the financial years with no statistically 
significantly results (Table 44 A&B in Appendices). 
As a result of the findings noted above, this research neither accepts nor rejects the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference in the amount of tax paid to the UK 
government from foreign-owned companies within the manufacturing and wholesale 
industries over time compared to the amount of tax paid by domestic companies. 
Since the tests demonstrated one statistically significant low value of the tax payment 
for the US-owned companies and six statistically significantly low mean values of tax 
payments for the Japanese-owned companies, the null hypothesis can be rejected if it 
is only based on the Japanese-owned companies. The low tax payment by Japanese- 
owned companies was evident consistently amongst both the manufacturing and 
wholesale industries. This finding confirms the results of previous research in the 
area as well as prior sections that surmised that Japanese-owned companies 
underperfonms by both profitability and tax payments compared to domestic UK 
companies. The distribution of the Japanese-owned companies' taxes provides 
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evidence on how likely it is that manipulation of income takes place. Persistently 
large losses in relation to assets or sales suggests limited tax planning as the foreign 
company could lower its worldwide tax bill by shifting some of its losses to other 
jurisdictions. 
Ho9: There are no differences in the amount of reported tax expense by foreign- 
owned companies prior and subsequent to the latest UK transfer pricing 
regulation introduced in 1998 corporation tax self-assessment compared to 
domestic companies. 
To test the impact of the latest UK 1998 regulation changes on the tax and transfer 
pricing regulations in the UK, it was necessary to examine the periods prior and 
subsequent to the tax changes. Fiscal years 1996-1997 and fiscal years 1999-2000 
were used to validate this null hypothesis. Using data from manufacturing and 
wholesale industries, each of the Japanese-, US-, and UK-owned data were tested 
separately using the One Way ANOVA test for the years prior and subsequent to the 
UK tax reform. The One Way ANOVA test combined the data prior and subsequent 
to 1998 in order to detect any effects of the new law. The results of the One Way 
ANOVA for the groups were as follows: 
Japanese-owned Companies (Manufacturing Industries) 
The results of the One Way ANOVA for the 47 Japanese-owned companies in the 
manufacturing industry revealed an increase in tax payments after the introduction of 
the new UK self-assessment with no significant results (Table 45 in Appendices). 
US-owned Companies fflanufacturing industries) 
The results of the One Way ANOVA for the 202 US-owned companies in the 
manufacturing industry revealed a decrease in tax payments after the introduction of 
the new UK self-assessment with no significant results (Table 46 in Appendices). 
UK-owned Companies (Manufacturing Industries) 
The results of the One Way ANOVA for the 249 UK-owned companies in the 
manufacturing industry revealed an increase 
in tax payments after the introduction of 
the new UK self-assessment with no significant results (Table 47 in Appendices). 
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Japanese-owned Companies (Wholesale Industries) 
The results of the One Way ANOVA for the 41 Japanese-owned companies in the 
wholesale industry revealed a decrease in tax payments after the introduction of the 
new UK self-assessment with no significant results (Table 48 in Appendices). 
US-owned Companies (Wholesale Industries) 
The results of the One Way ANOVA for the 80 US-owned companies in the 
wholesale industry revealed a decrease in tax payments after the introduction of the 
new UK self-assessment with no significant results (Table 49 in Appendices). 
UK-owned Companies (Wholesale Industries) 
The results of the One Way ANOVA for the 121 UK-owned companies in the 
wholesale industry revealed a decrease in tax payments after the introduction of the 
new UK self-assessment with no significant results (Table 50 in Appendices). 
The statistical results obtained using the One Way ANOVA on all manufacturing and 
wholesale industries indicated no significant differences between the tax payments 
prior and subsequent to the new tax reform, thus the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences in the amount of taxes paid by foreign-owned companies prior and 
subsequent to the 1998 UK self-assessment tax compared to domestic companies can 
not be rejected. 
7 .3 
Interviews with ITP Specialists 
7.3.1 Consultiniz Firms 
In order to further validate the research findings, interviews were conducted with two 
transfer pricing consultants. In addition to confirming the research findings, the 
consultants provided a wealth of information on transfer pricing in practice. They 
noted that although there remain theoretical differences between TNMM and CPM, in 
practice the differences are minimal. OECD Guidelines give companies freedom in 
determining profitability within the range; profit level indicators are open to differing 
interpretations with subjectivity involved in determining comparables. The 1998 UK 
self-assessment tax law brings greater compliance burdens, awareness, and 
requirements to companies and gives more authority to the tax authorities. In terms of 
procedures, the inter-quartile range is widely used by consultants and tax authorities 
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within the UK. Profit-based methods are widely used to support companies' ITP 
policy. Consultants are aware of ownership effects. Aggregation of the transactions 
is an accepted mechanism by the tax authorities. Finally, although the 1998 UK self- 
assessment has given Inland Revenue more authority, its resources are limited in 
comparison to those of ITP consultants. The following is a summary of the comments 
of the interviewees related to the findings of this study: 
Interviewee I 
Interviewee 1 holds a doctorate in transfer pricing and is a senior transfer pricing 
manager at an international accounting firm. The interview was conducted in London 
in July 2002 with the main points as follows. 
To avoid the problem of bigger profit ranges in practice, consultants use the US IRS 
statistical tool which eliminates 50% of the results (inter-quartile range) in the UK. 
Although Inland Revenue does not require companies to report their comparable 
ranges with any limitations (statistical method), it is commonly accepted to eliminate 
the outliers by using the statistical method (inter-quartile ranges). In specific 
circumstances consultants use the full range depending on the purpose of work. For 
example, quartile ranges are used for planning exercises to support a filing position by 
the taxpayer. Companies defend their comparable sets more ably if it is within the 
quartile ranges because top and bottom 25% are eliminated. Tax authorities in some 
cases might not only reject the range but also the method used. 
With differing approaches available in practice as well as differing interpretations of 
OECD Guidelines, the main issue is supporting companies' position in terms of 
method chosen with tax authorities and ensuring compliance with arm's length. This 
observation supports the significance of this research as comparables remain 
important even when transaction based methods applied. 
The process in developing comparables includes: industry, keywords search, 
independent websites, and business description. The number of comparables is 
usually between five and twenty companies. The same process in developing 
comparables is used for all industries. Foreign operating profit measures are preferred 
over the gross profit measure with certain 
industries have differing priorities in terms 
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of deciding which profit measures to use. For example, distribution industries may 
use operating margin while trading industries may use the Berry ratio. 
Companies are more likely to make decisions in terms of profit level indicators when 
preparing their own documentation to ensure acceptance by Inland Revenue. 
Transactional methods are preferred, but they are difficult to obtain and apply since it 
requires adjustment for risks, currency, and terms of sale. Even if comparable sets are 
obtained, tax authorities carefully evaluate them and require companies to make the 
necessary adjustments. 
Tax authorities are less likely to question profitable companies and are more likely to 
question loss-making companies. In practice, consultants might use loss-making 
companies as a part of a good comparable set. Consultants use Jordan's FAME 
database to obtain comparables for UK companies. In developing comparables, 
consultants place more adjustments when a large number of companies are available. 
In developing comparables consultants put less restrictions when a smaller number of 
companies is available. The key issue is that companies have similar function and 
risk rather than size or strategy. Foreign-owned companies are expected to earn as 
much as domestic companies since arm's length price is based on functional risk. In 
practice, foreign-owned companies may earn the same as a UK distributor, the key 
issue being to satisfy the arm's length. The difference between foreign-owned and 
domestic-owned profits might be due to the fact that some of these companies incur 
additional costs such as startup costs, foreign exchange, R&D, etc. Whereas 
according to this research's findings, differences in profitability between the foreign- 
owned companies and their domestic counterparts are, in all probability, due to skilled 
tax planning and income reallocation. The influences of startup costs and R&D were 
eliminated in this research when matching foreign- and domestic-owned companies 
by using established companies (active for a minimum of four years) and by 
reviewing the intangibles (without significant license to third parties) in the sample 
sets. Due to time restrictions and cost issues, transactions are aggregated by the line 
of business or type of transaction with one set of comparables obtained for the group. 
Although consultants are aware of ownership effects, focus from tax authorities on 
certain nationalities has not been noticed. 
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Prior to the latest UK transfer pricing regulations, consultant firms only had a handful 
of ITP specialists. Now many consulting firms have a whole department full of ITP 
specialists. The main reason is compliance with new guidelines to support a 
company's position. Greater compliance burden/documentation has resulted in more 
companies meeting with requirements. Taxpayers may take an active role in 
determining their comparable sets, possibly leading to a change in the set of 
comparable companies that will prove satisfactory to both the consultant and the 
taxpayer. As a result of the large number of comparable companies available and the 
leeway when choosing PLIs, the previous observation supports this research's 
findings that companies are able, to a certain degree, to select the comparable sets, 
PLIs, and the profit range most appropriate to their ITP policy. 
Interviewee 2 
Interviewee 2 is also a senior transfer pricing manager at an international accounting 
firm. The interview was conducted in London in July 2002 with the main points as 
follows. 
The second consultant confirmed the observations of the first interviewee regarding 
the vast profit ranges in practice and the use of the inter-quartile range. The 
explanation of the wide profit ranges being that the techniques used to date are not 
sufficiently sophisticated to hone in on the underlying return for a specific function 
and risk. As a result, the attempts are to control for as much as possible. Consultants 
today are seeing ranges fairly wide across different industries, although for some 
industries the ranges are a bit narrower. This observation is further confirmed through 
this research as seen in Table 7-3, where the number of comparable sets varied from 
21 to 75 companies throughout the eighteen industries. According to this consultant's 
experience, the number of reported comparables in a set is usually between five and 
ten, thus confirming this research's implication that companies can select their 
preferred sets. Overall, practices are becoming more sophisticated and consultants 
use IR as a guide even though IR today is a couple of years behind the consultants in 
terms of techniques used and database analysis. 
Quartile ranges remain a good tool to control for the factors that cannot be controlled 
when developing comparables. The choice of profit measure (PLIs) is determined by 
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looking at the most reliable justifiable measure. In some cases more than one profit 
measure is used. Inland Revenue appears to be particularly interested in the choice of 
the profit measure. For example, whether the manufacturing industry uses return on 
assets, the selling/trading industry uses operating margin, etc. In some situations the 
choice of profit indication leads to a discussion with IR on which profit level 
indicators to choose, possibly due to the absence of detailed regulations. 
When aggregating transactions, the size of the transactions and the profit level 
indicator choice might be considered. Additional refinements such as telephone 
surveys, extra research, internet, etc are utilized to reduce the comparable sets when a 
large number of comparables are available. Tax authorities do not have the resources 
consultants have... "When Revenue comes up with an alternative set of comparables 
they are not doing a good job as their arguments will be limited against consultants' 
comparables sets. " Inland Revenue is less in a position to argue against a set of 
comparables prepared by consultants due to limited resources and heavy workloads. 
Although the interviewee states that IR might challenge the comparable sets and 
selected PLIs, experienced MNEs and tax consultants remain in a position to use their 
discretion in terms of compliance with the arm's length principle. 
Transfer pricing guidelines provide some flexibility when ascertaining degree as no 
exact comparables can be obtained. `Pepsi not comparable to Coke' and there is 
always an element of subjectivity. 
One of the explanations of the differences between foreign-owned and domestic- 
owned companies might be the value of intangibles, such as R&D or research centers 
that might be located in the parent country. For example, Japanese companies might 
be unwilling to make profits outside of Japan possibly because of the Japanese tax 
authorities. In practice, there have been examples where Japanese companies were 
questioned by Inland Revenue because they did not seem to be making enough profit 
in the UK. Certain Japanese clients explained that part of Japanese culture is that the 
transfer price is set in the home country. One of the interviewee's Japanese clients 
explained, "You need to understand the Japanese business culture in Japan, we want 
to make our profit in Japan. " A business culture practice such as this is usually 
backed up by tax authorities in Japan who also believe that Japanese companies 
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should make their profit in Japan. This might follow the same argument that IR would 
like UK companies to have the profit in the UK, whereas this is not the case for US 
companies because they might be more aware of the implications of ITP. While the 
findings of the tax analysis section (7.2-Ho8) of this research showed one low figure 
of reported tax expense for the US-owned companies, it showed six low figures of tax 
expenses for Japanese-owned companies confirming the interviewee's previous 
comments. 
The latest 28AAICTA 1998 UK transfer pricing regulations brings more awareness 
and encourages companies to do things properly which includes choosing the 
appropriate comparables and profit level indicators. This might have a direct effect 
on foreign-owned companies which might be under investigation of the tax authorities 
(more compliance for foreign-owned companies within the acceptable range), 
especially that the latest 1998 UK regulations brings a compliance burden on the 
taxpayers. 
This research supports the opinions of the interviewee that the UK latest transfer 
pricing rules introduced in 1998 corporation tax self-assessment would have a great 
impact on both foreign- and domestic-owned companies as it contains a specific 
requirement for profits to be calculated in accordance with the arm's length principle. 
Previously there was no requirement to adhere to the arm's length principle in 
calculating profits for inclusion in a tax return. Instead, IR has the authority, through 
the use of some cumbersome processes, including the issue of formal directions by its 
Board, to replace prices on transactions which has resulted in the understatement of 
profits in the UK through pricing at arm's length. As there was no statutory 
requirement to return profits calculated in accordance with the arm's length standard 
no penalties could ordinarily be attached to the tax on uplifts made by IR. (Ernst & 
Young UK, 2000) 
The final comment made by the interviewee was that findings of this research study 
were consistent with consultants' experience in practice. 
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7.3.2 International tax agency 
To authenticate the research findings, three other interviews were conducted with ITP 
specialists from the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) in the 
Netherlands in order to authenticate the research findings. The specialists provided 
their views regarding the research problem in theoretical and practical bases. The 
following is a summary of the comments of the interviewees which is related to the 
findings of this study: 
Interviewee 3 
Interviewee 3 is an international taxation professor, ITP expert, and published author. 
The following are the main comments from the interviewee conducted December 
2002 in Amsterdam. 
Not until the early 1990's was there a shift towards one central benchmark which is 
comparable to the operating profit of comparable enterprises. "We cannot assure that 
this is the number one method like in the US where data on operating profit can be 
easily found, and we hope that we do not go in the direction of the US. " From the 
point of view of this research, the previous comment made by the interviewee 
supports the research method used, based on UK data, when comparing TNMM and 
CPM since detailed financial data are available in the UK. 
From a theoretical point view, the focus should remain on the use of traditional 
methods because both TNMM and CPM is basically returning to the third empirical 
method approach of transfer pricing where no reliable accounts or no accounts at all 
can be found. CPM does not include the arm's length principle because it is based on 
Anglo-Saxon approach that develops to avoid income shifting internationally, such as 
US laws in 1917 and UK 1918. 
According to this research the importance of comparables is not only due in part to its 
use for profit-based methods such as TNMM and CPM, but also its relevance in the 
documentation which must include sufficient detail for the economic argument as to 
placement within or outside any comparable range. 
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Interviewee 4 
Interviewee 4 is a tax lawyer and ITP consultant, previously employed by the 
Australian tax authorities. The following are the main comments from the interview 
conducted December 2002 in Amsterdam. 
It seems that getting tighter profit ranges improves comparability of the data sets but 
CPM is not always applied in practice. In essence, this research used similar 
procedure as thoes done by consulting firms and government agencies. 
The justification of the lower profitability by US- and Japanese-owned companies is 
because they are based on higher sales volume. This comment was addressed by the 
research method through the use of turnover as criteria to match foreign- and 
domestic-owned companies. 
In closing, in reality, it might be the large number of companies to a tested party, but 
these can only be used as supporting documentation. In addition, aggregation of 
transactions should be acceptable. Relating this comment to this research, 
aggregating transactions might lead to enhanced discretion by the taxpayers as it 
allows the use of wider criteria (less control) in obtaining comparable sets. 
Interviewee 5 
Interviewee 5 is a tax lawyer. The following are the main comments from the 
interviewee conducted December 2002 in Amsterdam. 
The emphasis was given to the justification of the profit measure used in practice and 
the feeling that it is important for the measure to represent an arm's length situation. 
For example, where the assets are not the driving force, the profit on the return on 
assets can't be used. 
The differences in the performance of foreign-owned companies can be explained by 
the dividends paid to the parent companies or funds transfer between countries. 
Consideration might be given to the strategy of Japanese-owned companies that can't 
be covered by ITP regulations. It is possible that transfer pricing regulations allow 
income shifting. 
174 
The introduction of the UK 1998 self-assessment has an influence in foreign-owned 
companies because companies will look for the safe side and to avoid penalties. This 
can be seen when the US introduced their detailed transfer pricing rules which led the 
OECD to follow it by introducing the new version of their rules. Countries fear that 
detailed restricted rules in one country lead enterprises to seek the safe side in that 
country at the expense of other countries. This research supports the opinions of the 
interviewee that the new self-assessment would have a great impact because of its 
detailed documentations requirement and possible penalties. 
The interviewee's final comments were that OECD Guidelines are an attempt to limit 
the fear of European countries from US regulations. 
7.4 Summary 
This study provides important results from a theoretical and practical standpoint. On a 
the theoretical level, the results of the analysis do not support FDI theories regarding 
the high quality performance (profit and taxes) that foreign subsidiaries expect to 
achieve. On a practical level, Section One provided an in depth analysis of the 
differences in practice between OECD profit ranges, full range, and US IRS profit 
ratios, inter-quartile ranges in addition to evaluating different PLIs across individual 
industries. This section highlighted the results of examining different methods of 
creating comparables which relate to the function and risk profiles. In addition to 
uncovering the effects of ownership on comparables, Sections Two and Three 
represent a contribution to the limited empirical studies in the UK. By comparing the 
performances of foreign-owned companies to domestic companies, this study 
increased the strength of the results by stressing the importance of the use of matching 
between groups and joint-ventures partners. The final section illuminated on the 
influence of the latest transfer pricing regulations and provided evidence of the low 
amount of reported tax by foreign-owned companies in the UK. 
The interviews carried out by this research confirmed the findings of the analysis, 
noted the preference by the continental European experts for OECD profit methods 
and, provided a core understanding of ITP challenges. These interviews underscore 
the importance of profit-based methods and comparables and the flexibility of transfer 
pricing guidelines in allowing MNEs discretion in terms of compliance, in addition to 
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sensing improper practices by foreign-owned companies. This study opens a 
multitude of new areas of future research in theory and practice as explained in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Findings, Limitations, and Future research 
8.1 Introduction 
The objective of this research is to contribute and improve understanding of profit 
based methods and the process of creating comparables. This goal can be achieved 
through the inspection of the most recent OECD TNMM and US IRS CPM, the 
performance (profit and tax) of foreign companies, and the examination of the degree 
of discretion provided under these regulations. In this chapter a summary of the 
findings, expected implications, the contribution of this research to both FDI theories 
and ITP literature, and an assessment to the research method and methodology is 
provided. The remainder of this chapter identifies strengths and limitations of this 
research, considers the research method used, and suggests directions for future 
research. 
8.2 Findings and Implications 
Table 8-1 lists the nine tested null hypotheses for the four sections and the 
conclusions drawn from the results. The following provides detailed findings of each 
of the individual sections of this research. 
The first section found differences between OECD full ranges and US IRS inter- 
quartile ranges for all the profit ranges with significant differences observed between 
profit measures in different industries. There were differences between profit 
measures in providing a comparable range, thus indicating that the OECD TNMM 
and the US IRS CPM are conceptually the same method of determining transfer prices 
(both based on profit ratios of a group of comparable companies) but with differences 
seen in their application. In particular, the US IRS emphasizes the inter-quartile range 
and adjustment to the midpoint. 1994 US IRS regulations (Section 482) kept CPM 
and subjected the choice of methods to the best method rule. Given that the IRS 
decided to retain CPM and use it when it was the best method, OECD Guidelines 
issued in 1995 contained TNMM and recognized it as a method of last resort. In 
practice and as stated by Interviewee 1 (UK), countries such as the UK whose transfer 
pricing regulations are based on OECD guidelines, accept US IRS inter-quartile 
ranges to limit the ranges for profit level indicators. 
These findings imply that companies might be exposed to different regulations, 
TNMM vs. CPM, and face conflicts in compliance since the application of different 
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regulations gives different profit ranges acceptable to different fiscal authorities. 
Different industries may offer a different number of comparable companies, thereby 
allowing companies to select preferable sets. This finding is significant because it 
allows companies the ability not only to adjust their profit level within a range, they 
may also decide which PLI or profit measure to use. The freedom of profit indicators 
is enhanced as the measures themselves give differing degrees of profitability within 
each industry. Companies may opt to use any PLI and any point within their 
respective comparable industry range for optimum benefit thus increasing companies 
discretion. 
Table 8-1: 11ypotheses and Findings 
Hypothesis Findings 
110 1 There are no differences between OECD profit ranges (represented Rejected 
by a full range) and IRS profit ranges (represented by inter- 
quartile ranges) 
Ho2 There are no differences between profit measures in different Rejected 
industries 
Ho3 There are no differences between profit measures when providing Rejected LL a comparable range 
Secti on 2: Foreign-owned Companies (Japanese and US) m. Domestic U K Companies 
11o4 There are no differences between the performances (profitability Rejected 
measures) of foreign-owned companies (Japanese- and US-owned) 
and their domestic counterparts 
Ho5 There are no differences between the performances (profitability Not Rejected 
measures) of joint venture foreign-owned companies 
(Japanese/UK- and US/UK-owned) and the performances of UK- 
owned companies 
Sec tion 3: Foreign-owned Companies (Japanese and US) wid: Operati ng Losses vs. 
Domestic UK Companies with Operating Losses 
Hob There are no differences between the performance (profitability Not Rejected 
measures) of foreign-owned companies with average negative 
operating profit (Japanese- and US-owned) and UK-owned 
corn anies with negative operating profit 
Hol There are no differences between the performance (profitability Not Rejected 
measures) of joint venture foreign-owned companies with average 
negative operating profit (Japanese/UK- and US/UK owned) and 
UK-owned companies with negative operating profit 
Section 4: Tax Analjsis 
Ho8 There is no difference in the amount of reported tax expense by Not Rejected 
foreign-owned companies (Japanese- and US-owned) compared to 
the amount of reported tax expense by domestic companies. 
Hog There are no differences in the amount of reported tax by foreign- Not Rejected 
owned companies prior and subsequent to the latest UK transfer 
pricing regulation introduced in 1998 corporation tax self- 
assessment compared to domestic companies. 
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The findings of Section 1 are consistent with findings by Horst (Cole, 1999) which 
investigated return on assets of US independent wholesalers for the years 1986-1990. 
Horst found that the 25`h percentile average was 2.6%, while the 75th percentile was 
15.4%. That is to say, half of all independent distributors reported average return on 
assets between 2.6% and 15.4% while the remaining half were either above or below 
the range. 
While there is much variability in profit level indicators, a small random sample may 
by chance have a median value and full or inter-quartile range that is quite different 
from the median value and the full or inter-quartile range, respectively, of the 
theoretical population from which the small sample was drawn. This research 
therefore concludes that companies may easily achieve low or high ranges of PLIs 
directly or indirectly by imposing artificial selection of criteria. 
This study represents a step forward towards a more credible process in which the 
identification of potential comparable parties strives to be as objective as possible. 
Due to the ease in which criteria for selecting PLIs can be manipulated to achieve a 
contrived result, TNMM or CPM must provide more stringent guidelines on the 
selection of PLIs. This study suggests that the criteria for selecting PLIs when 
identifying potential comparables should be clearly stated by the regulations with 
insistence that reasonable effort be made in identifying all companies meeting those 
criteria. Criteria that are economically meaningful, verifiable, and fully disclosed 
should be applied. 
The results of Section 2, Chapter 8 are in line with the findings of previous income 
shifting studies (Wheeler, 1988; Kim and Lyn, 1990; Gideon, 1990; Crain and Stiffs, 
1994; Oyelere and Emmanuel, 1996; Munday and Peel, 1997) regarding the lower 
profitability of foreign-owned companies. Buckley and Hughes (1996) suggested that 
the low profitability of the Japanese companies was mainly due to target costing 
system used by Japanese subsidiaries which allow the parent company to "squeeze" 
margins as well as costs. The Japanese overseas company is not regarded as a profit 
centre in its own right and therefore, there is no incentive to increase company profits. 
From the Japanese point view, profit in a subsidiary company is dysfunctional 
(Buckley and Hughes, 1996). 
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This study confirms lower performance by US-owned and Japanese-owned 
companies compared to UK companies, raising a number of issues. There is a 
dichotomy between the comparatively high productivity characteristics of Japanese- 
owned and US-owned companies and their relatively poor profit performance since 
the samples were matched companies with similar operating profits, growth, or 
turnover. There is a definite ownership effect on the profitability, suggesting profit 
management on the part of the Japanese- and US-owned companies in order to 
maximize global profits. It is worthwhile for future studies to investigate whether UK- 
owned companies operating across national borders follow similar practices of 
shifting income to the UK. 
The findings in Section 2 also revealed that differences in profitability were found 
between US joint ventures and UK joint ventures companies. No differences in 
profitability were found between Japanese joint ventures and UK companies. The 
presence of monitoring by a local partner prevents abuse and therefore confirms 
results of previous studies that suggest that the lack of monitoring by local partners 
draws the attention of tax authorities for tax audits (Chan and Chow, 1997). 
In Section 3, it appeared from the statistical test of the different groups of MNEs that 
the effects of ownership seem to change according to differences in the nationality of 
MNEs. The Japanese-owned companies had, on average, lower profits than the UK- 
owned companies. This supports the findings of Section 2 regarding the questionable 
low profits of the Japanese-owned companies and explains in part the high percentage 
of loss-making Japanese companies in the UK. (According to the FAME database, 
over 34% of Japanese-owned companies are loss-making for the year 2000, a 
significantly higher proportion than the 19% found for UK companies. ) 
On the other hand, the results from the tests of different joint venture groups with 
operating losses indicated no differences between the performance of joint venture 
foreign-owned companies with negative operating profit and UK-owned companies. 
This is consistent with previous studies as well as the previous section of this research 
regarding joint ventures and the role of monitoring of the local partner, thus 
eliminating the gaps in profits between foreign- and domestic-owned companies. 
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Finally, Section 4 results confirmed the findings of Sections 2 and 3 with the 
conclusion that there was evidence of low tax expense reported by Japanese-owned 
companies, but not for the US-owned companies, compared to the domestic 
companies for all the manufacturing and wholesaling industries. This suggests that 
companies with certain ownership such as the Japanese-owned companies in the UK 
seem to aggressively manage their tax expense, through ITP policy which might allow 
low profitability, reporting losses and low tax since tax rates are considered highly 
significant determinants of reported profits. Grubert et al (1993) findings were 
similar, noting that foreign companies pay significantly less tax than US companies. 
Although Grubert et al did not use similarly large companies for both groups, they 
found after adjusting for the age profiles of foreign and domestic companies and other 
factors that could cause legitimate differences in profitability, they were able to 
account for part of the differential but roughly 50% of the difference remained 
unexplained. Their results imply that foreign companies attempt to reduce US taxable 
income through income shifting. 
Section 4 findings are supported by the empirical results presented in Chapter 4 as 
well as by the empirical results of other research studies (Piper, 1996; Munday and 
Peel, 1997) that concluded that Japanese companies in the UK pay only a fraction of 
the tax of their domestic counterparts. Whether the manipulation of transfer prices in 
the UK reflects a deliberate desire to minimize tax liability, to avoid exchange rate 
risks, or simply reflects the culture of Japanese businesses, remains uncertain. 
The implication of these findings for tax authorities worldwide is obvious. Gaps and 
loopholes in rules and regulations between and within national tax jurisdictions need 
to be gradually blocked to minimize the opportunities to circumvent ITP regulations. 
The continuous development of such legislative instruments should be carried out on 
an inter-country basis and in consultation with all parties that are likely to be affected 
by the outcome, such as international organizations, MNEs, and professional bodies 
such as the OECD and US IRS which commonly carry out such consultative 
processes. A Trans-national body similar to the EU arbitration model might be 
introduced to arbitrate and develop case laws, although the likelihood of such might 
be slim given individual countries' fiscal interests. 
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In the UK, Inland Revenue modernized transfer pricing rules in 1998 by 
implementing overhauled self-assessment transfer pricing laws. The final portion of 
this research tested the impact of the latest UK regulations on both foreign-owned and 
domestic UK companies with the results revealing some immediate positive effects 
such as increased tax payments without significant differences for the sample group of 
foreign-owned and domestic-owned companies. The latest UK transfer pricing 
regulation appears to have had a great impact on both foreign- and domestic-owned 
companies as it contains a specific requirement for profits to be calculated in 
accordance with the arm's length principle. Before the UK 1998 transfer pricing 
regulations, companies adhered to the arm's length principle in calculating profits for 
inclusion in a tax return. IR assessed a company's profits and wielded the authority, 
through the use of some cumbersome processes including the issue of formal 
directions by its Board, to replace prices on transactions which had resulted in the 
understatement of profits in the UK through pricing other than at arm's length with 
the price that would have been agreed had the parties been independent and acting at 
arm's length. In addition, penalties, as well as the threat of increased audit, appear to 
be an effective deterrent to non-compliance of the regulations. Companies may face 
threats of penalties, aggressive tax audits, and/or double taxation. Over time, tax 
payment differences between foreign and domestic may converge to become less 
volatile due to management experience in complying with the regulations. Companies 
may outsource the preparation of the transfer pricing documentation and use advance 
price agreements to comply with the regulations. 
Reported tax expenses by foreign-owned companies have improved via penalties, 
contemporaneous documentation, and self-assessment. The latter still allows MNEs a 
great deal of discretion when selecting comparables. 
8 .3 
AssessingFDI Theories and ITP Literature 
The theories of MNEs reviewed in Chapter Two suggest that the main pre-condition 
for the spread of FDI is the ability of a company to internalize certain advantage(s), 
transport them across national boundaries and translate them into returns that are over 
and above what indigenous companies 
in the host country can make. This higher 
return is necessary to compensate the 
foreign MNE for developing, internalizing and 
transporting the advantage(s). The theory therefore supports superior levels of 
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performance by foreign-owned subsidiaries. Most of the findings and the empirical 
evidence of this research do not depart from those of the empirical studies mentioned 
in Chapter 3 regarding performance of foreign-owned companies. Wheeler (1988, 
1990) was able to show that indigenous firms in the US outperform their foreign- 
owned counterparts six times over in terms of return on assets. Munday and Peel 
(1997) and Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998) also reported similar evidence in the UK. 
In addition, Kim and Lyn (1990), for example, found that "foreign-owned firms 
operating in the United States do not appear to earn higher profits than American- 
owned firms" (p. 51). Gideon (1990) and Crain and Stifts (1994) also reported similar 
results. 
Through the examination of the hypothesis embedded in these FDI theories, this study 
also questions the rationale for advantage-based involvement of companies operating 
in foreign countries. Ho4 in Section 2 provides evidence of low profits by foreign- 
owned companies compared to their domestic UK counterparts. The low performance 
of foreign-owned companies operating in the UK cannot be explained by the number 
of Japanese companies located in the UK nor can the disproportionate ratio of 
foreign-owned companies (especially Japanese-owned) be easily understood. All 
companies in the sample operate within UK base and hence faced the same economic 
environment. 
It is difficult to understand the lower reported performance by foreign-owned 
companies over the period sampled (1998-2000), especially since they are required to 
meet reporting standards in the UK. One possible answer is that the performances of 
foreign-owned companies are being under-disclosed due to flexible ITP regulations 
without detailed requirements, differences in ITP rules in different countries, or low 
enforcement of the regulations. As with all studies using publicly available data, only 
indirect inferences can be made but the evidence provided here indicates that ITP 
cannot be eliminated to explain diverse performance of foreign-owned and UK 
companies. 
8 .4 
Assessing the Research Method and Methodoloev 
In an effort to provide some insight to the logic behind the methodological choices 
made, the following attempts to address the strengths and the limitations associated 
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both with the overall research design and the particular method employed in this 
study. Given the complex nature of this study, transfer pricing regulations and the test 
of comparables, concerns regarding the research might certainly arise. Some may 
criticize the use of an electronic database for data collection, with the assertion that 
companies' finance directors, consulting firms, and tax agents may provide a deeper 
understanding of the issues under investigation in all of its proportions. However, 
given that the main purpose of the study was to test whether the new regulations on 
comparables can curb MNE discretion, whether ownership effects can be detected, 
and whether regulation changes can be shown to affect tax paid, the selected data 
source was chosen as the most relevant. Due to FAME's content (detailed company 
information, quantitative and qualitative data, 10 years of data for each company, and 
a listing of both private and public companies), its basis on UK GAAP, and its data 
collection from Companies House, it appeared to best fit the specific needs of this 
research. 
This is not to say that the chosen research method that has been employed in this 
study is regarded as a faultless data-collection instrument. On the contrary, an 
attempt was made throughout the thesis to document all the potential and actual 
limitations and when judgment was necessary, controls or screens were placed on 
samples to try to detect patterns. In the final analysis, however, it seems safe to 
conclude that all the previously discussed strengths and weaknesses, concerning both 
the actual method and the overall research design utilized in this research which 
included some fieldwork authentication, represents a trade-off between the precision 
that comes from a high degree of control and the loss of `real-life' richness (Greene 
and D'Oliveira, 1982). Eventually, such choices depend largely on the purpose of the 
research, the conclusions which are expected to be drawn from it, and the conditions 
under which the research is actually carried out. 
8.4.1 Internal Validity 
All in all, the level of internal validity of this research remains high. This is 
fundamentally a study of a more positive nature, which is structured upon 
i) the a priori construction and statement of hypotheses that derive from a 
given theoretical model (FDI and MNE theories and ITP regulations); 
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ii) the explicit identification, operationalization and measurement were carefully 
selected; and, 
iii) the collection of data through the use of a highly structured, standardized 
data-collection method (FAME database and fieldwork of structured 
interviews). 
It is this structured nature, along with the statistical control over the identified 
variables in the stage of data analysis that essentially renders this study with a 
relatively high degree of confidence that the conclusions regarding the hypothesized 
relationships are warranted. However, the inability of the study to control for the 
possible effect of other factors which requires access to individual companies may 
have affected the selection of the criteria when developing comparables. The above 
constitutes a discrepancy between the statistical significance and the substantive 
importance of the results reported. 
8 . 4.2 
External Validity 
Traditionally a positive research study is endowed with a high level of overall 
external validity (generalizability) (Abernethy et al., 1999). Secondary data research 
endeavours most usually entail the careful random selection of samples that enable the 
obtained findings to be generalized to wider populations with a high degree of 
confidence. For Section 1, this study draws data from randomly selected samples of 
comparable companies within 18 different manufacturing and wholesale industries 
representative of the entire population sample. The population validity - that is, its 
ability to generalize from the sample of twelve manufacturing and six wholesale 
industries to all manufacturing and wholesale industries is high and to all other 
industries might be limited. In addition, the samples for Sections 2,3, and 4 cover 
most Japanese-owned companies and a large sample of US-owned and UK companies 
within selected industries with the findings being highly generalizable for the 
Japanese- and US-owned companies within the manufacturing and wholesale 
industries in UK and limited to other foreign-owned companies in the UK. 
As far as the study's ecological validity is concerned (that is, its ability to provide 
results that can be readily generalized from the actual social context in which the 
research has taken place to other contexts and settings (Gill & Johnson, 2002)), the 
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high degree of standardization and structure of the instrument used to collect data is 
likely to have created a relative lack of naturalism that may have thereby adversely 
affected the study's overall ecological validity. 
This research used some fieldwork interviews in addition to the main data to gather 
data and authenticate findings from interviewees who were both academic and experts 
in the field acting within their actual social context to provide a definite advantage in 
terms of ecological validity. These more qualitative data that were collected from the 
interviews enriched and provided triangulation for the findings that emerged from the 
main data source. All things considered, the overall external validity of this research 
is held to be relatively high. 
8.4.3 Construct Validity 
With regard to the construct validity of the study, the fact that all variables were 
measured with instruments drawn from the ITP regulations, which have been 
previously developed and extensively tested in practice, gives some confidence about 
the extent to which the constructs of theoretical interest have been successfully 
operationalized and measured here and therefore, provide some assurance of the 
overall study's criterion and construct validity. 
8 . 4.4 
Reliability 
Lastly, the reliability of the study is also considered to be fairly high. The use of a 
highly structured method for collecting data in a form that is quantitatively 
analyzable, as well as the emphasis on the statistical control over the variables 
identified in the research, provide a relatively high degree of confidence about the 
consistency of the results obtained. Overall, mainly owing to the high level of 
structure and rigour maintained in the data collection and analysis, the present study is 
regarded as easily replicable for similar research endeavours in the future, and hence 
as highly reliable. 
8 .5 
Research Strengths 
The literature review in Chapter 3 identified many of the previous empirical studies. 
Regarding transfer pricing methods, the majority of the previous studies focused on 
either the selection of the acceptable methods 
by MNEs or the factors that influenced 
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the selected methods. By concentrating on how each of the acceptable methods of 
transfer pricing is applied and knowing the inner workings on how these methods are 
applied in practice improves the understanding of ITP and fill in the gaps between 
theory and practice. Many of the previous studies lack the focus to provide 
meaningful explanations of ITP practice given that transfer pricing is such a multi- 
disciplinary area with numerous competing theories and many conflicting findings. 
To increase the reliability of the comparable sets and the validity of the findings, this 
research's carefully selected sources of data is the same source used by consultants 
and accepted by Inland Revenue (Interviewee 2-UK). 
This research introduced empirical differences between TNMM and CPM, the 
ownership of more than one group of foreign companies, the performance of loss- 
making companies in relation to ITP, and finally, the empirical effects of the latest 
UK transfer pricing rules. Another focal point of this study was the data analysis. The 
data analysis contained four integrated sections in addition to interviews which at 
least in part verified the results. 
Previous empirical studies have used unmatched samples (e. g. Norusis, 1999), not 
distinguished between the different forms of investment the foreign-owned companies 
represent (Oyelere and Emmanuel, 1996), or have drawn conclusions based on one 
year's worth of data (Munday and Peel, 1997). Unlike previous research, this study 
used three matching methods to assess the performance of foreign-owned companies 
with the performance of domestic-owned companies. By controlling for many factors 
(strategies, product cycle, growth, profitability and, size of operation) that might 
affect the performance, this research eliminated the disadvantages of using one 
matching method. The matching process was also used to assess the reported tax 
expense of foreign-owned companies with domestic-owned companies. 
This research disaggregated foreign-owned companies into a group of Japanese- 
owned companies and a group of US-owned companies in order to avoid missing any 
cultural tendencies that might exist within a certain group of foreign companies. The 
importance of the matching methods between individual companies cannot be stressed 
enough as it is essential to any research that considers testing the performance of 
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different groups of companies as a representation of a company's capability. 
Continued research in this direction will promote a greater understanding of the 
behavior of foreign companies, encouraging a transaction level analysis which may 
require different research methods. 
Lastly, this research's major strength is the balance between the research methods and 
the research questions, which provided solid findings of benefit to MNEs, policy 
makers, tax authorities, and consulting firms. To demonstrate the importance of 
comparables, Section 1 examined the profit-based methods TNMM and CPM and 
found differences between OECD and IRS profit ranges and variations between 
different PLIs. Section 2 provided comparisons between foreign-owned (Japanese 
and US) companies and discovered low profitability of Japanese- and US-owned 
companies compared to UK companies. Section 3 provided comparisons between 
foreign-owned companies (Japanese and US) with operating losses compared to UK 
companies with operating losses and found that a vital number of the Japanese-owned 
companies are loss making and that Japanese-owned companies with operating losses 
significantly under perform their UK counterparts. Finally, Section 4 tested the 
effects of the latest UK transfer pricing regulation introduced in 1998 corporation tax 
self-assessment tax and offered evidence of the tax expenses reported by foreign- 
owned companies (Japanese and US) which confirms the low amount of reported tax 
on behalf of the Japanese-owned companies. 
8.6 Research Limitations 
As is the case with all research of this nature, certain limitations may apply. One 
potential limitation is the necessity of making assumptions regarding the control for 
functions and risk when developing comparables using both TNMM and CPM. Due 
to the limitation of the qualitative data available on each company, this study did not 
use rigorous controls for function and risk differences. Although the same controls 
were applied for both TNMM and CPM when selecting the comparable sets, this 
limitation was partially overcome through the strategy of using individual industry 
analysis with four digit SIC codes, five different PLIs and, recent three year average 
data. 
The foreign-owned companies used in the research sample are companies with 
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foreign ownership (control) whose activities and practices may be largely limited by 
the decisions taken by their parents as well as accounting and other rules and 
regulations of the parent home country. This may, to some extent limit the level of 
comparability of the data collected. However these companies, insofar as they operate 
within the UK and report to Companies House, are expected to meet UK generally 
accepted accounting principles. 
Exact matching of individual foreign companies with domestic companies proved 
difficult. Research judgments were used in order to balance the matching methods 
with the number of matched samples. More specifically, companies were matched 
based on a matching method of plus or minus 2.5% to 10% as explained in Chapter 6 
which is consistent with previous literature (Munday and Peel, 1997). 
The investigation of the performance of foreign-owned and domestic-owned 
companies was based solely on financial accounting figures, average profit level 
indicators for Sections 2 and 3 and tax paid for Section 4, as reported in the financial 
statements of sampled companies. Accounting figures alone may not capture all the 
economic value-based performance of a company within a certain period. Other 
models that measure differences in a company's value at the beginning and end of a 
period, for example, may perhaps provide a more accurate measure of performance. 
Profit level indicators, as obtained from the financial statement of the companies, 
however remain a globally recognized medium of communication in the business 
world, and are included in the ITP regulations. 
Although this research conducted five fruitful interviews, none of the interviewees 
represented any of the sample companies or the tax authorities due to the sensitivity of 
the subject, restricted access, and time constraints. As access is a major difficulty to 
this kind of fieldwork, future studies might consider interviews or case studies with 
tax agents and company finance directors to obtain in-depth evaluations of 
comparables and ITP profit methods. 
A final limitation is associated with researcher bias in interviews. This research 
recognized this possibility and attempted to address it in a number of ways. The 
interviews were conducted in the knowledge that the researcher was an independent 
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academic and the preliminary findings were used as guidelines with an explanation of 
the research question, research method and data samples provided to each 
interviewee. 
8.7 Future Research 
Transfer pricing represents a controversial area that cannot be dealt with in a single or 
few studies or by using one particular methodological approach. Further research and 
other approaches, possibly eliminating some of the limitations of this study, remains 
necessary. This research might influence the directions for future research for ITP in 
several directions in addition to paving the road for new research questions and 
methods. 
This research is one of the few studies that focus on certain groups' tendencies. Future 
studies should continue breaking samples down by country of ownership to observe if 
these different nationality traits exist with respect to ITP practices and performance. 
Future research might consider comparing matched samples of foreign-owned 
companies with other foreign-owned companies rather than their domestic 
counterparts which due to time and resource limitations was not tested by this 
research. 
Japanese-owned MNEs present a key area for future research due to their unique (in 
terms of profit and taxes) performance in the UK. In general, more in-depth 
investigation is required for the ITP policies of loss-making companies operating in 
the UK, which is currently an under researched area. 
Through the testing of ITP methods (TNMM and CPM) in Section 1, it was deduced 
that the wide profit ranges witnessed were mainly due to the lack of detail in the 
regulations. These general regulations allowed different adjustments on the part of 
consulting firms and companies (as mentioned by Interviewee 2-UK). Further studies 
might consider investigating the practices of different consulting groups in applying 
and developing comparable data sets. In addition, it might be worthwhile 
investigating whether consultants have a comparative advantage or do other factors 
outweigh the need for comparables. 
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This study also moves one step forward toward more tax-oriented research in the UK. 
Further studies are needed to investigate companies' strategies and FDI decisions. 
Because of the diversity of the transfer pricing topic, various aspects cannot be 
captured through one single work, thus it is recommended that future research is 
conducted to consider the use of different research methods such as case study, which 
might be useful to this type of study. Comparative case studies of matched set 
foreign-owned companies with domestic-owned companies would be essential to 
further assess their performance and comparability. Finally, it is essential for future 
studies to test the performance of matched foreign parent companies (headquarter) at 
their home country with the performance of UK parent companies to further explain 
whether differences in the performance are due to economical and environmental 
factors or perhaps cultural, national tendencies. 
8.8 Summary 
This research offers additional insight regarding the level of discretion that can be 
provided under different regulations and the extent to which ownership effect on 
profit and taxes can be detected. It is apparent that MNEs attempt to achieve more 
than one transfer pricing objective through their transfer pricing decisions. As the 
primary objective of most MNEs remains profit maximization as motioned in the 
earlier chapters, the use of particular acceptable methods by an MNE is appropriate. 
This study suggests several factors must be carefully considered when applying 
profit-based methods. Many of the same factors must be considered in applying any 
transfer pricing method. Application of TNMM and CPM requires resolution of a 
series of specific issues that may have a significant impact on the final result. TNMM 
and CPM are theoretically the same method of determining transfer prices. The 
differences between the two methods lie in the nuances of their application. While 
rejecting CPM, OECD guidelines include a similar method, TNMM, with the 
injunction that TNMM be used only as the last resort. The wide profit ranges and the 
freedom of selecting PLIs in developing comparables for both of these methods 
cannot be ignored. In general, both profit-based TNMM and CPM afford MNEs 
differing degrees of discretion in terms of compliance. 
The review of the application of CPM and TNMM highlights the fact that, in practice, 
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CPM and TNMM are either close cousins or identical methods. However, the official 
position in most of the countries covered more often reflects the view, based on the 
theory, that there is a difference. In particular, it is worth noting that the most 
common reason given for the suspicion with which CPM is often regarded is that a 
proper analysis is required of the functions and risks of the companies used as sources 
of comparable data and of the data they disclose. However, where CPM is applied in 
the manner in which, its proponents argue is intended, such an analysis is indeed 
performed. 
Where TNMM is accepted in preference to CPM this seems to be because the theory 
of TNMM focuses more on the underlying transactions. CPM is equated more to an 
industry average style of approach. The conclusion is that in practical application, 
neither of these two is really true. In practice, the truth might lie somewhere between 
the two. 
In the absence of reliable internal data on arm's length profitability, the application of 
TNMM usually relies on published financial statements of independent companies. 
Because this data is limited as to detail, rendering the desegregation of product lines 
and the making of adjustment all but impossible, the effect is that the practical ap- 
plication of TNMM looks very much like a CPM approach. 
TNMM and CPM are useful tools in a company tax policy, but neither is a substitute 
for transaction-based methods. CPM is not recognized by the regulatory bodies of 
some OECD member countries and remains questionable to researchers as it might be 
considered a departure from the arm's length principle (Eden, 1998). Findings 
suggest that the different applications of regulations are questionable in that widely 
different ranges might occur. 
The success of the UK's policy of subsidizing and encouraging foreign FDI as a 
means of promoting regional and national development revolves around the ability of 
these companies to create real spillover advantages for the UK manufacturing and 
wholesaling industries. This policy will be called into question if such investors are 
shown to be performing inadequately relative to the matched domestic competition. 
Low profitability on part of US-owned companies and low profitability, persistent 
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losses, lack of monitoring by local partners, and low taxes on the part of Japanese- 
owned companies provides evidence on how different nationalities have different 
tendencies and the likelihood that manipulation of income does indeed occur. 
Clearly, further research into the performance of foreign-owned companies and 
Japanese-owned companies in particular is needed in the light of the claims made for 
these MNEs in terms of profit and tax. 
Through the theoretical awareness and knowledge gained from this study, it is certain 
that the transfer pricing topic will remain one of the most challenging areas for future 
research. 
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Table: 3A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (ALL) 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin %- Negative Ranks 18a 9.50 171.00 
OECD Gap Profit Margin % Positive Ranks 0b 
. 00 . 00 Ties 0c 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales Negative Ranks 18d 9.50 171.00 
%- OECD Gap Profit Margin on Positive Ranks 0e 
. 00 . 00 sales % Ties Of 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Net Margin %- OECD Negative Ranks 189 9.50 171.00 
Gap Net Margin % Positive Ranks 0h . 00 . 00 Ties 0' 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %- OECD Negative Ranks 18, 9.50 171.00 
Gap Berry Ratio % Positive Ranks 0k 
. 00 . 00 Ties 01 
Total 
18 
Quartile Gap Return on Assets %- Negative Ranks 18M 9.50 171.00 
OECD Gap Return on Assets % Positive Ranks on . 00 . 00 Ties 00 
Total 18 
a. Quartile Gap Profit Margin %< OECD Gap Profit Margin % 
b. Quartile Gap Profit Margin %> OECD Gap Profit Margin % 
C. OECD Gap Profit Margin %= Quartile Gap Profit Margin % 
d. Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %< OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales % 
e. Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %> OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales % 
f. OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales %= Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales % 
g. Quartile Gap Net Margin %< OECD Gap Net Margin % 
h. Quartile Gap Net Margin %> OECD Gap Net Margin % 
I. OECD Gap Net Margin %= Quartile Gap Net Margin % 
I. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %< OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
k. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %> OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
I. OECD Gap Berry Ratio %= Quartile Gap Berry Ratio % 
M. Quartile Gap Return on Assets %< OECD Gap Return on Assets % 
n. Quartile Gap Return on Assets %> OECD Gap Return on Assets % 
0. OECD Gap Return on Assets %= Quartile Gap Return on Assets % 
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Table 3B 
Test Statistics' 
Quartile Gap Quartile Gap 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Return on 
Profit Margin on Sales %- Quartile Gap Quartile Gap Assets %- 
%- OECD OECD Gap Net Margin % Berry Ratio % OECD Gap 
Gap Profit Profit Margin - OECD Gap - OECD Gap Return on 
Marin % on sales % Net Margin % Berry Ratio % Assets % 
Z -3.7244 -3.724a -3.724a -3.724a -3.724a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Table 3C 
Sign tes t- Frequencies 
N 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Negative DifferenceJ3,1 18 
%- OECD Gap Profit Positive Differencesf"9" 0 
Margin % Tiesk, i, m, n, o 0 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Negative Differencesa" 18 
on Sales %- OECD Gap Positive Differencesf"9 0 
Profit Margin on sales % Tiesk"I, m"n"o 0 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Net Margin Negative Differences3 18 
%- OECD Gap Net Positive Differencess9 0 
Margin % Tiesk. I, m, n, o 0 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Berry Ratio Negative DifferencesP" 18 
%- OECD Gap Berry Positive Differencess"e" 0 
Ratio % Tiesk"t, m, n, o 0 
Total 
18 
Quartile Gap Return on Negative Differences. 18 
Assets %- OECD Gap Positive Differencesf"o 0 
Return on Assets % Tiesk"I, m, n"o 0 
Total 18 
a. Quartile Gap Profit Margin %< OECD Gap Profit Margin 
b. Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %< OECD Gap 
Profit Margin on sales % 
C. Quartile Gap Net Margin %< OECD Gap Net Margin % 
d. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %< OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
e. Quartile Gap Return on Assets %< OECD Gap Return 
on Assets % 
f" Quartile Gap Profit Margin %> OECD Gap Profit Margin 
oha 
9. Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %> OECD Gap 
Profit Margin on sales % 
h. Quartile Gap Net Margin %> OECD Gap Net Margin % 
I. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %> OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
J. Quartile Gap Return on Assets %> OECD Gap Return 
on Assets % 
k. OECD Gap Profit Margin %= Quartile Gap Profit Margin 
I. OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales %= Quartile Gap 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
m. OECD Gap Net Margin %= Quartile Gap Net Margin % 
n. OECD Gap Berry Ratio %_ Quartile Gap Berry Ratio % 
0. OECD Gap Return on Assets %= Quartile Gap Return 
on Assets % 
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'A 
Table 3D 
Test Statisticd' 
Quartile Gap Quartile Gap 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Return on 
Profit Margin on Sales %- Quartile Gap Quartile Gap Assets %- 
%- OECD OECD Gap Net Margin % Berry Ratio % OECD Gap 
Gap Profit Profit Margin - OECD Gap - OECD Gap Return on 
Margin % on sales % Net Margin % Berry Ratio % Assets % 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) . 000a AOOa . 
0008 
. 
000a 
. 
0008 
a. Binomial distribution used. 
b. Sign Test 
200 
Table 4A: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (Ex Losses) 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin %- OECD Gap Negative Ranks 18a 9.50 171.00 
Profit Margin % Positive Ranks 0b . 00 . 00 Ties oc 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %- Negative Ranks 18d 9.50 171.00 
OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales % Positive Ranks 0e 
. 00 . 00 Ties Or 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Net Margin %- OECD Gap Negative Ranks 189 9.50 171.00 
Net Margin % Positive Ranks oh . 00 . 00 Ties 01 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %- OECD Gap Negative Ranks 18J 9.50 171.00 
Berry Ratio % Positive Ranks Ok . 00 . 00 Ties of 
Total 
18 
Quartile Gap Return on Assets %- OECD Negative Ranks 18'" 9.50 171.00 
Gap Return on Assets % Positive Ranks on . 00 . 00 Ties 00 
Total 18 
a" Quartile Gap Profit Margin %< OECD Gap Profit Margin % 
b. Quartile Gap Profit Margin %> OECD Gap Profit Margin % 
C. OECD Gap Profit Margin %= Quartile Gap Profit Margin % 
d. Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %< OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales % 
e. Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %> OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales % 
f. OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales %= Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales % 
9" Quartile Gap Net Margin %< OECD Gap Net Margin % 
h. Quartile Gap Net Margin %> OECD Gap Net Margin % 
I. OECD Gap Net Margin %= Quartile Gap Net Margin % 
J. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %< OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
k. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %> OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
I. OECD Gap Berry Ratio %= Quartile Gap Berry Ratio % 
M. Quartile Gap Return on Assets %< OECD Gap Return on Assets % 
n" Quartile Gap Return on Assets %> OECD Gap Return on Assets % 
0. OECD Gap Return on Assets %= Quartile Gap Return on Assets % 
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Table: 4B 
Test Statistics' 
Quartile Gap Quartile Gap 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Return on 
Profit Margin on Sales %- Quartile Gap Quartile Gap Assets %- 
%- OECD OECD Gap Net Margin % Berry Ratio % OECD Gap 
Gap Profit Profit Margin - OECD Gap - OECD Gap Return on 
Margin % on sales % Net Margin % Berry Ratio % Assets % 
Z 3.724a -3.724a 3.724a -3.7243 -3.7243 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Table 4C 
Sign Test - Frequencies 
N 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Negative Difference. 18 
%- OECD Gap Profit Positive Differenced. 9. 0 
Margin % Tiesk, i, m, n, o 0 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Negative Difference. 18 
on Sales %- OECD Gap Positive Differenced. 9. 0 
Profit Margin on sales % Tiesk, i, m, n, o 0 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Net Margin Negative Differences 18 
%- OECD Gap Net Positive Differencesi. a, 0 
Margin % Tiesk, l, m, n, o 0 
Total 18 
Quartile Gap Berry Ratio Negative Difference! P" 18 
%- OECD Gap Berry Positive Differencest. 9 0 
Ratio % Tiesk, i, m, n, o 0 
Total 
18 
Quartile Gap Return on Negative Differences 18 
Assets %- OECD Gap Positive Differenced-9, 0 
Return on Assets % Tiesk"i, m, n, o 0 
Total 18 
a. Quartile Gap Profit Margin %< OECD Gap Profit Margin 
b. Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %< OECD Gap 
Profit Margin on sales % 
C. Quartile Gap Net Margin %< OECD Gap Net Margin % 
d. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %< OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
e. Quartile Gap Return on Assets %< OECD Gap Return 
on Assets % 
f. Quartile Gap Profit Margin %> OECD Gap Profit Margin 
9" Quartile Gap Profit Margin on Sales %> OECD Gap 
Profit Margin on sales % 
h. Quartile Gap Net Margin %> OECD Gap Net Margin % 
I. Quartile Gap Berry Ratio %> OECD Gap Berry Ratio % 
J. Quartile Gap Return on Assets %> OECD Gap Return 
on Assets % 
k. OECD Gap Profit Margin %= Quartile Gap Profit Margin 
I. OECD Gap Profit Margin on sales %= Quartile Gap 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
m. OECD Gap Net Margin %= Quartile Gap Net Margin % 
n" OECD Gap Berry Ratio %= Quartile Gap Berry Ratio % 
0. OECD Gap Return on Assets %= Quartile Gap Return 
on Assets % 
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Table 4D 
Test Statistics' 
Quartile Gap Quartile Gap 
Quartile Gap Profit Margin Return on 
Profit Margin on Sales %- Quartile Gap Quartile Gap Assets %- 
%- OECD OECD Gap Net Margin % Berry Ratio % OECD Gap 
Gap Profit Profit Margin - OECD Gap - OECD Gap Return on 
Marin % on sales % Net Margin % Berry Ratio % Assets % 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) . 000a . 000-'l . 
000a . 000a . 000a 
a. Binomial distribution used. 
b. Sign Test 
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Table 7A: Descriptives SIC 2416 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 51 -11.20 31.03 6.8012 6.7171 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
51 
. 
53 31.99 7.5961 5.7598 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
51 . 53 
47.04 8.6963 7.8515 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 47 6.27 3821.66 114.2579 552.7629 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 51 -14.87 31.95 10.9392 9 6526 avg) . 
Valid N (listwise) 47 
Table 7B: 
Correlations - 2416 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
3 rs av 3 rs av avg) %3 rs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
51 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 
. 738 991 Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
ý,! 51 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
-. 117 . 140 118 Correlation 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 774 563 522 ' 135 avg) Correlation . . 
" 
N t J 
l J , 
4/ 
from +1 at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
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Table 8A: Descriptives SIC 2466 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 42 -25.03 21.20 5.7798 7.7782 
Profit Margin on Sales % 42 . 
60 18.03 6.2898 4.5055 (3 yrs avg) 
Net Margin % (Operating 42 . 61 
21.99 7.0352 5.2760 Margin 3 yrs avg) 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 29 13.55 134.93 47.5766 29.8493 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 42 -19.26 99.20 12.3800 21.0301 avg) 
Valid N (listwise) 29 
Table 8B: 
Correlations - 2466 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
%3 rs av 3 rs av avg) %3 rs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
42 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 995 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
42 42 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
Correlation 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 498 . 085 083 - 177 avg) Correlation " 
, 
N t t. 
from +l at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
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Table 9A: Descriptives SIC 2524 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 44 -7.21 26.46 7.1407 7.1852 
Profit Margin on Sales % 44 . 34 
27.17 8.0952 1962 6 (3 yrs avg) . 
Net Margin % (Operating 
44 . 
34 37.31 9.3452 8.1779 Margin 3 yrs avg) 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 39 8.70 140.30 46.3828 31.6358 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 44 -4.43 35.37 9.8473 8.4543 avg) 
Valid N (listwise) 39 
Table 9B: 
Correlations - 2524 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs avg) avg) % (3yrs avg) 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
941 
N 
44 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 
. 930 . 995 Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
44 44 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 621 638 3 625 Correlation 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 86,1 772 738 
j 
600 
avg) Correlation . 
N 44 44 . sei 
from +l at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
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Table IOA: Descriptives SIC 2862 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 23 -2.54 18.82 6.0822 5.6062 
Profit Margin on Sales % 24 . 
09 89.04 9.0938 17 6904 (3 yrs avg) . 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
24 . 09 
812.28 39.8238 164.6289 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 16 11.82 136.43 49.5238 28.9490 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 24 -2.29 31.88 8.3179 8 0567 avg) . 
Valid N (listwise) 16 
Table 10B: 
Correlations - 2862 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
%3 rs av 3 yrs av avg) %3 rs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
814 
N 
23 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 
. 812 . 971 Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
23 24 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 014 Correlation 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 
. 
727 - . 084 . 079 
I 
380 
avg) Correlation 
N Zs 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.01 (One-tailed) 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.05 (One-tailed) 
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Table IIA: Descriptives SIC 2875 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 72 -12.10 27.92 7.3243 7.1826 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
72 
. 
50 42.02 7.8561 7.1156 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
72 . 51 
72.49 9.3214 10.6446 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 63 -. 61 164.57 36.7795 28.3746 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
72 -20.73 45.30 11.4275 10.6389 
Valid N (listwise) 63 
Table 11 B: 
Correlations-2875 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs av av %3 rs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
898 
N 
72 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 982 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
72 72 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
Correlation 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson fä28 398 249 128 
avg) Correlation 
N (jA 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.01 (One-tailed) 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.05 (One-tailed) 
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Table 12A: Descriptives SIC 3002 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 39 -6.80 21.77 6.5338 5.1250 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
39 . 14 31.85 8.9333 7.2191 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
39 . 14 46.74 10.5726 9.9448 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 29 6.93 333.11 63.3045 76.1055 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
39 -37.24 78.78 15.2000 17.8883 
Valid N (listwise) 29 
Table 12B: 
Correlations - 3002 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs avg) avg) % (3yrs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
39 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 994 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 39 39 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
Correlation 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 
. 771 . 367 . 317 053 avg) Correlation 1 
N t, 
' 
from +1 at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
216 
Table 13A: Descriptives SIC 3162 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 75 -4.89 43.56 10.2341 8.6479 
Profit Margin on Sales % 75 . 14 43.03 10.3759 8 2027 (3 yrs avg) . 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
75 . 15 
75.52 12.5855 12.2539 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 69 3.39 218.61 51.8013 40.6737 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 75 -29.18 65.20 14.1977 13 3160 avg) . 
Valid N (listwise) 69 
Table 13B: 
Correlations - 3162 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs av av % (3yrs avg) 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
934 
N 
75 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 
. 
938 
. 
977 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
75 75 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 373 410 394 Correlation 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 707 657 . 626 252 avg) Correlation 
N 
ificant from +1 at 
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Table 14A: Descriptives SIC 3210 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 51 -3.01 42.74 9.8575 11.0648 
Profit Margin on Sales % 51 . 
22 41.05 9.2580 9.4401 
(3 yrs avg) 
Net Margin % (Operating 51 . 
22 69.64 11.6563 14.4011 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 44 2.06 396.26 44.5155 59.3625 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 51 -13.44 51.72 12.8922 13.6206 avg) 
Valid N (listwise) 44 
Table 14B: 
Correlations - 3210 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs av avg) %3 rs avg) 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
877 
N 
51 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 874 989 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
51 51 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson o 
Correlation 
" 
N il "1 a t, 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 677 598 582 Qa3 
avg) Correlation 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.01 
Correlation sienif"icant from +1 at 0.05 
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Table 15A: Descriptives SIC 3220 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 31 -3.24 36.30 8.7406 8.8021 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
31 . 55 48.45 9.6823 10.4081 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
31 . 55 93.97 12.7303 18.4546 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 26 9.85 1145.05 94.1769 217.9906 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
31 -2.32 41.72 12.6606 10.9973 
Valid N (listwise) 26 
Table 15B: 
Correlations - 3220 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
%3 yrs av 3 rs av avg) %3 rs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
931 
N 
31 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 852 977 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
N 
31 31 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
, 329 259 1 Correlation 92 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 749 559 406 218 
avg) Correlation , 
N ,S1 .5131 "0 
Correlation significant frone +1 
Correlation significant fron +1 
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Table 16A: Descriptives SIC 3230 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 15 -1.47 14.41 3.9400 4.8637 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
15 . 
33 11.98 4.5747 3.9089 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
15 . 33 13.61 4.9647 4.4417 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 15 4.06 139.21 52.3127 42.0358 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 15 -3.63 27.97 7.4807 7374 8 avg) . 
Valid N (listwise) 15 
Table 16B: 
Correlations - 3230 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
%3 yrs av 3 yrs av avg) %3 rs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 948 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
15 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 949 999 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
15 15 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 435 , qß1 502 Correlation I 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 929 918 
. 917 523 avg) Correlation 
N 15 15 15 
from +1 at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
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Table 17A: Descriptives 3320 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 58 -1.09 43.79 9.7034 8.8866 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
58 . 
03 32.52 8.9193 6.8117 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
58 . 
03 48.20 10.4876 9.5214 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 51 14.04 317.15 62.1065 45.3165 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 58 -268.16 71.37 9.4309 39 8545 avg) . 
Valid N (listwise) 51 
Table 17B: 
Correlations - 3320 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs avg) avg) % (3yrs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
58 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 992 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
58 58 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 353 545 572 Correlation I 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 380 359 35S 171 Correlation avg) 
N 
from +1 at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
221 
Table 18A: Descriptives SIC 3410 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 24 -5.60 7.99 2.4733 3.2620 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
24 . 33 7.60 3.5617 2.1369 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
24 . 33 8.23 3.8400 2.2743 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 22 5.00 69.66 25.2123 17.0459 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
24 -2.09 22.49 6.1779 5.9636 
Valid N (listwise) 22 
Table 18B: 
Correlations - 3410 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs avg) avg) % (3yrs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
24 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
989 
N 
24 24 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
Correlation 
N 22 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 
. 
800 
I 
99 616 
I 
251 
avg) Correlation 
N 24 
from +1 at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
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Table 19A: Descriptives SIC 5142 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 38 -3.03 17.20 5.8418 5.0782 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
38 . 40 16.33 6.1976 4.5323 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
38 . 40 19.52 6.8566 5.3093 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 28 10.50 111.93 55.5546 31.4424 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
38 -2.99 48.70 12.7868 12.1726 
Valid N (listwise) 28 
Table 19B: 
Correlations - 5142 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
%3 yrs av 3 yrs av avg) %3 rs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
g25 
N 
38 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 928 999 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
38 38 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 45Q 551 Correlation 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 776 712 708 X59 
avg) Correlation 
N su s Ad ,i 
from +1 at 0.01 
from +1 at 0.05 
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Table 20A: Descriptives SIC 5143 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 70 -1.18 41.01 5.4424 6.2940 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
70 . 
21 36.42 5.3651 5.6243 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
70 . 
21 57.27 6.2327 8.0684 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 63 3.75 146.82 35.6167 28.4537 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
70 -2.25 38.78 11.0453 8.7716 
Valid N (listwise) 63 
Table 20B: 
Correlations - 5143 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs avg) avg) % (3yrs avg) 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 988 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
70 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 981 986 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation 
N 
70 70 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 710 696 705 Correlation , 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 819 817 764 432 
avg) Correlation 
N /u /0 /u t,, 5 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.01 (One-tailed) 
Correlation sienificant from +1 at 0.05 (One-tailed) 
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Table 21A: Descriptives SIC 5146 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 45 . 13 26.67 6.9711 6.3133 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
45 . 13 26.72 6.9693 6.0672 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
45 . 13 36.47 7.9824 7.7519 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 41 3.25 137.17 31.9159 32.3259 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
45 
. 50 56.34 13.6760 11.6517 
Valid N (listwise) 41 
Table 21B: 
Correlations - 5146 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs avg) avg) % (3yrs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
985 
N 
45 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 981 996 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
N 
45 45 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 698 
J 
689 
I 
673 Correlation 
4 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 811 , 775 780 . 446 avg) Correlation 
N 4ýj . lam 4:, 41 
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Table 22A: Descriptives SIC 5155 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 32 -2.53 28.46 3.6609 5.4160 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
32 . 19 33.11 4.1606 5.8170 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
32 . 19 49.49 4.9772 8.6053 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 28 5.20 135.25 27.6404 27.5266 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
32 -6.96 41.98 7.4081 8.6441 
Valid N (listwise) 28 
Table 22B: 
Correlations - 5155 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs a (3 yrs a avg) %3 rsav 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
969 
N 
32 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 
. 
944 990 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
N 
32 32 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
Correlation 
N 28 28 28 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 960 . 903 . 861 089 Correlation avg) . 
N 32 32 32 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.01 (One-tailed) 
Correlation significant from +1 at 0.05 (One-tailed) 
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Table 23A: Descriptives SIC 5164 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 27 . 36 25.98 7.7426 8.4766 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
27 
. 
42 26.60 7.0337 7.7587 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
27 . 
43 36.24 8.3893 10.0626 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 26 11.29 911.33 96.0862 193.8382 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
27 -. 27 90.69 16.3919 19.3356 
Valid N (listwise) 26 
Table 23B: 
Correlations - 5164 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs avg) (3 yrs avg) avg) % (3yrs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
969 
N 
27 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 962 997 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
N 
27 27 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 553 508 499 Correlation 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 391 383 
I 
b 266 
avg) Correlation 
N 21 1i 21 1o 
ificant from +1 at 0.01 
ificant from +1 at 0.05 
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Table 24A: Descriptives SIC 5165 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Profit Margin % (3 yrs avg) 21 . 
89 51.01 13.1862 12.7487 
Profit Margin on Sales % 
(3 yrs avg) 
21 2.00 49.92 11.6410 11.3478 
Net Margin % (Operating 
Margin 3 yrs avg) 
21 2.04 99.67 16.1405 22.1468 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) 20 14.94 86.52 46.6910 20.9199 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs 
avg) 
21 1.02 75.90 18.2767 15.8154 
Valid N (listwise) 20 
Table 24B: 
Correlations - 5165 
Net Margin % 
Profit Margin (Operating 
Profit Margin on Sales % Margin 3 yrs Berry Ratio 
% (3 yrs av (3 yrs; avg) avg) % (3yrs av 
Profit Margin on Sales % Pearson 
(3 yrs avg) Correlation 
784 
N 
21 
Net Margin % (Operating Pearson 
Margin 3 yrs avg) Correlation . 
796 
. 
984 
N 
21 21 
Berry Ratio % (3yrs avg) Pearson 
. 086 
( 
. 538 
I 
4 5 Correlation . 8 
N 
Return on Assets % (3 yrs Pearson 
. 
859 
. 
836 
. 
860 178 
avg) Correlation 
N 21 21 21 1() 
from +1 at 0.01_(One-taile(l) 
from +1 at 0.05 (One-tailed) 
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Table 45: Japanese Companies (Manufacturing Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax paid 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1096248.596 1 1096248.6 . 479 . 490 
Within Groups 426058284.1 186 2290635.9 
Total 427154532.7 187 
Means Plots 
1 000 
'Cl 900 cv 
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0 
c co 
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700 
Before 98 Tax Reform After 98 Tax Reform 
Time 
265 
Table 46: US Companies (Manufacturing Industries) 
ANOVA 
tax Paid 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 66911658.817 1 66911658.8 1.174 
. 279 
Within Groups 45952763063 806 57013353.7 
Total 46019674722 807 
Means Plots 
a 
x 
w 0 
C 
N 
a) 
Before 98 Tax Reform After 98 Tax reform 
Time 
266 
Table 47: UK Companies (Manufacturing Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax Paid 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 34777531.120 1 34777531.1 1.219 
. 270 
Within Groups 28361625535 994 28532822.5 
Total 28396403066 995 
Means Plots 
Co 
d 
x 
co H 
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c m 
a) 
Before 98 Tax Reform After 98 Tax Reform 
Time 
267 
Table 48: Japanese Companies (Wholesale Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax Paid 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 304182.738 1 304182.74 . 234 . 629 
Within Groups 210333566 162 1298355.3 
Total 210637749 163 
Means Plots 
cu 
a- 
x 
cu H 
0 
c Co Co 
2 
Before 98 Tax Teform After 98 Tax Reform 
Time 
268 
Table 49: US Companies (Wholesale Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax Paid 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1974275.703 1 1974275.703 . 195 . 
659 
Within Groups 3213874980 318 10106525.1 
Total 3215849256 319 
Means Plots 
13- 
x 
m H 
9- 0 
c 
ca a) 
ý1 
Before 98 Tax Reform After 98 Tax Reform 
Time 
269 
Table 50: UK Companies (Wholesale Industries) 
ANOVA 
Tax Paid 
Mean 
Sum of Squares df Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6153105.752 1 6153105.75 
. 209 . 648 
Within Groups 14178856624.6 482 29416715.0 
Total 6153105.752 483 
Means Plots 
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